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When facilitating decisions in which some performance evaluations are uncertain, a de-
cision must be taken about how this uncertainty is to be modelled. This involves, in
part, choosing an uncertainty format – a way of representing the possible outcomes that
may occur. It seems reasonable to suggest – and is an aim of the thesis to show – that
the choice of how uncertain quantities are represented will exert some influence over the
decision-making process and the final decision taken.
Many models exist for multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) under conditions of un-
certainty; perhaps the most well-known are those based on multi-attribute utility theory
[MAUT, e.g. 147], which uses probability distributions to represent uncertainty. The great
strength of MAUT is its axiomatic foundation, but even in its simplest form its practi-
cal implementation is formidable, and although there are several practical applications of
MAUT reported in the literature [e.g. 39, 270] the number is small relative to its theo-
retical standing. Practical applications often use simpler decision models to aid decision
making under uncertainty, based on uncertainty formats that ‘simplify’ the full probability
distributions (e.g. using expected values, variances, quantiles, etc). The aim of this thesis
is to identify decision models associated with these ‘simplified’ uncertainty formats and to
evaluate the potential usefulness of these models as decision aids for problems involving
uncertainty. It is hoped that doing so provides some guidance to practitioners about the
types of models that may be used for uncertain decision making.
The performance of simplified models is evaluated using three distinct methodological
approaches – computer simulation, ‘laboratory’ choice experiments, and real-world appli-
cations of decision analysis – in the hope of providing an integrated assessment. Chapter
3 generates a number of hypothetical decision problems by simulation, and within each
problem simulates the hypothetical application of MAUT and various simplified decision
models. The findings allow one to assess how the simplification of MAUT models might
impact results, but do not provide any general conclusions because they are based on
hypothetical decision problems and cannot evaluate practical issues like ease-of-use or the
ability to generate insight that are critical to good decision aid. Chapter 4 addresses
some of these limitations by reporting an experimental study consisting of choice tasks
presented to numerate but unfacilitated participants. Tasks involved subjects selecting
one from a set of five alternatives with uncertain attribute evaluations, with the format
used to represent uncertainty and the number of objectives for the choice varied as part
of the experimental design. The study is limited by the focus on descriptive rather than











practice in that natural tendencies are identified which may need to be overcome in the
course of a prescriptive analysis.
Chapter 5 complements the experimental studies by reporting three real-world applica-
tions using simplified decision models. The first application involves the construction of
a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of intervention programs aimed at reducing
household electricity consumption, and uses quantiles to represent uncertainty. The sec-
ond constructs a risk-value framework for depicting different slot machine varieties on the
floor of a large casino in the Western Cape, and uses probabilities of poor performance.
In the third application, a group of market researchers must evaluate how one “client”
alternative performs in relation to its competitors on the basis of multi-attribute evalu-
ations collected in a survey; expected values are used to represent uncertain evaluations.
The applications are useful in addressing more practical issues around the use of simplified
models.
The most important findings drawn collectively from the three methodological approaches
are:
1. The use of any of the simplified uncertainty formats considered in this thesis rather
than probability distributions can be justified.
2. A model using quantiles is the most promising of the simplified models and should
be used as a ‘default’ option in the absence of other information.
3. A model using variances is the least promising of the simplified models and should
not be used unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
4. Scenarios result in relatively poor approximations of MAUT and are primarily de-
vices for helping decision makers to gain a better understanding of the causes of
uncertainty and their consequences.
5. Placing elements of simplified uncertainty formats (scenarios, quantiles, variances
and other explicit risk attributes) in the second level of the objectives hierarchy can
offer a useful uncertainty-orientated view of a decision problem.
6. Deviations from linearity in marginal utility functions increase the attractiveness of
MAUT relative to all of the simplified models.
7. Increases in the size of a decision problem (number of alternatives and attributes)
increase the attractiveness of all of the simplified models relative to MAUT.
8. Errors in the assessment of inputs to all simplified models cause substantial deteri-
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This thesis is based on three uncontroversial statements about decision making. First, in
comparing alternative courses of action it is often useful to value their performances on a
number of different attributes rather than attempt an overall valuation directly. Second,
in nearly all cases there will be no one alternative that performs best on all attributes.
It is partly for this reason that overall valuations are difficult to make directly. The
comparison of different alternatives requires that the trade-offs between performance on
different attributes be addressed and themselves subjected to some kind of valuation. It
also requires that these (now weighted) evaluations be aggregated in some way to arrive
at a final decision. Third, in many cases the evaluation of alternatives will be complicated
by their performance on at least some attributes not being known with certainty. It is
the treatment of cases in which all three of these statements are true – decisions involving
multiple conflicting objectives and attribute evaluations that are in some way uncertain –
that form the subject of the thesis.
1.2 Statement of the problem
When facilitating decisions in which performance evaluations are uncertain, a decision
must be taken about how this uncertainty is to be modelled. This involves, in part, choos-
ing an uncertainty format – a way of representing the possible outcomes that may occur.
At one extreme level of detail, one may write out all the outcomes that are possible for a
given alternative and associate a probability with each possible outcome. At the opposite
extreme, one may use a single (probably location) measure such as the mean, median, or
mode. Between these extremes lie a host of possible compromises: measures of spread such
as the variance or range; sets of quantiles; probabilities of achieving specified performance
levels; and piecewise approximations of the full probability distributions, to name a few.
A related step in modelling decisions with uncertain outcomes involves choosing a model











choice of an uncertainty format, which may suggest or even impose a particular preference
model (and vice versa). Throughout this thesis, any uncertainty format summarising the
full probability distribution is referred to as a ‘simplified uncertainty format’, and any de-
cision model using a simplified uncertainty format is termed a ‘simplified decision model’.
It seems reasonable to suggest – and is an aim of the thesis to show – that the choice
of how uncertain quantities are represented will exert some influence over the decision-
making process and the final decision taken. Decision makers may assess some uncertainty
formats more accurately than others, which may give decision models based on some pieces
of information an advantage over others that are poorly assessed. Even if correctly as-
sessed most uncertainty formats summarise the full range of possible outcomes, which may
bias decisions in favour of those alternatives that perform relatively better on whatever
summary measures happen to be used. Certain aspects of decision making (e.g. making
trade-offs between performances on different objectives, or between risk and return on a
single objective; or eliminating dominated alternatives) may also be easier with (or more
strongly suggested by) some uncertainty formats than others.
Of the many models that exist for multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) under con-
ditions of uncertainty, perhaps the most well-known are those based on multi-attribute
utility theory [MAUT, e.g. 147]. The great strength of MAUT is its axiomatic foundation
“justifying the prescriptive approach provided the problem owners accept the related ra-
tionality assumptions” [116], but even in its simplest form the practical implementation of
MAUT is formidable, requiring the assessment of full probability distributions over each
attribute as well as trade-offs involving single- and multi-attribute lotteries. Although
there are several practical applications of MAUT reported in the literature [e.g. 39, 270],
this number is small relative to its theoretical standing. The view taken here is that
practitioners often prefer to use simpler decision models to aid decision making under
uncertainty. The aim of this thesis is to identify a number of such ‘simplified’ decision
models that are currently in use and to evaluate the potential usefulness of these models
as decision aids for problems involving uncertainty – that is, to establish the costs, if any,
involved with the use of simplified uncertainty formats in decision analysis. In doing so I
hope to provide some guidance to practitioners about the types of simplified models that
are being used for uncertain decision making.
1.3 Methodology
Addressing the aim above requires that one specify the kinds of ‘costs’ which may arise as
a result of using a simplified model and then establish theoretical or empirical results eval-











model are defined in the course of the thesis, but can be broadly characterised as measures
of either “substantive” or “procedural” quality (in the usual terminology, substantive or
procedural “rationality” [233]). A model or modelling process that is of a high substantive
quality leads to a good outcome or course of action; a model or modelling process that
is of a high procedural quality possesses certain properties that are assumed a priori to
be desirable. Although procedural quality can give the appearance of being “amorphous,
plastic, and somewhat arbitrary” [247], there is considerable agreement within the field of
decision analysis about what properties good decision aid should possess. These include
helping the decision maker to learn about or clarify the problem which faces them, as
well as their own preferences; using concepts that are familiar to the decision maker, or
can be clearly and unambiguously understood with reasonable effort; not requiring an
inordinate amount of interaction time; yielding transparent and justifiable results; and
challenging existing points of view and encouraging the exploration of potential courses of
action [223, 117].
Evaluations of substantive and procedural quality require quite different methodological
approaches. Evaluations of substantive quality have a long history of using computer sim-
ulation (e.g. [20, 243]), largely because doing so using real-world MCDA applications is
difficult or impossible. This is because, prior to the decision process, preferences are not
fully formed and merely awaiting elicitation. Rather these are at least partly formed by
the process itself – the “constructivist” view of decision aid [31]. Identifying whether a se-
lected alternative is ‘objectively’ good is thus difficult even for a single decision problem.
Comparing different approaches would require that the same decision maker be facili-
tated through the independent construction of multiple simplified models, which seems
impossible to achieve practically. In contrast the controlled but artificial environment of
a simulation allows one to specify preferential information exactly and to vary certain
aspects of the decision process independently of the others.
Evaluating procedural quality requires some form of human participation; simulation ex-
periments cannot evaluate practical issues like a decision model’s ease-of-use or ability to
generate insight into a problem. Real-world applications in the mode of “action research”
[197] can be used. These provide clear results around practical issues but for MCDA –
because of “constructivism” – any comparisons between different approaches can only be
drawn qualitatively (though this can still be useful). The generality of any finding is also
difficult to establish because the time and effort involved in a single application means that
conclusions are usually based on only a small number of applications, and many elements
within each application cannot be controlled for experimentally.











ologies above is to design simplified versions of a decision problem and present these to
study participants in an experimental setting. This offers the researcher some degree of
control while retaining the aspect of human decision making that makes real-world ap-
plication so attractive. Although this might be a somewhat unconventional approach to
research in MCDA, similar strategies have been regularly applied to the study of human
decision making (e.g. [204, 142, 214, 233]). By designing the decision task carefully it is
possible to obtain some indication of substantive quality by which to compare simulation
results with human decision making. Elements of procedural quality can also be assessed
by participants, although these will need to take into account the simplifications made
to the real-world problem. By simplifying the decision problem it becomes possible to
show each decision maker multiple problems, which allows for comparisons of different
approaches within the same decision maker. In this thesis I refer to such experiments as
“choice experiments”.
The approach followed in this thesis is to evaluate the performance of simplified models
using each of these methodologies: computer simulation, choice experiments, and real-
world applications. By integrating the results of all analyses I hope to provide a unified
evaluation of the performance of simplified models for decision making under uncertainty.
1.4 Objectives
The broad aim of the thesis is to examine the way in which uncertain attribute evaluations
are treated by models for multi-criteria decision analysis and in particular to provide an
evaluation of the usefulness of models which in some way summarise the full distribution
of possible outcomes. A more specific set of objectives is:
1. To describe currently available treatments of uncertainty in decision making and to
place these into a coherent framework.
2. To use the controlled environment of a simulation experiment,
(a) to identify whether, and under what conditions, the simplified models are able
to give a good approximation to the results that would be obtained in idealised
conditions using MAUT.
(b) to assess the robustness of the simplified models to various environmental con-
ditions.
3. To use an experimental setting involving a set of hypothetical decision tasks per-
formed by human subjects
(a) to gain some idea of how unskilled decision makers go about making multi-











(b) to investigate how the form in which uncertain outcomes are presented affects
the quality and process of decision making,
(c) to investigate decision makers’ preferences for different uncertainty formats.
4. To apply a small number of the simplified decision models to real-world decision
problems in which uncertainty is a substantial component, and to evaluate their
effectiveness.
5. To construct a set of guidelines for modelling uncertain attribute evaluations in
multi-criteria decisions.
1.5 Limitations
• The thesis considers only the type of uncertainty that relates to the physical ran-
domness of future events, where the consequences of a particular choice are unknown
because they depend in some way on future events. This is sometimes referred to as
“external uncertainty” [246]. Many other types of uncertainty have been proposed –
some examples are uncertainty about values and trade-off assessments, uncertainty
about whether all criteria have been included, and uncertainty about the aim of the
decision problem. These other uncertainties cannot be ignored entirely – they may
be present in both the choice experiments of Chapter 4 and the real-world appli-
cations of Chapter 5 – but an integrated treatment of all types of uncertainties in
multi-criteria modelling is beyond the scope of the thesis.
• With the exception of the literature review the thesis considers only value function
methods. Other schools of MCDA (e.g. outranking, reference point methods) are
excluded in the interest of keeping results concise. The axiomatic foundation of the
value function approaches also make it easier to hypothesise an “idealised” decision
process – other MCDA approaches would probably need to choose one particular
variant or model as ‘ideal’ but could otherwise proceed along similar lines to those
described in Chapters 3 and 4.
• The simulation and choice experiments conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 are based
on the assumption that the aim of the analysis is to place the alternatives in a
(not necessarily complete) rank order, that is the ranking “problematique” [222] is
assumed in these chapters.
1.6 Plan of development











Chapter 2 contains the literature review. Two broad streams of literature are reviewed.
The first covers the assessment of different uncertainty formats, and is drawn from
the behavioural sciences – predominantly the psychology of measurement and per-
ception. The second covers decision models employing different uncertainty for-
mats: models using probabilities or probability-like quantities, quantiles, variances
or variance-like quantities, fuzzy sets, and scenarios.
Chapter 3 describes a simulation experiment used to analyse the performance of five
simplified approaches for representing uncertainty in the context of multi-attribute
utility/value theory: variances, probabilities of achieving some specified level of per-
formance, quantiles, three-point approximations to the distributions (fuzzy sets),
and scenarios. Performance is analysed for a variety of environmental conditions
and decision maker characteristics. A number of implications for the remainder of
the thesis are identified.
Chapter 4 describes a second experiment investigating the effects of uncertainty formats
on decision making. In contrast to the previous chapter, which uses a simulation
environment, the focus of this chapter is on actual decision making behaviour, in
the form of a choice experiment administered to 28 study participants. The same
six uncertainty formats are used, and effects on decision making are tracked using
four outcomes – the quality of the final choice, the characteristics of the alternative
that is selected, the difficulty experienced in making a decision, and the process by
which a decision was made. The results build on the simulation results by providing
insights into how human decision makers make single- and multi-criteria choices in
the presence of uncertainty (and some format for representing uncertainty) but in
the absence of any facilitation.
Chapter 5 describes three real-world applications involving decision analysis with sim-
plified uncertainty formats. The first application involves the construction of a
framework for evaluating the effectiveness of intervention programs aimed at re-
ducing household electricity consumption, undertaken for an energy research group.
The objective in this case was to provide a comparative evaluation of intervention
projects. The second application constructs a risk-value framework for depicting
different slot machine varieties and was undertaken for a large casino in the West-
ern Cape. The main objective of this analysis is to describe the slot machines in a
systematic and formalised way, allowing the casino to determine the types of players
(in terms of attitudes towards playing) that they are catering for with their portfolio
of machines. The third application provides decision support to a group of market
researchers about how one “client” alternative performs in relation to its competitors











Chapter 6 collects together the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters and states
these as a number of findings and related recommendations for the practical support
of decisions involving uncertain attribute evaluations. A final section concludes with












Literature review: uncertainty in
decision analysis
At an intuitive level, uncertainty is easily recognised as a distinct lack of something – the
absence of complete knowledge or certainty. However, just as there are many different kinds
of knowledge, there are also many different types of uncertainty. The type of uncertainty
considered in this thesis arises when the consequences of an action are unknown because
they depend on future events. This is sometimes termed “external uncertainty” (e.g.
[246]) because it relates to uncertainty about environmental conditions lying beyond the
control of the decision maker. External uncertainty corresponds to uncertainty arising
from physical randomness in French’s taxonomy of uncertainty [101], and to the inherent
lack of information about the uncertain future in Zimmerman’s taxonomy [304]. In the
remainder of the thesis I refer to external uncertainty simply as ‘uncertainty’.
2.1 Methods for eliciting assessments of uncertainty
2.1.1 Uncertainty formats
Probabilities
Consider a decision problem consisting of I alternatives denoted by ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
evaluated on J attributes denoted by cj , j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Let Zij be a random variable
denoting the (stochastic) attribute evaluation of ai on cj , with an associated probability
distribution governing its possible outcomes. A multivariate probability distribution gov-
erns the joint realisation of performance outcomes across all alternatives and all attributes.
Independence conditions would dictate whether the full joint distribution could be con-
structed from the marginals or whether it would in principle have to be evaluated directly.
This is ‘in principle’ because in all likelihood directly assessing the joint distribution would













A large body of empirical research suggests that when making decisions people do not
weigh probabilities linearly. That is, they transform probabilities of occurrence into what
are known as “decision weights” [139, 290], and use these. This raises the question of
how people transform probabilities. Research on this question is ongoing but many im-
portant results have been obtained, suggesting for example that people underweight large
probabilities and overweight small probabilities, and also overweight low-ranked outcomes
relative to higher-ranked outcomes. These findings as well as the general use of decision
weights are reviewed as part of Section 2.3.
Explicit risk measures
Explicit risk measures are generally attempts to summarise the full probability distribution
using a single (or small number of) measures indicating how uncertain the performance
of an alternative on a particular attribute is. The fundamental notion is that underlying
uncertain attributes can be expressed in terms of both ‘value’ and ‘risk’ components.
‘Value’ components are typically based on expected values or some other central location
measure. Specific risk measures are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4, but some
common examples include the variance or standard deviation, inter-quartile or max-min
ranges, specified quantiles of the distributions, the probability of obtaining a performance
below some specified value, and coefficients of relative or absolute risk reduction.
Fuzzy sets
Fuzzy set theory is a general theory for the modelling of imprecision. The fundamental
notion in fuzzy set theory is that imprecision manifests itself as an arbitrariness in estab-
lishing precise boundaries for a set of interest. This allows the membership of an element
x to a set A to be considered a matter of degree by allowing a membership function µA(x)
to take on any value between 0 and 1, which are respectively equivalent to the classical
concept of set exclusion and inclusion.
Scenarios
Scenarios are incomplete descriptions of how the future might unfold, with emphasis placed
on the development of an internally-consistent chain of causal reasoning that allows the
decision maker to gain understanding of the problem at hand and generate unusual insights
into possible courses of action. The use of scenarios is more qualitative than any of the
other measures discussed here, and form part of the ‘contextualised’ approaches (e.g. [136])
focusing on providing people with an informational context – in terms of descriptions of
antecedents and consequences – in which to understand and interpret their risk. Although











of the world’ i.e. single realisations of the full multivariate distribution defined over all
possible outcomes, it is often useful to think of them as representing groups of states that
share similar important characteristics. The construction and use of scenarios in decision
analysis is reviewed in Section 2.6.
2.1.2 Assessment and framing effects
The decision problem under conditions of uncertainty requires that the decision maker ex-
press his or her individual judgement about the uncertain quantities: which outcomes are
possible, which outcomes are more likely than others, and so on. The processes whereby
these expressions are obtained are referred to as ‘assessment’ or ‘elicitation’ procedures.
Spetzler and Staël Von Holstein [238] define elicitation as “the process of extracting and
quantifying individual judgement about uncertain quantities”, while Garthwaite et al.
[102] take the more explicitly constructivist view that it is “the process of formulating
a person’s knowledge and beliefs about one or more uncertain quantities into a (joint)
probability distribution”. Although this second definition reflects the overwhelming focus
on probability elicitation, one could substitute any of the other forms of uncertainty rep-
resentation. The other noteworthy feature is the implicit reference in both definitions to
the role played by a facilitator or analyst who helps with the ‘extracting’ or ‘formulating’.
Probabilities and decision weights
Methods for eliciting probabilities – for example probability wheels, direct assessments, or
other graphical aids – are well-established, and reviews can be found in [238] and chap-
ter 10 of [265]. These elicitation methods aim to help the decision maker make “good”
assessments, where this is usually interpreted (e.g. [102]) as assessments that are (a) inter-
nally consistent or coherent i.e. obeying certain logical conditions, in particular the laws
of probability, (b) externally consistent or well-calibrated i.e. against any available data,
and (c) self-consistent or reliable i.e. the assessments should be stable over repeated tests.
At around the same time that the elicitation methods came to prominence in decision anal-
ysis, a growing body of evidence suggested that peoples’ assessments of probabilities often
fell foul of all three of these requirements. Assessments were subject to systematic biases
which, given certain conditions, could lead to substantial errors in judgements: internal-,
external-, and self-inconsistency. This body of research is equally well-established and
documented, and reviews can be found in [257, 138, 104, 105]. The “heuristics and biases”
model proposes that people make use of three basic heuristics when assessing probabilities:
1. Anchoring and adjustment refers to the tendency to fix a probability (or other)
judgment at an initial estimate, the “anchor”, and then adjust it. Research suggests











the size of the adjustment away from the anchor is in many instances insufficient.
Biases arising from the anchoring and adjustment heuristic include systematic over-
or under-estimation and a tendency to assess conjunctive events as more likely than
(equally probable) disjunctive ones.
2. Availability is the tendency to assess the frequency or probability of an event by how
easy it is to recall instances of the event. Ease of recall is related to actual frequency,
but is also related to several non-probabilistic factors such as the vividness or salience
of the event, or how recently it occured. These factors mean that the availability
heuristic can give rise to biases such as the miscalibration of probabilities and the
detection of illusory correlations.
3. Representativeness is the tendency to judge the probability of an event belonging to
a class by the extent to which it is similar to or “representative of” that class. The
classic demonstration of representativeness is the “Linda” effect in which a person
(Linda) is usually adjudged to have a relatively high probability of being a librarian
on the basis of a description that is “representative” of a stereotypical librarian [257].
Biases arising from the representativeness heuristic include ignoring or discounting
base rate information and sample sizes, miscontruing chance events and sequences of
random events, the conjunction fallacy, and failing to detect regression to the mean.
Although there is much empirical evidence in support of the heuristics and biases school
(see the reviews listed above), there has also been strong criticism and contradictory evi-
dence directed predominantly at the message that human judgement is inherently flawed.
These rebuttals have received less attention than the original claims, but are well sum-
marised in reviews in [134] and [157]. From the perspective of prescriptive decision aid,
the most salient objections are that poor assessments are often found using experimental
setups employing word problems that are strongly influenced by linguistic cues, and that
these cues are often intentionally arranged to mislead or cause confusion for the subject.
Simple changes to the structure of the problem can often greatly reduce the proportion
of errors – for example, by using frequencies rather than probabilities [121], using nega-
tive framings [249], explicitly providing base rates [152], or making nested probabilistic
structures explicit [235]. Johnson [134] cites evidence that “in favorable environments in-
dividuals can make excellent subjective probability judgments”. Favourable environments
are those aided by expertise [135, 236], training and relevant feedback [180, 36], motiva-
tion [26, 13], a naturalistic rather than experimental setting [209, 134], and prediction
tasks rather than memory retrieval tasks [286]. All of these are either common features of
decision problems (e.g. naturalistic settings, prediction tasks) or would generally be con-
sidered good problem structuring practice (e.g. feedback, training, inclusion of relevant











Shanteau [232] also lists characteristics of the kinds of tasks in which expert assessments
tend to be good or bad. Many of the chacteristics inducing good performance would
be considered standard practice in prescriptive decision aid: decomposing the problem,
having decision aids available, repetitive assessment so that consistency checks can be
carried out, the incorporation of objective information where possible, and the provision
of feedback. Evidence also suggests that assessments improve when decision problems are
realistic and relevant to the decision maker [36]. Other aspects – the uniqueness of a task
and a lack of inherent predictability – can lead to poor performance but simply reflect
the complexity of typical multi-criteria applications. A fair summary seems to be that
careful framing – how a question is asked as well as what is asked for – is a critical aspect
of elicitation of any uncertain quantity, and that the mainstream heuristics and biases
literature provides ample evidence of the types of errors that can be made if due care is
not taken. However, the literature also indicates that prescriptive decision analysis may
be relatively well-off; there is much evidence suggesting that good probability assessments
can be obtained under the sorts of conditions which constitute current best practice.
An important question is to what extent these findings, which are almost all obtained
from studies using assessments of probability, carry over to the other uncertainty for-
mats discussed in this thesis. The different uncertainty formats described in Section 2.1.1
have attracted differing levels of attention from researchers, all dwarfed by the focus on
probability, although there are some clear and valuable findings.
Explicit risk attributes
Research on the assessment of explicit risk measures has focused on quantiles and ranges
obtained from quantiles, and variances. Many of the findings relating to probability distri-
butions apply to the assessment of quantiles as well. Experiments have found that people
can often estimate quantiles reasonably well [102], although there is a clear tendency for
people to overestimate their ability to predict an uncertain quantity so that their inter-
quantile intervals tend to be too narrow [257, 174]. There is substantial uncertainty about
which quantiles people are most accurate at assessing. Bisection methods can be used to
obtain medians and upper and lower quartiles, with good results reported in [217] and
[202]; other studies find that overconfidence is reduced if the 33% and 67% quantiles are
used [103]. There is more agreement on the relative difficulty of accurately assessing the
tails of the distribution [8], casting some doubt on the appropriateness of using extreme
quantiles. As before, practice, training and feedback can all assist to improve the accuracy
of assessments [102].
Variance, on the other hand, is a concept that people find difficult to interpret and to











dicate substantial assessment errors. An early study demonstrated that assessments of
the variance are often influenced by the mean [123], although even when the effect of the
mean is removed assessments are poor [166, 27]. Variances, however, may be approximated
from the quantiles using the results in [144, 82]. Means on the other hand can usually
be assessed with a high degree of accuracy [28, 237], although if the distribution is highly
skewed the estimate can be biased towards the median [216].
Fuzzy sets
The assessment of fuzzy sets has received far less attention than it deserves given the
subtlety of the ‘membership’ concept and the potential for multiple meanings. The lack
of assessment procedures is a regular criticism of fuzzy decision aid (e.g. [100, 31]) which
is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5, but here three points are worth making. Firstly,
in the case of external uncertainty it is not uncommon for fuzzy sets to be treated in a
very similar way to probability distributions: some authors advocate taking the possibility
distribution i.e. the membership function, and standardising it so that the area under the
function becomes one and it becomes a “probability” distribution (e.g. [127]). It might
be expected that many of the heuristics and other findings that apply to probabilities
to also apply to possibilities. Certainly, since fuzzy membership denotes a degree of set
membership, representativeness can be expected to play a role.
Secondly, many applications of fuzzy decision aid (e.g. [167, 96]) take the approach of
defining triangular fuzzy numbers between two extreme points (e.g. the maximum, min-
imum, or some extreme quantiles) and one intermediate point (e.g. mode or median).
Thus the same points noted for quantile assessment apply to these fuzzy numbers too. In
particular, one might expect fuzzy numbers to have smaller supports than they ‘should’
i.e. to underestimate uncertainty. Other objections to the generic use of interval numbers
(uniform distributions) and triangular distributions have been made in [207] and [102] –
essentially claiming that these representations are in most cases overly simplistic.
Finally, fuzzy sets are often applied as a linguistic approach in which verbal assessments
(e.g. “quite likely”, “fairly good”) are converted into fuzzy sets. Research into the verbal
use of likelihood statements suggests that while people are more comfortable expressing
their uncertainty verbally than numerically, the same phrase can be associated with very
different probability ranges for different people, and these ranges can be strongly affected
by contextual factors [175, 271, 199]. These findings all suggest that verbal assessments
would need to be preceded by careful modelling of the meaning of the linguistic terms for












The assessment issues that arise when scenarios are used to represent uncertainty are
somewhat more complicated because there are two types of assessments that must be
performed. Firstly, there is the qualitative assessment of the scenarios themselves; then,
the generally quantitative construction of alternatives within each scenario must also be
assessed.
Most scenario planning texts deal explicitly with the question of scenario construction
(e.g. [260, 230]), so that techniquess for the development of scenarios are well-established.
The traditional conditions for ‘good’ assessments are that scenarios should provide an
internally consistent chain of cause-and-effect reasoning as well as offering novel insights
into the decision problem (e.g. [260]). Clearly, these qualitative criteria make it far more
difficult to judge consistency in the assessment of scenarios than for probabilities or other
risk measures. Most studies into scenario assessment have dealt mainly with the issues of
what constitutes good assessment [119] or why the current consistency criteria are sensible
[288, 63]. The basic argument is provided in [288], which develops a theoretical model of
the strategic process in which threatening and stressful circumstances – if unchecked –
lead to ‘coping behaviour’ such as bolstering of the status quo and procrastination. This
has a net result of entrenching a culture of conservatism and uncritical adherence. In this
view, good scenario planning interventions overcome this tendency by providing challeng-
ing viewpoints and encouraging alternative views of what may happen. By implication,
poorly assessed scenarios do not do these things, and rather become co-opted into the
coping behaviour described above. Empirical support for this model has been reported in
a review of an actual failed application of scenario planning [122].
There is thus some evidence to suggest the kinds of problems that can arise in actual
scenario construction, although it seems that more research, and particularly more quan-
titative research, is needed in this area. Another matter is how the assessments within
each scenario should be made, and what kinds of heuristics and biases may affect these
assessments. To the best of my knowlege, there has been no research directly focusing
on this area – something that can be attributed to the lack of formal decision analysis in
strategic applications of scenario planning – but for the integration of scenario planning
and decision analysis these seem critical. The few texts dealing with the assessment of in-
formation within scenarios typically use conventional elicitation approaches either within
each scenario (i.e. under the conditions specified by that scenario) or simultaneously over
all scenarios [109, 197]. This leaves open the key question of whether the nature of the
underlying scenarios might bias evaluations in some way. For example, evidence suggests











their own performance, and also rate pessimistic scenarios as less likely to occur [203].
These differences might conceivably result in assessments in favourable scenarios being
more reliable than those in unfavourable scenarios, or bias relative trade-offs between
performance levels in different scenarios. Currently though, it is simply not known how
and even which qualitative characteristics of scenarios, if any, influence the quantitative
assessment of performance within scenarios.
2.2 Decision analysis with probability distributions
Modelling uncertainty about the consequences of actions using probabilities and probabil-
ity theory represents what might be called the “classical” approach in decision analysis.
This section presents three ways in which probability distributions have been employed in
decision analysis: axiomatised multi-attribute utility theory, pairwise comparison meth-
ods, and methods using Monte Carlo simulation to draw from the distributions.
2.2.1 Multi-attribute utility theory
The multi-attribute version of utility theory is founded on the single-attribute case, so
that it is useful to begin with the latter. The aim is to roduce a utility function U satis-
fying the ‘expected utility hypothesis’: that an alternative a will be preferred to another
alternative b if and only if the expected utility of a is greater than the expected utility
of b. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [264] proved that such a function exists provided
that a small number of superficially reasonable axioms are satisfied: completeness, tran-
sitivity, consistency, continuity, and independence. These axioms became the foundation
of subjective expected utility theory. Within a relatively short space of time a number of
systematic violations of these axioms, particularly independence, were reported (e.g. the
famous paradoxes of Alläıs [7] and Ellsberg [94]). It is now a well-established fact that
subjective expected utility does not adequately describe peoples’ choices, in the sense that
a substantial proportion of people violate one or more of the axioms at least some of the
time.
Violations of the axioms of expected utility elicit a number of responses which can be
grouped into three broad categories. The first is that the axiomatic violations are ‘not
that bad’, even in a descriptive sense: that the majority of decision makers are at least in
tentative agreement with the axiom of independence [101] and that at least some apparent
violations of expected utility theory can be classified as decision making with error rather
than axiomatic violation [48]. The second is a pragmatic prescriptive response: that it
is undoubtedly true that expected utility is descriptively invalid, and that violations are
frequent and systematic, but that the theory retains a prescriptive value because it allows











and easy to explain and understand even to non-technical users (see chapter 4 of [31] for
a defense of this argument). The final response is to seek to extend the expected utility
model so that the resulting model is able to accommodate behaviour violating the axioms
of expected utility. This has generated a large amount of interest and research for the case
of a single attribute, although extensions for multi-criteria decision aid have only appeared
more recently. These developments are the subject of Section 2.3.
In moving from one to several attributes, the aim of (now multi-attribute) utility theory
remains to produce a function such that an alternative is preferred to another if and only if
its expected utility is greater, but the presence of multiple attributes means that expecta-
tions must now be taken with respect to multivariate probability distributions. Practically,
this requires (a) the construction of a marginal utility function uj for each attribute cj , and
(b) some way of aggregating the marginal utility functions into a global utility function
U satisfying the expected utility hypothesis. The existence of each individual marginal
utility function depends on the satisfaction of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for
each attribute. Suitably simple aggregation of the marginal utility functions requires that
further assumptions hold – Keeney and Raiffa’s famous results showing that additive in-
dependence, mutual utility independence, and attribute-wise (but not full mutual) utility
independence imply an additive, multiplicative, or multi-linear utility function respectively
[146].
Some simplifications to the MAUT model have been proposed. Stewart [242] has shown
that the effect of using an additive aggregation when preferences actually follow a multi-
plicative model is small over a range of problem settings. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards
(in chapter 10 of [265]) indicate that there may be little difference in using marginal
value functions instead of utility functions, which frees the decision maker from specifying
preferences between lotteries. Some supporting evidence for this claim has recently been
provided by Abdellaoui et al. [4] in the context of non-expected utility.
2.2.2 Pairwise comparisons of probability distributions
In some instances a pairwise comparison of probability distributions is sufficient to confirm
that one alternative is preferred to another (in the sense of the expected utility hypothesis),
provided that certain constraints on the underlying marginal utility function are satisfied.
Three ‘stochastic dominance’ relations [114, 284] are defined as:
Faj >1 Fbj ⇐⇒ H1(x) = Faj(x)− Fbj(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [0,∞) (2.1)
Faj >2 Fbj ⇐⇒ H2(x) =
∫ x
0
H1(y)dy ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [0,∞) (2.2)
Faj >3 Fbj ⇐⇒ H3(x) =
∫ x
0











where Faj is the cumulative distribution function associated with Zaj and the relation
>i refers to first-, second-, and third-degree stochastic dominance for i = (1, 2, 3) respec-
tively. By assuming different classes of utility functions it is possible to express preferences
consistent with the expected utility hypothesis in terms of stochastic dominance relations
[25]. First-degree stochastic dominance implies that expected utility theory holds for all
increasing utility functions; second-degree dominance implies it holds for all concave, in-
creasing functions; and third-degree dominance implies it holds for all decreasingly risk
averse, concave, increasing functions. Similar conditions have been provided for convex
utility functions [110, 299]. When moving into a multicriteria framework, Huang et al.
[126] have shown that a necessary condition for multiattribute stochastic dominance is
stochastic dominance on each individual criterion, although the conflicting nature of mul-
ticriteria problems means that this is perhaps unlikely to occur often.
Pairwise comparisons of probability distributions have also been incorporated into a num-
ber of stochastic outranking methods. Jacquet-Lagrèze [130] removes the intersection of
the two probability mass functions as evidence in support of indifference, and then uses the
the cumulative distributions to allocate the remaining probability mass as evidence either
that alternative a is preferred to b, or vice versa. Aggregation proceeds as for Electre I.
A second set of models [78, 187, 188] compares distributions by constructing a matrix Pj
whose entries P jab denote the probability that alternative a is superior to alternative b on
criterion cj i.e. Pr[Zaj ≥ Zbj ]. The models differ with respect to the subsequent exploita-
tion of the probabilities. Dendrou et al. [78] simply aggregate the P jab using a weighted
sum over criteria to arrive at a global index for each pairwise comparison Pab. Martel et
al. [187, 188] incorporate more sophisticated outranking concepts such as indifference and
preference thresholds, and subsequent aggregation and exploitation proceeds in a similar
fashion to Electre III. In all of these models the distributional aspect of the problem
is fully absorbed into the problem at an early stage of the process through the definition
of the P jab. In contrast, d’Avignon and Vincke [73] use the uncertain attribute evalua-
tions to form a stochastic (or ‘distributive’) outranking degree indicating the probability
of attaining various degrees of outranking, rather than summarising the stochastic evalu-
ations directly as P jab. A fourth group of models [301, 300, 188, 14, 205] uses stochastic
dominance relations. Zaras and Martel [301, 300] use a simple weighted aggregation of
indicator variables cj(a, b) which equal 1 if a stochastically dominates b on criterion cj
and are otherwise zero. This results in a concordance index as for Electre I. Martel et
al. [188] and Azondékon and Martel. [14] use a more nuanced approach by defining the
local preference index cj(a, b) as a product of three functions each scaled between 0 and 1
that cause cj(a, b) to decrease as dominance conditions weaken from first- to third-order











2.2.3 Models simulating from probability distributions
If evaluations can be specified using probability distributions, one option is to use Monte
Carlo simulation to generate values from the distributions and to use these simulated
values as inputs to a decision model. This approach has been particularly popular in
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Early research into the modelling of probabilities
in the AHP was largely concerned with deriving relationships between the distributional
form of the uncertain pairwise judgements and the distributions of the marginal evalu-
ations contained in the ‘priority vector’ i.e. the eigenvector corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue [262, 22, 23]. Subsequent probabilistic AHP models [170, 171, 24, 18] have
focused on using Monte Carlo simulation to randomly generate pairwise evaluations from
the distributions specified by decision makers. These approaches all follow the same basic
approach. The decision maker expresses pairwise comparisons in the usual way i.e. using
the same 1–9 scale as for deterministic AHP, except that these comparisons are allowed
to be random variables with associated probability distributions. No restriction is placed
on the types of distributions that are appropriate. Next, sets of random pairwise judge-
ments are generated using Monte Carlo simulation. For each set of randomly generated
evaluation matrices, the priority vector is computed. Repeating this process many times
gives a distribution of priorities for each alternative. These simulated distributions can be
used to rank the alternatives; in most cases using the mean of the distribution.
Most authors make small embellishments around this general process. Levary and Wan
[170, 171] incorporate scenarios into their model. Decision makers thus assess different
(possibly stochastic) judgemental matrices for each scenario. Their simulation approach
first generates a random number to specify which scenario is being used, and then generates
further random numbers specifying the pairwise judgements within each scenario. Basak
[24] uses a Bayesian approach to integrate expert judgements with the decision maker’s
prior probabilistic assessments. Pairwise judgements are simulated by drawing from the
posterior distributions. Bañuelas and Antony [18] use the basic simulation approach but
add a more substantial post hoc sensivity analysis phase to investigate the most important
sources and effects of the uncertainty.
The other area of MCDA in which Monte Carlo simulation from probability distributions
has been popular is in the family of stochastic multicriteria acceptability analysis (SMAA)
methods. The SMAA methods are essentially inverse-preference methods that are useful
in situations where it is difficult or impossible for a decision maker to explicitly give pref-
erence information, for example in highly antagonistic political situations. In these cases,
information is provided about the types of preferences that would lead to the selection of











from distributions defined over the values of possible attribute evaluations and preference
parameters. The models thus incorporate both internal uncertainty (about preferences)
and external uncertainty (about attribute evaluations). The extent to which decision
makers may express their preferences can be located anywhere along a continuum from
no assessment at all [125] to complete assessment of preferences as for regular prescriptive
decision aid [141, 251]. The two key outputs of a SMAA analysis are the acceptability
index, which is the relative proportion of all simulations in which each alternative attains
a particular rank (most importantly, the top rank), and the central preference vector,
which summarises the types of preferences that lead to a particular alternative being the
preferred one. Most often this is computed using the center of gravity of the hypervolume
containing all the preferences supporting the selection of an alternative. Further details
are provided as part of the applications in Chapter 5.
The original SMAA method in [159] analysed the combinations of attribute weights that
result in each of a set of prospective alternatives being selected when using an additive
utility function. Subsequently, the SMAA methodology has been extended to several other
prescriptive models of choice: to outranking in [250], to goal programming and reference
point methods in [161] and [87], to data envelopment analysis in [163], to prospect theory
in [164]; and to ordinal and mixed ordinal-cardinal evaluations in [165, 160]. Although it
appears not to have been directly applied to the AHP, it is clear that such an application
would result in a model very similar to those discussed above. Practical examples of the
application of SMAA in a prescriptive context are given in [141] and [251], while two recent
studies have also applied SMAA in a descriptive setting [88, 89]. Further technical details
about implementing SMAA can be found in [252].
2.3 Decision analysis with decision weights
Whether or not simplications to multi-attribute utility theory lead to worse prescriptive
decisions, the results obtained by Alläıs [7], Ellsberg [94] and later many others indicate
that expected utility theory does not accurately represent actual i.e. descriptive, choices.
This has led others to develop models of choice that are able to capture the elements
of choice under uncertainty that expected utility cannot. While these are predominantly
descriptive theories, their influence has extended into normative and prescriptive modelling
in the search for models that are “more responsive to the complexities and limitations of
the human mind” [256].
2.3.1 Empirical evidence
Although early empirical evidence such as the ‘paradoxes’ of Alläıs and Ellsberg was aimed











not made, there is now a fairly good idea of what properties a decision model should
possess if it is to be descriptively valid. Starmer [239] presents a comprehensive review of
results obtained from a large number of experimental studies using probability triangles,1
from which he draws three “stylised facts”. The first is that although linear parallel in-
difference curves (as predicted by expected utility theory) are inappropriate, so too are
generalised fanning-out (relative to an origin outside the triangle) indifference curves. Fan-
ning out implies that decision makers become more risk averse as their prospects improve
but empirical evidence suggests that they in fact become less risk averse (e.g. [67, 45]).
Descriptive decision models require a mixture of fanning-out and fanning-in.
Secondly, indifference curves should not be required to be linear. Linearity imposes the
requirement that a mixture of two gambles cannot be preferred to either of those gambles,
and that a decision maker should be indifferent between any mixture of two gambles that
are equally valued. These requirements constitute a weak form of the independence axiom
called ‘betweenness’. Empirical evidence suggests that decision makers are often unwilling
to randomise equally-valued gambles [47], implying quasi-convex rather than linear indif-
ference curves.
A third empirical observation is that violations of expected utility theory tend to be
more pronounced when certain or near-certain prospects are involved i.e. on or near the
boundaries of the probability triangle. This does not imply that expected utility theory
is conformed to in the interior of the triangle (see [289] for violations of that sort), just
that behaviour is less conforming on the boundaries (e.g. [71, 46]). The fact that decision
makers weigh extreme probabilities not just by their probability of occurance – and are
more sensitive to changes in the probability of an outcome with an extreme probability
– suggests the use of a non-linear function to weigh the probabilities according to their
importance to the decision maker.
Some further empirical observations have been added by the work of Kahneman and Tver-
sky (e.g. [139, 258]), most of which have been incorporated into their prospect theories,
which are discussed in the next subsection. These can be summarised as (a) the pres-
ence of a reference point relative to which outcomes are evaluated as gains or losses, (b)
loss aversion, the tendency for losses to “loom larger than corresponding gains” [258],
(c) diminishing marginal sensitivity to both gains and loss, and (d) non-linear weighting
of probabilities, in particular one which underweights large probabilities and overweights
1Probability triangles are graphical representations of gambles (or lotteries) defined over three outcomes
x1, x2, x3 with x1 < x2 < x3, so that any gamble can be represented on the triangle using the probabilities
of each outcome occuring, (p1, 1− p1 − p3, p3). Lines of indifference can be drawn on the triangle between
gambles a decision maker is indifferent between, and it is the pattern of these indifference curves that are
a major focus of empirical research – because different decision model make different predictions about the











small probabilities. The first three of these observations suggest utility functions that are
convex for losses and concave for gains, and are steeper in the domain of losses; the last
observation suggests an inverted s-shape form for the probability weighting function.
Empirical observations are useful because they allow entire classes of models to be eval-
uated as appropriate or otherwise. As discussed in the next section, the observations
above leave relatively few descriptively-sound candidates. Normatively and prescriptively,
of course, one must evaluate whether the observations indicate traits that one would wish
to include for good decision making. This is done as part of Section 2.3.3; before that I
review the non-expected utility theory models.
2.3.2 Descriptive theories of choice under uncertainty
The earliest violations of expected utility theory (e.g. Alläıs’ paradox [7]) can be explained
with models possessing indifference curves that fan outwards. Models of this type include
those using (a) weighted utility theory [64], which replaces the independence axiom with
a weaker independence requirement which constrains indifference curves to be linear but
not necessarily parallel, and (b) the theory of disappointment [30], which has not been
axiomatised but values prospects using expected utility as well as an additional expected
‘disappointment’ or ‘elation’ caused by an outcome being respectively worse or better than
prior expectations.
Empirical evidence suggests that indifference curves fan both inwards and outwards (in
the same probability triangle). This type of behaviour can be accommodated by assuming
betweenness rather than independence, an approach followed by implicit expected utility
theory [77] and implicit weighted utility theory [65]. Betweenness still implies linear indif-
ference curves though (the converse is also true), which is contrary to empirical evidence
suggesting a regular aversion to randomisation of equally-valued lotteries. Thus between-
ness must be relaxed as well. This has been done in models using quadratic utility theory
[66], which replaces betweenness with the weaker requirement of mixture symmetry2, and
the even less restrictive gamble dependent utility theory [29], which assumes only ordering,
continuity and monotonicity and thus makes nearly no predictions of behaviour at all.
Other non-expected utility theories assign subjective ‘decision weights’ to the probabilities
of different consequences, rather than assigning weights to the consequences themselves (as
the models discussed above do). These models usually do not satisfy betweenness because
the sum of the decision weights of complementary events may be sub- or super-additive
depending on the form of the weighting function. In a descriptive setting, this is a distinct
2Mixture symmetry holds if, for two equally-valued lotteries x and y, the decision maker is indifferent
between the mixture lottery with probability p of obtaining x and 1 − p of obtaining y and one with











advantage since it allows for non-linear indifference curves, as empirical evidence suggests
is necessary. The so-called simple decision weighted utility models – in which decision
weights take the place of probabilities in the traditional expected utility formulation –
have the undesirable consequence that the resulting preference function is non-monotonic
and dominated options may be selected. This problem is avoided by rank-dependent ex-
pected utility [218, 240], which assigns decision weights based on both the probability of
an outcome as well as its rank relative to others in magnitude, and cumulative prospect
theory (without an editing phase) [258], which uses a utility function employing reference
points, loss aversion, and diminishing marginal sensitivity, and an inverted s-shaped func-
tion to transform cumulative probabilities into decision weights.
Regret theory [183] evaluates prospects relative to the possible consequences of other
choices rather than to a fixed reference point. The utility of an outcome is measured by
a function that increases in the value of the outcome and decreases in the value of out-
comes on other options. When prospects are statistically independent from one another,
regret theory is a general case of the weighted utility theory discussed earlier, in which
the axiom of transitivity has been relaxed. It therefore predicts specific types of cyclical
or non-transitive choices. Some of these predictions are supported by empirical evidence
[181, 182], but other studies have found empirical non-transitive choices that cannot be
accommodated by regret theory [241].
2.3.3 Developments in prescriptive multi-criteria decision aid
Traditionally debate about the prescriptive usefulness of non-expected utility theories has
tended towards philosophical argument about the normative status of the various viola-
tions of expected utility (see [9] for a review as well as a defence of the normative validity of
many of the violations). As pointed out in [268] however, a motivation for non-expected
utility theories can be found without entering this debate. A key part of the practical
implementation of utility theory is the elicitation of utilities from the decision maker.
A common assumption of many elicitation techniques (e.g. the certainty-equivalent and
probability-equivalent methods) is that utilities can be inferred from information provided
by the decision maker using the tools of expected utility theory. Bleichrodt et al. [34] call
this the “classical elicitation assumption”, and make the important points that (a) this is
a descriptive assumption, dealing with observed behaviour, and is thus independent of the
‘normative’ debate; (b) imposing the assumption on a decision maker who does not follow
expected utility theory can lead to biased assessments of utility. Some inconsistencies
may be resolved though discussions between the decision maker and analyst – this is the
approach advocated as ideal in [34] – but there well may be others that are resistant to











faulty inputs to later modelling phases – whatever form this modelling may take.
The practical problems involving the prescriptive use of expected utility theory have led to
some exciting developments in the integration of prescriptive decision aid and non-expected
utility. These can be divided into three broad areas. The first is the development of alter-
native assessment techniques that can be used to construct utility functions without using
expected utility foundations i.e. that can construct non-expected utility functions. The
second is the empirical question of how much the classical elicitation assumption biases
the assessment of utilities, and the consequential effect on decisions. The third is the
development of procedures for the decomposition of multi-attribute non-expected utility
functions, similar to those formulated by Keeney and Raiffa [146] for multi-attribute (ex-
pected) utility theory.
Significant advances have been made in all three of these areas. Wakker and Deneffe
[268] propose a utility assessment method that does not depend on the actual probabil-
ity values, and is thus robust to the kinds of probability transformations that decision
makers often use. Their gamble-tradeoff method uses two reference outcomes R and r
(with R > r) and elicits the value X that makes a decision maker indifferent between the
gambles3 (X, p; r) and (x, p;R) for some x, and the value Y for which (Y, p; r) ∼ (y, p;R)
for some y. It can be shown that this pair of indifferences can be rewritten in the form
u(X)− u(x) = u(Y )− u(y) and thus that a standard sequence of indifference assessments
will yield a utility function without needing to know the value of the probability p. Wakker
and Deneffe suggest that events without known probability can be used in place of p e.g.
“surgery will succeed” [268]. All that matters is that the decision maker uses p consis-
tently throughout. Extensions by Abdellaoui [3] and Bleichrodt and Pinto [33] allow for
the assessment of both the non-expected utility function and the probability weighting
function. Both methods employ the utilities obtained with the gamble-tradeoff method
to elicit decision weights using a set of further indifference questions. Bleichrodt et al.
[34] develop standard correction procedures for the certainty and probability equivalence
methods for cases in which time or other resource constraints prevent interactive discus-
sions between decision maker and analyst, using median probability weighting functions
obtained from Kahneman and Tverky’s work on cumulative prospect theory [258]. More
recently, further extensions have been proposed in [5] that allow the full assessment4 of
the prospect theory utility function i.e. one that is defined over the whole domain of losses
and gains.
3Notationally I write a gamble returning an outcome X with probability p and an outcome r with
probability 1− p as (X, p; r).
4Previous methods, like [268], assessed the prospect theory utility function separately for gains and
losses, because under prospect theory the probability transformation function may be different in the loss
and gain domains. Abdellaoui et al. [5] use a series of three indifference questions to link the utility on











All of the above-mentioned papers contribute empirical results in addition to their practical
developments. Utility functions obtained using assessment procedures that are sensitive to
probability weighting exhibit more risk aversion for gains [268, 5] and more risk proneness
for losses [5] than utility functions obtained with the gamble-tradeoff method. Wakker and
Deneffe [268] interpret this as a result of certainty effects. The corrective procedures in
[34] make fairly large adjustments to both certainty and probability equivalence methods,
particularly at high probabilities and particularly for the probability equivalence method.
The greater sensitivity of the probability equivalence method – also reported in [268] –
is ascribed to response-mode effects in which the use of a probability scale in the former
method draws attention to that aspect of the problem [268]. Most evidence supports the
form of the probability weighting function proposed by prospect theory: an inverted s-
shape for the probability weighting function [3, 33], and different weighting functions for
losses and gains [3]. Linearity at intermediate probabilities (implying closer correspon-
dence with expected utility theory) is supported in one study [33] but refuted in another
[3]. The only model able to elicit full prospect theory utility functions [5] finds utility
functions that agree with the theory (convex for losses and concave for gains) for just
over half of the subjects taking part. Perhaps the most intriguing results from a practical
perspective are found by Abdellaoui et al. in [4]. They compare a number of methods
for assessing utility functions and find that (a) there are no inconsistencies between as-
sessment methods once probabilities have been transformed according to prospect theory,
and (b) there is no difference between the value functions elicited using riskless strength-
of-preference information and the utility functions elicited using more complex choices
between lotteries. The latter finding in particular seems important for practical decision
aid.
Multi-attribute applications require some way of decomposing the multi-attribute prefer-
ence function into its simpler marginal constituents. In expected utility theory, Keeney
and Raiffa [146] were able to use various independence conditions to provide a number
of different decompositions – in particular the multi-linear, multiplicative, and additive
representations. Miyamoto and Wakker [194] show that many of the same decomposition
results obtained under expected utility theory are also valid under non-expected utility.
The decomposition procedures use the same definition of utility independence used by
Keeney and Raiffa, except that the condition is defined over the set of all rank-ordered
gambles5 includes rather than all gambles. Utility independence of each attribute and full
mutual utility independence are necessary and sufficient to infer multilinear and multi-
plicative aggregations respectively, as in expected utility theory, but the conditions for an
5Gambles whose outcomes have been ranked in descending order of preference i.e. a two-outcome gamble












additive represention are somewhat different. This is because marginality – the condition
that preferences between gambles depends only on the marginal distributions – imposes
linearity in the probabilities and has thus been shown to imply an expected utility model
[92]. Independence results have been used to provide multi-attribute representations for
(among others) rank-dependent expected utility and prospect theory in [194], and cumula-
tive prospect theory in [298] and [32]. These developments in non-expected utility suggest
that multi-attribute modelling using non-expected utility foundations would not look a
great deal different from that done using expected utility.
2.4 Decision analysis with explicit risk attributes
Given the aim of taking external uncertainty about outcomes on an attribute into account,
one possible approach is to use some measure of this uncertainty as an attribute in its own
right. This approach provides a single (or small number of) risk measures indicating how
variable or ‘risky’ performance is. The fundamental notion is that uncertain evaluations
can be expressed in terms of ‘value’ and ‘risk’ components. Multi-attribute risk-value

















where Vij and R
(k)
ij are measures of the ‘value’ and ‘risk’ of Zij respectively, wj is a ‘swing
weight’ reflecting the relative importance of a one-unit change in attribute cj , and wR
(k)
ij
is a weight for R(k)ij , termed a ‘risk weight’ and also interpreted as a swing weight. Note
that in this general formulation the risk weights may depend on alternatives as well as
attributes. The number of risk measures used is denoted by K but usually there will only
be a single measure and the superscript k will be dropped. The measurement of value is
relatively uncontroversial and the use of expected values for this purpose i.e. Vij = E[Zij ],
is widely accepted [228]. There is far less agreement on an appropriate measurement of
uncertainty, and there remain several conflicting notions about how uncertainty should be
defined and modelled [98].
2.4.1 The measurement of risk
One way of approaching the problem of risk measurement is to attempt to describe what
people mean when they say that an event is ‘risky’. Weber and Bottom [282] provide a
review of empirical research on how the attributes of gambles influence risk and conclude
that: risk increases with an increase in range, variance or expected loss of a gamble; risk
decreases if a constant positive amount is added to all outcomes of a gamble; risk increases
if all outcomes are multiplied by a constant positive number greater than one; and risk











be interpreted carefully for the purpose of any normative or prescriptive modelling. Risk
attitudes and in particular judgements involving probabilities are, as discussed in Section
2.1.2, notoriously prone to biases that can lead to what in many circumstances would be
considered poor decisions.
Sarin and Weber [228] and Jia and Dyer [133] consider links between measures of risk and
preference models in the context of (single-attribute) lotteries. Variance can be used as
a risk measure if the decision maker has a quadratic utility function or where the utility
function is increasing and concave and the random variables representing lotteries are nor-
mally or log-normally distributed. A linear combination of variance and skewness can be
used as a risk measure if the utility function is a third-order polynomial, while another risk
measure, bE[ec(X−X̄)], is appropriate for a utility function of the form U(x) = ax− b e−cx.
For any multi-criteria modelling, two issues are of special importance. As Stewart points
out in [246], it seems doubtful that decision makers would be able to give meaningful
answers to trade-off questions based on anything more complex that the variance or stan-
dard deviation. In the multi-criteria problem it would be very difficult to use different risk
measures for different attributes (where the underlying marginal utility functions are of
different functional forms). It is doubtful that this additional complexity would add any
insight for the decision maker, and the scope for confusion seems considerable.
An alternate approach is to consider risk as the probability of ‘something bad happening’
– more formally, of some target not being met. This has intuitively appealing associations
with everyday usage of the term ‘risk’, and evaluating alternatives by the chance of a
resulting catastrophe has a well-established history in risk analysis (e.g. [97]). In a multi-
criteria context, Stewart [245] found that decision makers were able to think clearly about
risk in terms of the probabilities of fishing stocks lasting certain periods of time before
collapsing. Other researchers have also proposed the probability of loss as a measure of
risk [98], as well as a non-linear combination of the probability of losses and gains [185].
However the use of a single fixed target means that there is no guaranteed existence of
an equivalent utility function formulation for these probability-based risk measures [49].
In order for such an equivalence to exist, the target must be probabilistic. Castagnoli
and Li Calzi [49] show that an alternative formulation of the expected utility model is to
assume a decision maker who has only two different utility levels depending on whether
an uncertain target is met or not. The ‘target oriented’ decision maker assesses probabil-
ities p(x) that the target is achieved given an attribute performance of x, rather than a













Stewart [245] applies both variances and probabilities of poor performance to a fish-stock
management problem. That study (a) showed that the probability of poor performance
– collapse of a fish population over various time horizons – can provide a representation
of uncertainty that decision makers find useful to work with, (b) argued that the variance
may sometimes be a misleading risk measure (when the utility function took the form of a
power function and lotteries were non-normal) but in other circumstances may be perfectly
adequate (when an exponential utility function was used, even where lotteries were non-
normal), and (c) suggested that “the use of two well-chosen cumulative probabilities may
be useful” (again with mixed results depending on the form of the underlying utility
function).
Bordley and Kirkwood [38] extend the single-attribute results in [49] to show that for each
multi-linear (or multiplicative or additive) utility function, there is an equivalent multi-
linear (or multiplicative or additive) target-oriented formulation. Some basic assessment
procedures are provided, and it appears that weight elicitation could technically proceed
using the usual SMART procedure (e.g. [265]), although it remains an open question
whether decision makers would find such information easy or useful to consider.
Further detail on the use of variances is provided by Kirkwood [150]. He shows that




j (E[Zij ]) can lead to close
approximations of expected utility under the important conditions that the Zij be normally
distributed or numerous enough for the central limit theorem to apply, and the underlying
utility functions uj “do not deviate too much from linear”. Results from another simulation
study ([91]; also presented as part of Chapter 3 of this thesis) found poor approximation
accuracy under strongly non-linear preferences, and that in such situations a model using
only expected values i.e. using wRij = 0, performed better. Further examples of the use of
explicit risk attributes in multi-attribute analysis can be found in the goal programming
methods, both of the variance-based [83, 15, 16] and probability-based [206, 149, 75]
variety. Both the variance-based and probability-based goal programming models can be
shown to be special cases of the target-oriented preference model [38]. Hallerbach and
Spronk [115] use variances to measure risk in their ‘multiple factor approach’ to portfolio
selection.
2.4.3 Models using quantiles
In practical decision analysis it is common to represent probability distributions using a
small number of (usually three to five) quantiles [102], this being the basis for well-known











[144] have also shown that the single-attribute expected utility of an alternative can be
closely appoximated by assessing utilities at each of the 5%, 50%, and 95% quantiles of
performance and forming a weighted sum in which the median receives a weight of 0.63
and the 5% and 95% quantiles each receive a weight of 0.185. Triples consisting of the
minimum, median/mode, and maximum are also popular in fuzzy decision analysis [e.g.
167, 96]. Obtained quantiles may be used in several ways – full distributions may be fitted
to the quantiles, they can be used to provide moment estimates using approximations such
as those in [144], or they can be considered as criteria in their own right. Figure 2.1 shows
a value tree formulation for a hypothetical decision problem consisting of three uncertain














Figure 2.1: A value tree illustrating a hypothetical MCDA process where uncertain eval-
uations are represented using quantiles.
Figure 2.1 represents what might be called a ‘conventional’ view of quantile-based MCDA,
in which uncertainty is resolved at the lower-levels of the value tree. An alternate approach
is to place the quantiles at the second level of the tree, as shown in Figure 2.2. This
has the effect of creating a ‘super-MCDA’ problem consisting of Nq ‘deterministic’ and
generally closely related problems, where Nq is the number of quantiles used. Aggregation
over quantiles is therefore carried out at the end of the decision process rather than at
the beginning. This allows decision makers to compare alternatives separately at their











point-of-view for uncertainty modelling using quantiles, it is similar to the approach taken
by scenario-based MCDA, which is described in Section 2.6 (although a single quantile
cannot generally be described by an internally consistent ‘storyline’, as a scenario can). It
is conjectured that decision makers may find the additional information provided within

















Figure 2.2: An alternate value tree formulation for quantile-based MCDA. In this tree,
quantiles are represented in the second level of the objectives hierarchy rather than as
lower-level criteria.
The value tree formulations in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 are mathematically equivalent, so that











where qk refers to a specific quantile, z
(qk)
ij is the qk-th quantile of Zij , and wjk and ujk
are respectively the weight and marginal utility function associated with quantile qk and
attribute cj . Note that in this general formulation the attribute importance weight and
marginal utility function associated with a particular criterion cj is allowed to differ over
quantiles qk. Where necessary (which would perhaps not be often) joint weights can be
evaluated in the usual way for higher-level criteria. First, relative criterion weights wj|k can











denotes the weight of criterion cj at quantile qk, with
∑
j wj|k = 1, ∀k). Then, quantile
weights can be assessed i.e. weights wqk associated with each quantile qk, and joint weights
are given by the product of the two i.e. wjk = wqkwj|k. The practical interpretation and
assessment of the quantile weights wqk has not been fully resolved and requires some care.
On one hand, the Keefer-Bodily values indicate values for wqk which, on average, give the





values constitute an interval preference scale, the wqk can also be interpreted as relative
(“swing”) weights on performance in different quantiles. These could be assessed based
on the usual trade-off questions involving pairs of quantiles on a common attribute, and
there is no theoretical reason why in general they should be equal to the Keefer-Bodily
weights. At present there is little guidance on which approach is to be preferred.
Alternatively the wjk can be assessed directly using comparisons between performance
levels on different combinations of attributes and quantiles, although this may be imprac-
tical for large numbers of attributes or quantiles. In the perhaps more conventional case













Decision models using quantiles can be expressed as explicit risk models with the value
component set to the median rather than the mean i.e. Vij = z
(0.5)
ij , and extreme quantiles






ij , with w
R(k)
ij =
−wjwqk and q1 and q2 referring to the 5% and 95% quantile respectively. For this reason
they have been included here under the heading of the explicit risk models. Two example
applications can be found in [245].
2.5 Decision analysis with fuzzy sets
Fuzzy decision models seek to model the elements of the decision-making process that are
subject to uncertainty using fuzzy sets. From a philosophical point-of-view, uncertainty
in any of these elements is said to arise because of (a) unquantifiable information, (b)
incomplete information, (c) nonobtainable information, and (d) partial ignorance [59].
Practically, there is usually no difference in how the types of uncertainty are incorporated
into a fuzzy decision model. Fuzzy multi-attribute decision making is usually divided into
two stages [85, 303, 59]: a first stage consisting of the assessment and aggregation of
attribute evaluations; and a second stage producing a rank order of alternatives from the
aggregated performance ratings of the first stage. Each of these stages is discussed in turn











2.5.1 Aggregation models for fuzzy evaluation
Many if not all decision models can be fuzzified because of the existence of fuzzy versions
of nearly all operations that are likely to be employed by a decision model (e.g. addi-
tion, multiplication, finding a minimum or maximum). Three decision models that have
received the most attention from fuzzy researchers are focused on: weighted additive mod-
els, models based on ideas related to the analytic hierarchy process, and aspiration-based
models using comparisons to constructed ideal and anti-ideal solutions.
Models using weighted additive sums
Fuzzy weighted additive aggregation models have been used in [54, 51, 70] and [120]. The
first three of these papers differ mainly with respect to the way in which the fuzzy numbers
formed using the weighted additive aggregation are exploited to arrive at a ranking. The
final paper also employs a simple weighted additive model, but this time with unknown
weights. A linear programming formulation is used to solve for the weights under the
somewhat strange assumption that one wishes to maximise the sum of absolute weighted
evaluation differences over all alternatives and attributes – on the basis that this maximises
some kind of collective ‘importance’. The case of solving for unknown attribute weights is
fairly popular (see also [172] and [278], which also use a weighted additive model) but it
is outside the scope of the current thesis, which considers the more traditional context in
which weights would be assessed as part of the decision aiding process.
Models using the analytic hierarchy process
The decision aiding approach that seems to have received the most attention from fuzzy
practitioners is the AHP. On the face of it, the AHP seems an obvious candidate for fuzzi-
fication because of the qualitative nature of the pairwise comparisons made. Although
these judgements are traditionally quantified on a 1-9 scale, the points along the scale are
given linguistic meanings and comparisons will often be made predominantly with these
linguistic labels in mind. It is therefore easy to imagine that a decision maker might be
uncertain about some of these judgements. Since the 1996 reviews, I have found more
than 30 papers involving the application of fuzzy set theory to the AHP, and there are
doubtless many more. The methodological papers differ predominantly in how the vector
of marginal preference information is computed from the matrix of judgemental ratios
assessed by the decision maker.
It is well-known in the AHP literature that because the judgements expressed by the
decision maker may not be consistent (in the sense that rik = rijrjk, where rik denotes
the (ratio-scaled) strength of preference of ai over ak), there are a variety of ways to











eigenvector of the matrix of assessed judgements, but two further estimation approaches
are also popular, using least squares (e.g. [132]) or logarithmic least squares optimisa-
tion (e.g. [156]). Exactly which method is best has been a point of some debate over
the years (e.g. [226]). All three estimation approaches have been modified to make use
of fuzzy input data: eigenvalue methods in [254, 72, 274], least squares in [291], and log
least squares in [261, 35, 292, 276]. Several other methods have also been proposed. Two
early applications proposed using the fuzzy geometric mean to compute marginal evalua-
tions [41, 283]. Deng [79] uses fuzzy arithmetic means to represent marginal evaluations,
forming crisp evaluations by taking a specific α-cut of each fuzzy mean and forming a
weighted average of the left and right points of the resulting interval. These are then
standardised and evaluated by comparing them to positive and negative ideal solutions.
Mikhailov et al. [191, 192, 193] uses a preference programming formulation to maximise
both the consistency of judgements and the possibility i.e. membership values, of those
judgements. Leung and Cao [169] define a different fuzzy version of consistency based on
specifying a tolerance level for inconsistent ratio judgements, and maximise membership
values subject to constraints on this consistency. Yu et al. [297] use a multi-objective lin-
ear programming approach to maximise membership values and minimise inconsistency,
requiring an additional trade-off parameter. Xu and Chen [294, 293] also minimise the
inconsistency of assessed judgements, but for additive preference relations rather than the
multiplicative relations common in AHP. Chang [50] proposes a method for triangular
fuzzy evaluation called ‘extent analysis’, which first uses the fuzzy arithmetic mean to
represent marginal evaluations and then performs pairwise comparisons by computing the
possibility that one fuzzy mean is greater than another. For two fuzzy numbers A and A∗,
the possibility that A > A∗ is given by 1 if the point x at which µA(x) = 1 is greater than
or equal to the point y at which µA∗(y) = 1, or by the height at which the membership
functions intersect otherwise. A final crisp evaluation for A is computed by taking the
conjunction i.e. minimum, of the possibilities that A is greater than each of the other fuzzy
marginal evaluations, and then standardising these to sum to one. Once crisp evaluations
are obtained, aggregation is straightforward – Chang [50] uses a simple additive model.
The extent analysis approach to fuzzy AHP is currently the most popular approach –
by some way – for real-world applications of fuzzy AHP, with some 20 papers published
since 2002. However, Wang et al. [277] have recently convincingly argued that the weights
obtained using extent analysis model do not represent the relative importance of criteria












Models using comparisons to ideal solutions
Another class of models that have been relatively popular targets for fuzzification are
those that evaluate alternatives by comparing them to an ideal and/or anti-ideal solu-
tion and choose the alternative that is in some sense closest to the ideal and farthest
from the anti-ideal. Most of these models make use of the TOPSIS method proposed
by Hwang and Yoon [128]. The TOPSIS method begins by defining two hypothetical
alternatives: an ideal solution consisting of the maximum weighted evaluations across all
alternatives on each attribute, and an anti-ideal solution consisting of the minimum evalu-
ations. Euclidean distances between each alternative and the ideal and anti-ideal solutions
are computed and alternatives are evaluated based on its distance to the ideal solution
expressed as a proportion of the sum of the two distances. All that is required in order to
use fuzzy input values are computations of fuzzy maxima (for the ideal solution), minima
(for the anti-ideal solution), and distances. All of these are standard fuzzy operations.
Differences between the fuzzy TOPSIS methods relate primarily to when in the deci-
sion process the fuzzy information is condensed into crisp evaluations. Tsaur et al.
[255] do this right at the beginning, representing fuzzy evaluations by their centroids
and calculating the crisp distances accordingly. Chu and Lin [68] use fuzzy multipli-
cation to obtain fuzzy weighted ratings but then convert these into crisp values using
the method of mean removals [143]. Chen [53] evaluates the ‘Euclidean’ distance be-
tween two triangular fuzzy numbers Ã = (l1,m1, u1) and B̃ = (l2,m2, u2) by d(Ã, B̃) =√
(l1 − l2)2 + (m1 −m2)2 + (u1 − u2)2, following which the deterministic TOPSIS method
can be applied to these crisp distances. Ashtiani et al. [12] use much the same approach,
but apply it to interval-valued fuzzy numbers i.e. a fuzzy number that is defined by two
membership functions, an ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ membership function (µUA(x) and µ
L
A(x) re-
spectively, with µUA(x) ≥ µLA(x)). Separate computations are carried out using the upper
and lower membership functions and at the final step a simple average is taken of the
relative idealities using µUA(x) and µ
L
A(x). Whether using double membership functions is
a necessary or even useful extension for decision aid seems another matter. Triantaphyllou
and Lin [254] use fuzzy arithmetic operations at each step, so that the result is a fuzzy
relative ideality for each alternative that must be ranked using one of the fuzzy ranking
methods. Their method, contrary to what is claimed in [12], preserves fuzziness right up
to the end of the decision process (barring the ranking stage), but Wang and Elhag [275]
find that this results in the supports of the fuzzy relative idealities being overexaggerated.
Their method uses a series of α-cuts, calculating the relative ideality of each alternative
at each α-cut. The relative idealities are each interval numbers whose lower and upper












2.5.2 Methods for ranking fuzzy numbers
As the evaluations arising from the aggregation in the previous sections are usually fuzzy
numbers themselves, the ranking of evaluations is often non-trivial and some kind of
ranking procedure is needed. The lack of an axiomatic basis for carrying out such a ranking
means that there is no clear guide as to how this ranking should be done, and procedures
are most often judged upon (a) how consistent their rankings are with human intuition, (b)
how often and in what cases they are unable to discriminate between two different fuzzy
numbers, and (c) how difficult they are to interpret and compute. All of these criteria are
themselves fraught with subjectivity, and unfortunately it is possible, for nearly all ranking
methods, to construct specific instances where (a) or (b) are poorly fulfilled. Research in
this area often takes this form, presenting an example where a previous method gives
an inconsistent rank order or is unable to distinguish two ‘intuitively’ differentiable fuzzy
numbers, and then proposing a new procedure that does better in this particular instance
(but possibly not in others).
Chen [59] provides a review of some 21 ranking methods up to 1992. A review to 2001
is provided in [272] and [273], and includes 29 methods. Outside of the ranking methods
contained in these reviews, I have been able to find more than 20 further proposed ranking
methods. A detailed review of all these methods is not attempted here; instead I have
simply classified the more recent methods in Table 2.1 according to which of a small
number of general ranking approaches they follow: whether centroids are used to defuzzify
fuzzy numbers; whether some form of distance or area measurement is used; whether one
or more reference (ideal or anti-ideal) fuzzy numbers are used; and whether any kind of
weighting or transformation function is applied. In the remainder of the section I use a
small selection of ranking methods to illustrate some general comments.
The main problem when attempting to organise fuzzy ranking methods is that many
concepts lack a consistent, meaningful behavioural interpretation. Parameters are often
given a dubious behavioural description or are ignored completely. Criticism of the lack
of formal procedures for eliciting the parameters of fuzzy decision models is not new (e.g.
[100, 31]) but remains a problem. As an example, one stream of papers has made use
of the centroid (x̄, ȳ) of a fuzzy number – the center of gravity of the area represented
by the fuzzy set – to build a single index of performance, an approach that goes back to
[201]. Cheng [62] uses the distance between the origin and the centroid as a measure of
performance (incidentally giving the wrong formula for computing the centroid – pointed
out and corrected in [279]). Subsequent methods proposed using the signed rather than
Euclidean distance [1], or the rectangular area formed between the centroid and the ori-











Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Authors Year Ref. centroid distance area ref. pt. weighting
Chen and Klein 1997 [54] y y
Cheng 1998 [62] y y
Cheng 1998 [62]
Raj and Kumar 1998 [220] y y
Lee-Kwang and Lee 1999 [168] y y
Raj and Kumar 1999 [221] y y
Yao and Wu 2000 [296] y
Chen and Lu 2001 [56] y y
Lee and Li 2001 [167] y y
Mattarazzo and Munda 2001 [189] y
Mattarazzo and Munda 2001 [189]
Yager et al. 2001 [295] y
Chu and Tsao 2002 [69] y y
Tran and Duckstein 2002 [253] y y
Chen and Chen 2003 [57] y y
Deng and Liu 2005 [80] y y y
Liu and Han 2005 [178] y y
Abbasbandy and Asady 2006 [1] y y
Deng et al. 2006 [81] y
Sun and Wu 2006 [248]
Asady and Zendehnam 2007 [11] y
Chen and Chen 2007 [58] y y y
Chen and Tang 2008 [55] y
Liu, Wu and Liu 2008 [177]
Wang and Lee 2008 [280] y y
Wang et al. 2008 [281] y y
Abbasbandy and Hajjari 2009 [2] y y
Chen and Chen 2009 [60] y y
Chen and Wang 2009 [61] y y y











whether the selection of one method over another can be informed by any behavioural
information. Liu [178] includes the possibility of using weighting functions on x and µ(x)
in calculating the centroid. These functions are interpreted as a form of “optimism” and
“confidential attitude” respectively, although without any discussion of their behavioural
validity beyond a statement that they were “easily understood” and “commonly used in
daily decision making”. This seems doubtful. Another method proposes that only x̄ be
used to rank fuzzy numbers, with ȳ being reserved for breaking any ties involving the x̄
[280]. Others modify the y co-ordinate of the centroid to incorporate the standard devi-
ation of the fuzzy number, creating a modified centroid point (x̄, ȳ∗), but again different
authors have modified the centroid in different ways. Some use the standard deviation as
a multiplier [58]; some use it as exponent [57, 80]. Again it is difficult to make any mean-
ingful comparison of these approaches. The modified centroid has been used to create a
new performance index (x̄+ ȳ∗) [57]. This is sometimes used to compute distances to ideal
and anti-ideal solutions [80], and sometimes to compute distances to a local minimum
(the point (x̄min, 0), where x̄min is the minimum x̄ over all fuzzy numbers to be ranked)
[58]. Other authors have simply excluded ȳ and based their index on x̄ and the standard
deviation of the fuzzy number only [60].
A related problem is that similarities (and even equivalences) between ranking methods
are often masked by the use of different terminology. Two methods [296, 56] independently
propose ranking two fuzzy numbers by using the sum of the area between the two left-side
membership functions and the area between the two right-side membership functions. The
method in [296] is “essentially the same” (in the authors’ own words) as the earlier area
compensation method in [99], but the former is phrased in terms of “signed distance”.
When this “signed distance” is integrated over all possible α-cuts it becomes the area in
[99]. Fortemps and Roubens [99] prove that the ranking provided by their method corre-
sponds to that provided by the total integral value – the sum of the areas under the inverse
functions of the left-side and right-side membership functions as used in [176]. Another
method [11] uses an unweighted sum of the same two areas making up the total integral
value and is thus equivalent to a special case of [176], although the authors describe their
approach in different terms, calling it the “nearest point” to a fuzzy number.
2.6 Decision analysis with scenarios
One way of addressing uncertainty about what is going to happen in the external envi-
ronment is to construct a number of ‘stories’ which describe possible ways in which the
future might unfold. Each of these possible futures is known as a ‘scenario’. The most
fundamental requirement of a scenario is that it is internally consistent – that is, that











imply that a description of a scenario must be complete.
2.6.1 Scenarios in scenario planning
The use of scenarios for strategic planning was developed as the more-or-less qualitatitive
technique of scenario planning (e.g. [267, 266, 260]), which also gave the term ‘scenario’
a more specific meaning. In the scenario planning view, a scenario should be constructed
to (a) be plausible in the sense that its evolution from the present can be traced in the
form of a logical ‘story’, (b) be relevant and useful for the decision makers, in the sense
that it provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating and developing future strategy,
and provides novel insights into the decision problem. The ideal number of scenarios for
achieving a balance between depth and breadth of exploration is said to be between two
and four [260]. The scenarios developed under scenario planning are meant to be fairly
extreme but still plausible, these being viewed as more likely to generate unusual insights
into the problem and also in some sense providing a wider coverage of possible futures,
something scenario planners refer to as “bounding the future” [229] (although there will
always be more extreme scenarios). They are not necessarily complete descriptions of a
single possible future, and the likelihood of occurence, beyond the existence of plausibility,
is not generally a concern when constructing scenarios for scenario planning. Scenarios
constructed in this way are considered part of ‘future-focused’ thinking [288] in contrast
to approaches which consider uncertainty in terms of what outcomes are possible for a
given set of alternatives (an example of ‘alternative-focused’ thinking [145]). Wright and
Goodwin [288] argue that scenarios generated using the latter approach are more likely to
suffer from well-known heuristics like anchoring and insufficient adjustment and inertia,
and are thus less likely to confront decision makers with challenging or surprising views of
the future – an important goal for scenario planning.
The implications of different scenario construction for forecasting and general strategic
decision making are further explored in [42] and [119]. The latter paper in particular
highlights some of the difficulties in evaluating what constitutes a ‘good’ scenario planning
intervention. Reported case studies represent only a small and probably positively-biased
sample and measuring long-term strategic impact is a particularly difficult task. Different
practitioners emphasise different aspects of scenario planning, particularly when it comes
to issues around predicition, the use of probabilities, and creativity. What emerges in [119]
is a set of several mechanisms by which scenario planning might be beneficial as a tool for
decision making rather than any definitive consensus over whether and why this is so.
In the scenario planning view, the constructed set of scenarios are useful in their own
right in getting a group of decision makers to express their views on uncertainty and agree











evaluate these scenarios in terms of their desirability (introducing a multi-criteria aspect;
see [129] for an example), even though the decision makers have no control over which
scenario occurs. More commonly though, the constructed scenarios are used to evaluate
and develop alternative strategies. It is at this stage that multi-criteria modelling seems
applicable, but many advocates of scenario planning prefer to avoid formal quantitative
modelling (e.g. [260, 230]) and use informed but informal judgement – some examples can
be found in [95, 285, 44]. Nevertheless some work has been done to integrate decision
analysis with the use of scenarios, and the use of scenarios (or “state-contingency”) has
also received attention in related areas, with Quiggin claiming that for economic problems
“in almost every case, uncertainty is best interpreted in a state-contingent framework”
[219].
2.6.2 Scenarios in multi-criteria analysis
The main objective of a scenario-based model is to evaluate and compare the performances
of alternatives in each scenario – given a decision problem, the approach considers that
problem separately in each scenario before (possibly but not necessarily explicitly) combin-
ing this information to arrive at a final decision. The general approach can be represented
using a value tree in which scenarios are placed in the second level of the hierarchy as
parents to Ns structurally similar “within scenario” value trees, where Ns is the number
of scenarios used. This tree would follow the same format as the tree illustrating quantile-
based decision making in Figure 2.2, except that scenarios would take the place occupied
by quantiles. Although from a mathematical perspective scenarios can also be included
at lower levels of the objectives hierarchy (e.g. as done with quantiles in Figure 2.1), this
is considered contrary to the philosophy of scenario planning and would generally not be












where sk refers to a specific scenario, z
(sk)
ij is the evaluation of alternative ai on attribute
cj in scenario sk, and wjk and ujk are respectively the weight and marginal utility function
associated with attribute cj under the assumption of scenario sk.
One of the most important issues in integrating the use of scenarios with multi-criteria
analysis is how (or whether) to compare and aggregate results in different scenarios. The
earliest multi-criteria scenario model (presented in Chapter 14 of [108] and is described in
slightly more detail in [109]) applied a multi-attribute value model within each of three
scenarios but made no attempt to aggregate the evaluations over scenarios to arrive at











which has strong ‘robustness’ views (see [260]), it does not not seem unreasonable to at-
tempt to aggregate over scenarios in some way. Applications of scenario planning to the
analytic hierarchy process [10, 184, 170, 171] and goal programming [153] have aggregated
results over scenarios using some form of relative likelihood to weigh the performance in
the different scenarios. Performance has also been aggregated over scenarios using weights
interpreted as swing weights for the performance under a particular scenario, in the value-
function [244] and goal programming [90] approaches. Kalu [140], on the other hand,
solves a lexicographic goal program under various scenarios representing different combi-
nations of operating parameters but stresses the impossibility of probability assignment.
The optimal decision vector is thus given separately for each scenario.
Another important consideration is how preference information is to be assessed in the
scenario model. Stewart [246] gives two general scenario-based models that are math-
ematically equivalent but differ practically in that their inputs require the specification
of different trade-offs and hence use different assessment procedures. The first model
considers combinations of alternatives and scenarios as INs distinct outcomes or ‘meta-
alternatives’ to be evaluated in terms of the J attributes. A marginal preference model
(whether this uses a value function, outranking, goal programming, or other approach) is
defined across all INs outcomes for each attribute. The result is an I×Ns table giving the
aggregate performance of alternative ai under scenario sk. This is the approach followed
in [108] and [109], although without a final aggregation over scenarios. If performance is















where wsk is the weight associated with scenario sk. If alternatives are not aggregated
over scenarios the second summation over k is simply ignored. As for the quantile weights
discussed earlier, the practical interpretation and assessment of the scenario weights wsk
has not been fully resolved. Stewart [246] argues that the wsk should not be equated with
scenario “probabilities” (because the set of scenarios does not constitute a complete prob-
ability space), nor with scenario “likelihoods” (because scenarios are incomplete descrip-
tions, they cannot in general be expected to represent the same dimensions in probability
space). Rather, they should be interpreted as relative (“swing”) weights on performance





constitute an interval preference scale, but as Stewart notes “it may be difficult to elicit
appropriate values for the scenario weights” [246].
The second model considers combinations of scenarios and attributes as NsJ distinct











This means that a marginal preference model is constructed for each of the NsJ meta-
attributes, following which performance would be aggregated over all meta-attributes (pos-
sibly first within each scenario and then over scenarios, if this is desired). The evaluation
of ai would now be given by (2.7).
There are a number of issues raised by the two scenario-based models. The first is that
it is only in the second model that preference information (trade-offs between attributes
and the strength of preference for incremental performance changes on any one attribute)
are allowed to vary between scenarios. In one of the few applications of scenario-based
MCDA, Montibeller et al. [197] found that in one of their two applications progress was
only possible once importance weights were allowed to vary across scenarios – and hence
the second model evaluating alternatives over scenario-attribute pairs was used. In the
other case one alternative was dominant and this was not necessary. In Korhonen [153]
aspirations and weights may be defined separately for individual scenarios. Parnell et al.
[211] also explicitly define different importance weights in different scenarios. In other ap-
plications preferences are held constant over scenarios [109]. It remains an open question
how often the detailed qualitative information gathered during the construction of the
scenarios might cause scenario-dependent preferences, or at least an awareness of those
preferences.
The practical assessment of preference information will also depend on which model is
employed. In the first model, each attribute is defined over a range covering all INs meta-
alternatives and weights can therefore be assessed as for a deterministic multi-attribute
problem, except that the joint consideration of alternatives and scenarios may prove dif-
ficult for decision makers (the case in [197]). The second model requires an importance
weight wjk for each scenario-attribute combination. These can be assessed directly us-
ing comparisons between performance levels on different meta-attributes, although this
may be impractical for large numbers of attributes or scenarios. A second approach is to
first establish the relative weight of each attribute cj under the assumption of a common
scenario sk, denoted wj|k and standardised to sum to one within each scenario, and then
assess the scenario weight wsk associated with each scenario sk by using trade-offs between
pairs of scenarios on a common attribute. The joint weights could then be inferred from
the two sets of ratios generated by the previous steps i.e. wjk = wskwj|k.
It is worth mentioning that some multi-attribute scenario applications [155, 129] include
elements that are under the control of the decision maker and for which guidance is being
sought (what would usually be termed the alternatives) in their constructed scenarios.
There are thus no ‘alternatives’ as such: it is the scenarios that are evaluated over at-











formulation such as this would be more approriate than the conventional evaluation of
alternatives over a set of constructed scenarios would seem to be a rarity6, and limited to
cases in which alternatives and future events are so interconnected that only one or two
alternatives are possible in each scenario. This formulation can be expressed in terms of
the first model, except that the ‘meta-alternatives’ are directly constructed through the
scenario planning process and it would make no sense to aggregate over scenarios.
6Some authors go further than this, implying that such a formulation goes against scenario planning
principles. Harries [119], for example, includes the independence of scenarios and actions as a characteristic












A simulation study investigating
the effect of uncertainty
representation on decision making
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed the many models that exist for multi-criteria decision anal-
ysis (MCDA) under conditions of uncertainty. The remainder of the thesis takes a number
of these ‘simplified’ decision models and evaluates their ability to replicate the results ob-
tained from a MAUT model, with the aim of providing some guidance to practitioners
about the types of simplified models that are being used for uncertain decision making.
This chapter performs part of that evaluation using a simulation experiment. As men-
tioned in Chapter 1, in using simulation it must be acknowledged that while simulations
allow one to assess how the simplification of MAUT models might impact results, they
cannot evaluate other critical issues like ease-of-use or ability to generate insight. Simu-
lation results alone are unable to provide general conclusions on the viability of different
methods, but they provide a starting point for doing so by identifying the potential trade-
offs in accuracy that are implied when using a simplified model. Ultimately accuracy –
the focus of this chapter – must be weighed against other practical factors to determine
which decision model may be most appropriate for a problem.
The models tested here represent uncertain attribute evaluations using (a) expected values,
(b) expected values and variances, (c) expected values and the probabilities of obtaining
performance below a specified cut-off, (d) quantiles, (e) fuzzy numbers, or (f) a small
number of ‘scenarios’. Since these methods all summarise aspects of the full probability
distribution, they are referred to collectively as ‘simplified’ approaches; models (b) and (c)
are sometimes referred to collectively as models using ‘explicit risk attributes’. All models
are based upon the principles of value function methods [e.g. 31]; investigating uncertainty











The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 very briefly summarises the models used
(more information can be found in Chapter 2). Section 3.3 lists research hypotheses to be
tested by the simulation study. Section 3.4 outlines the simulation experiment, and Sec-
tion 3.5 presents the results. A final section concludes the chapter with some implications
for practice.
3.2 Summary of simplified decision models used
Consider a decision problem consisting of I alternatives denoted by ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
evaluated on J attributes denoted by cj , j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Let Zij be a random variable
denoting the (stochastic) attribute evaluation of ai on cj , and uj(Zij) be single-attribute






where Ui is the expected utility of alternative ai and wj is an attribute importance weight
indicating the relative importance of a one-unit change in attribute cj [e.g. 31]. The addi-
tive MAUT model requires that preferences are additively independent [147], failing which
more complex aggregation forms are required (although [242] has shown that the addi-
tive form can closely approximate results obtained under the more complex multiplicative
form when additive independence does not hold). This chapter is concerned with further
simplifications of the MAUT model. The following is not exhaustive but provides a broad
coverage of the types of simplified models that appear in the literature.
3.2.1 Models using expected values and explicit risk attributes














where Rij is a measure of the ‘risk’ of Zij and wRij is a weight for Rij , termed a ‘risk weight’.
An expected value model (wRij = 0) and two explicit risk models are used: Rij = σ
2
ij and
Rij = Pr[Zij < L] with L a specified cut-off for ‘poor’ performance.
3.2.2 Models using quantiles

























where qk refers to a specific quantile, z
(qk)
ij is the qk-th quantile of Zij , wqk denotes the
weight associated with quantile qk, and Nq is the number of quantiles used. Note that here
attribute importance weights and utility functions have been kept constant over quantiles
(see Section 2.4.3 for details). Two example applications can be found in [245].
3.2.3 Models using fuzzy numbers
There are a large number of fuzzy value function approaches, with no general formulation.
In one standard approach triangular fuzzy global evaluations are computed using basic























ij denote some lower, intermediate, and upper quantiles respec-
tively. These evaluations can be ranked by any number of fuzzy ranking procedures – the
approach used here is based on left and right dominance [56], which is a generalization of
















where rin and lin are the upper and lower limits of the nth α-cut of the fuzzy number Ũi
(so-called right- and left-dominance) respectively, and Θ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight assigned to
right-dominance. The α-cuts used are given by αŨ = n/N for n = {0, 1, . . . ,N}. It can
be shown (see Appendix A.1) that this particular fuzzy decision model is equivalent to a
quantile model in which the right-dominance weight Θ determines the quantile weights1.
3.2.4 Models using scenarios















where sk refers to a specific scenario, z
(sk)
ij is the evaluation of alternative ai on attribute
cj in scenario sk, wsk is the weight associated with scenario sk, and Ns is the number of
scenarios used. Note that here attribute importance weights and utility functions have
been kept constant over quantiles (see Section 2.6 for details). Applications of multi-
attribute scenario models have been reported in [184, 118] and [197].
1Although the equivalence is easily shown it is not transparent a priori, and was only noted after
similar simulation results were observed for the two models. Although it is perhaps unnecessary to show
the quantile and fuzzy models results separately (since the equivalence means that any findings will apply
to both models), I have chosen to do so and so retain the original structure of the simulation study in the











3.3 Research aims and hypotheses
The main aim of this chapter is exploratory: to evaluate how closely the simplified models
in Section 3.2 approximate the results obtained using an additive MAUT model. Never-
theless there are some expectations which can be formalised as hypotheses. In this section
I give a brief motivation for each expected result before explicitly stating these as research
hypotheses. It is assumed without loss of generality that utility increases in Zij and that
each marginal utility function uj has been scaled to have a minimum of 0 and a maximum
of 1. In [91] it was found that a model using expected values was on average more accu-
rate2 than a variance model using Kirkwood’s [150] weights. Worse accuracy is expected
from variance models in which only a general appetite or aversion for risk i.e. wRij = Cwj
with C a constant, is expressed.
Hypothesis 1: Variance models in which risk weights are fixed multiples of attribute
importance weights will be less accurate than an expected value model.
Keefer and Bodily [144] have shown that expected values can be closely approximated
using the 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles, so three (or more) quantiles could be used to
approximate expected values and apply an expected value model. Better accuracy is
expected if quantiles are transformed into utilities before aggregation i.e. from the quantile
model.
Hypothesis 2: Quantile models will be more accurate than an expected value model.
The accuracy of all models will suffer from assessment errors, but theories of “error can-
cellation” [e.g. 151] suggest that models that use multiple inputs will be more robust to
random errors than those that provide more concise summaries of uncertainty.
Hypothesis 3: The robustness of model accuracy to assessment errors will be positively
correlated with the number of inputs used to summarise probability distributions.
One of the key determinants of the accuracy of the expected value model is the steepness of
the marginal utility functions in the region of the approximation, because any differences
between MAUT utilities and their approximations are more heavily penalised there [91].
The same effect is expected in all simplified models.
Hypothesis 4: The accuracy of all simplified models will worsen as utility functions
become steeper in the region of the attribute domain in which approximations are
made.
2All hypotheses and reported results use “utility loss” [19] to measure accuracy, as defined in Section
3.4.7. Other metrics were also gathered, including the average rank of the alternative selected by a
simplified model in the MAUT rank order, the average rank of the MAUT best alternative in a simplified
model’s rank order, and the rank correlation between the simplified model and MAUT rank orders. These











The accuracy of the expected value model is not materially affected by the number of
alternatives or attributes present [91]. The same relative insensitivity to problem size is
hypothesised for the other simplified models3.
Hypothesis 5: Problem size (the number of alternatives and attributes) will not have a
material effect on the accuracy of any of the simplified models.
Because there has been little systematic research into the use of scenarios in decision
analysis, no hypotheses are made regarding these models. An exploratory analysis of the
scenario models remains an important aim of the simulation.
3.4 Design of the simulation experiment
Figure 1 shows an outline of a single simulation run. Dashed boxes have been used to
indicate those parts of the simulation applied iteratively to each alternative and attribute.
Corresponding section numbers are shown to indicate where in the text further details can
be found (the chapter number is suppressed).
3.4.1 Generating realizations from Zij
The main difference between this and others’ simulations of realizations from Zij [e.g
20, 227] is that I consider each Zij to be composed of L = 10 normal distributions4, denoted
by N(µij`, σ2ij`), ` ∈ {1, . . . , L} where µ and σ2 are mean and variance respectively. The
index ` is referred to as indexing the ‘future’ f`.
Generating means for the realizations in each future
The means µij` are all independently generated on U [0, 1].
Treatment of dominated alternatives
A simulation parameter determines whether:
• the µij` are used directly, which allows alternatives to be dominated within one or
more futures i.e. have a smaller mean than another alternative on every attribute
[e.g. 20, 227], or
3This depends on utility loss being used to measure accuracy. Measures of accuracy based on ranks e.g.
the average rank of the selected alternative in the MAUT rank order, differ significantly with the number
of alternatives used, but an increasing rank does not necessarily imply a deterioration in decision quality
(because the size of the rank order has also increased).
4Most previous studies use a single distribution for each Zij . Multiple distributions are used here
because they allow a parsimonious simulated application of scenario models. The choice of distribution,
as well as the number of distributions to use, is somewhat arbitrary, but the robustness of the conclusions
has been tested against these choices. Evaluations were also simulated from the uniform distribution, and












Set environmental parameters I, J , L, σ(d), M; assessment error parameter ν; decision maker
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• alternatives are forced to be Pareto optimal in each future by standardizing within
each alternative ai so that
∑
j µij` = 1 [e.g. 91].
These cases are referred to as “with dominated alternatives” and “without dominated
alternatives” respectively.
Generating unstandardised realizations
Within each future f`, the simulation
1. Generates a standard deviation σij` randomly on U [0.01, σ(d)], where σ(d) is a pa-
rameter of the simulation.
2. Sets the number of realizations M` to be generated for future f`. A total of K = 400
realizations5 for each Zij is used (i.e. over all futures), and these are distributed
over futures either “uniformly” (M = [40, 40, . . . , 40]) or “non-uniformly” (M =
[60, 60, 60, 60, 40, 40, 20, 20, 20, 20]). In the latter case some futures are more likely
to occur than others. M is a parameter of the simulation.
3. Generates M` independent realizations from N(µij`, σ2ij`). The 1 × M` vector of
realizations generated in future f` is denoted z
(`)
ij .
Once realizations have been generated for each future, these are concatenated into a single
1×K vector containing all the realizations for Zij i.e. zij = [z(1)ij , z
(2)
ij , . . . , z
(`)




Realizations are scaled so that the largest realization on each attribute (over all alterna-
tives) is one and the smallest is zero.
3.4.2 Generating inputs to the simplified models
Each simplified model uses a different summary of the realizations in zij :
Expected value model
Uses the empirical mean of zij , E[zij ].
Explicit risk models
Two explicit risk models are simulated (both of these also use the expected values E[zij ]):
1. Variance model: uses empirical variances var[zij ] to measure risk
2. Probability of poor performance model: uses the proportion of realizations in zij that
fall below a cut-off L, a parameter of the simulation, to measure risk.












Uses empirical quantiles of the zij . The number of quantiles Nq is a parameter of the
simulation. If Nq = 3, the 5%, 50%, and 95% quantiles are used; if Nq = 5, the lower and
upper quartiles are added. For the fuzzy model, a triple consisting of the 5%, 50% and
95% quantiles is used i.e. q = (0.05, 0.5, 0.95), allowing a comparison with the quantile
models; a triple in which the 5% and 95% quantiles are replaced with the minima and
maxima respectively is also used i.e. q = (0, 0.5, 1), these being the extremes most often
used in fuzzy analysis (e.g. [167, 96]).
Scenario models
Inputs to the simulated scenario models are generated in a two-step process. First, a
random sample is drawn from the set of futures {f1, f2, . . . , fL} (the same random sample
is used for all alternatives and attributes); then, realizations in each of the sampled futures
are summarised, for each alternative and attribute. Scenario models differ with respect to
how the random sampling and summarization are performed. The following three models
are used:
• ‘Mean scenario’ model
1. Randomly draws a sample of size Ns from {f1, f2, . . . , fL} without replacement.
Each future f` has an equal probability of selection.
2. Summarises performance of ai on cj using the mean µij` in each of the Ns
selected futures.
• ‘Random scenario’ model
1. Randomly draws a sample of size Ns from {f1, f2, . . . , fL} without replacement.
Each future f` has an equal probability of selection.
2. Summarises performance of ai on cj by randomly selecting one realization from
z(`)ij in each of the Ns selected futures.
• ‘Most likely scenario’ model
1. Randomly draws a sample of size Ns from {f1, f2, . . . , fL} with replacement.
Each future f` is selected with probability proportional to M`.
2. Summarises performance of ai on cj by randomly selecting one realization from
z(`)ij in each of the Ns selected futures.
The proportion of futures selected i.e. Ns/L, is a simulation parameter termed the
‘coverage’ provided by a scenario model. Although attribute generation is somewhat











is that the coverage parameter captures (in an idealised way) the scenario planning
aim of constructing scenarios that “bound the future” [e.g. 229]; a scenario model
with 100% coverage is practically unrealistic but useful in giving an upper bound
on accuracy. More realistic scenario models with less coverage (50% and 30%) are
also simulated, and sensitivity to coverage and construction method are important
results.
3.4.3 Generating errors in the assessment of uncertainty information
Assessment errors are simulated by multiplying all inputs to the simplified models
(expected values, variances, probabilities of poor performance, quantiles, and realiza-
tions within selected futures) by independent and randomly generated realizations on
U [1 − ν, 1 + ν], with ν a simulation parameter. Final assessments are denoted using the
‘hat’ symbol e.g. expected values Ê[zij ].
3.4.4 Generating preference structures
The simulated marginal utility functions exhibit diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion
i.e. are convex below a reference level, concave above it, and steeper below the reference
level, a la prospect theory [139]. Each marginal utility function is described by four
parameters: the reference level, τj , the value of the utility function at the reference level,
λj , and the curvature of the utility function below and above the reference level, αj and









for τj < x ≤ 1
(3.7)
The same approach was used in [243] and [91]; a diverse set of preferences may be simulated
by adjusting τj , λj and βj (αj is set to βj + U [0, 2]). Attribute importance weights are
generated to be uniformly distributed with a minimum normalised value of 1/2J , following
[43].
3.4.5 Simulating the application of an additive MAUT model
The expected utility of ai is given by (3.1), where (as in other models) the vector of
realizations zij is used in place of the random variable Zij . Note that all probability
information is taken into account in the generation of zij .
3.4.6 Simulating the application of the simplified models
Expected value model












The evaluation of ai is given by (3.2). Risk weights are simulated using three approaches:
1. Using a fixed risk multiplier: risk weights are set so that the average contribution
made by the risk components over all alternatives is a proportion P (termed the
‘fixed risk multiplier’) of the average contribution made by the value components.
‘Fixed risk weights’ are given by wRij = Pwjuj(Ei[Ê[zij ]])/Ei[R̂ij ] ∀i, where Ei
denotes that expectations are taken over all alternatives and P ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1}.
2. Using an optimal risk multiplier: risk weights are again a constant proportion of the
wj but with the constant chosen to minimise the rank of the selected alternative
in the MAUT rank order. This is implemented with an integer program and the
results termed ‘optimal risk weights’. In practice one would not know the MAUT
rank order and thus the approach is not practically feasible, but it provides an upper
limit on accuracy with a single risk multiplier.
When using variances a further approach is included:
3. Using Kirkwood’s weights: Following [150] I use risk weights wRij =
(−1/2)wju′′j (Ê[zij ]).
Quantile models
The evaluation of ai is given by (3.3). Two approaches for generating quantile weights are
used. The first uses equal weights for each quantile i.e. wqk = 1/Nq. The second computes
optimal quantile weights using a similar integer program to the one above, except that
three (or five) weights can vary and quantile weights are constrained to sum to one.
Fuzzy models
The evaluation of ai is given by (3.4) and (3.5). The simulation uses N = 2 but results are
independent of this value. The weight Θ has been interpreted as an index of “optimism”
in [56] and is a parameter of the simulation, Θ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}6.
Scenario models
The evaluation of ai is given by (3.6). All scenarios are equally weighted7 i.e. wsk = 1/Ns.
6These correspond to quantile weights (for the 5%, 50%, and 95% quantiles respectively) of
(0.375, 0.5, 0.125) for Θ = 0.25, (0.25, 0.5, 0.25) for Θ = 0.5, and (0.125, 0.5, 0.375) for Θ = 0.75 (see
Appendix A.1 for details)
7I also tried weighting scenarios by their relative likelihoods i.e. M`/K, finding that this only improved
accuracy substantively when one scenario was overwhelmingly more likely to occur (e.g. 80% of all real-












3.4.7 Comparing results of the MAUT and simplified models
The accuracy of each simplified model is evaluated using utility loss [19]. Utility loss is
defined as UL = (Ui∗ −Uisel)/(Ui∗ −Ui∗) where Ui∗ and Ui∗ are the utilities (according to
MAUT) of the best and worst alternatives in the MAUT rank order respectively, and Uisel
is the utility (according to MAUT) of the alternative selected by a simplified model. Note
that minimizing the rank of the selected alternative in the MAUT rank order (as done by
the integer programming formulations above) is equivalent to minimizing utility loss.
3.4.8 Parameter values used in the simulations
Table 3.1 provides the parameter values used to simulate the decision problems. The effect
of problem size is investigated using I = 9 or 29 alternatives (so that a random choice of
alternative would appear on average 5th or 15th in the MAUT rank order respectively)
with J = 10 or 20 attributes. The four combinations allow for an independent investigation
of alternatives and attributes in decision environments located between ‘fairly small’ and
‘fairly big’ ([20] and [227] also include smaller problems but otherwise use similar values).
Parameter values for σ(d) were chosen by varying these until realizations in different futures
could not be distinguished and appeared sufficiently uncertain (in the ‘low’ and ‘high’
variability conditions the average difference between the 5th and 95th percentile of zij is
0.42 and 0.58 respectively). The assessment error parameter ν is key and so is varied at
four levels from 0% (error-free) to 30% (severely flawed assessment).
Parameter values for τj and λj can give preferences that are mostly convex (e.g. τj =
0.85, λj = 0.15), mostly concave (e.g. τj = 0.15, λj = 0.85), ‘S-shaped’ or linear (e.g.
τj ≈ λj , with αj and βj both large or small respectively). A wide range of preferences can
be simulated with relatively few parameters. The same parameter values have been used
in [243] and [91].
Table 3.2 shows the values used for the parameters of the simplified models. The fixed
risk multiplier P used in the explicit risk models is varied between 0 (i.e. the expected
value model) and 1 using intervals of 0.25. In assessing the probability of performing
below a cut-off, the simulation uses two cut-offs (L = 0.05, 0.10) that represent very poor
performance (between the 0.5% and 5% quantiles of performance, depending on attribute
variability) and one cut-off (L = 0.50) representing mediocre performance (between 40%
and 70% quantiles). Three- and five-quantile summaries are selected as standard sum-
mary statistics that are regularly used to approximate probability distributions [102] and
moments [144]. Quantiles are chosen for the fuzzy decision model to allow for a direct













I number of alternatives 9, 29
J number of attributes 10, 20
M distribution of realizations Uniform: [40, 40, 40, . . . , 40]
over futures Non-uniform:
[60, 60, 60, 60, 40, 40, 20, 20, 20, 20]
Attribute evaluations:
σ(d) upper limit for σij` 0.05 or 0.10
Errors in assessments of uncertainty information:
ν width of interval for random factor 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3
U [1− ν, 1 + ν] generating errors
Marginal utility functions:
τj reference level for uj U [0.15, 0.4] or U [0.6, 0.85]
λj value of uj at the reference level U [0.15, 0.4] or U [0.6, 0.85]
βj curvature of uj above reference level 0, U [0, 2] or U [0, 5]
Table 3.1: Parameter values used to simulate hypothetical decision problems
membership functions between an absolute minimum and maximum [167, 96]. The main
goal in selecting the number of scenarios is to investigate the effect of omitting futures
– the selection of ten, five and three of the original L = 10 futures, giving ‘coverage’ of
100%, 50% and 30% respectively, is simulated. Note that this does not test the general
effectiveness of using three, five, or ten futures, even in the limited sense of accurate ap-
proximation of MAUT.
Parameter Description Values
P fixed risk multiplier 0.25, 0.5, 1
L poor performance cut-off 0.05, 0.1, 0.5
Nq number of quantiles used 3, 5
q quantiles used in fuzzy model (0.05, 0.5, 0.95), (0, 0.5, 1)
Θ right-dominance weight (‘optimism’) 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
Ns/L coverage 30%, 50%, 100%
Table 3.2: Parameters used to simulate the application of simplified decision models
A resolution V fractional factorial design [e.g. 195, chapter 8] is used, so all main effects
are unconfounded with two- and three-factor interactions, and all two-factor interactions
are unconfounded with other two-factor interactions. The simulation performs 100 runs
for each combination of parameters, giving standard errors of at most 0.003 for mean
utility losses in groups formed by combinations of two factors. This is small enough for












Figure 3.2 shows the average utility loss of each simplified model under error-free (indicated
by unshaded circles) and erroneous assessments (indicated by shaded circles (10% error),
squares (20% error) or triangles (30% error)). Within each model type, utility losses are
ordered from best to worst according to the error-free values. This allows one to see the
smallest/best mean utility losses as well as the range of possible values. For comparative
purposes, a random selection policy gives a utility loss of approximately 0.50 whether
dominated alternatives are removed or not. The mean utility of the MAUT best (worst)
alternative is 0.43 (0.33) when dominated alternatives are removed, and 0.52 (0.32) when
they are included. The larger range of utilities when dominated alternatives are included
means that utility losses are generally smaller in that condition – because dominated
alternatives are very rarely selected by any of the simplified models – but conclusions
are not affected by the presence of dominated alternatives. The discussion below focuses
mainly on results obtained without dominated alternatives.
In Figure 3.2, Hypothesis 1 and 2 are strongly supported and Hypothesis 3 is conditionally
supported. The average utility loss using expected values is better than any explicit risk
model using fixed risk multipliers (Hypothesis 1), provided assessment errors are not large.
When assessment errors are large a model using probabilities of performing below a central
quantile can be more accurate than one using expected values. This suggests that an ex-
plicit risk attribute may impart some robustness to assessment errors. In general though,
it appears that a model using a fixed risk multiplier approximates MAUT relatively poorly.
Sensitivity to assessment errors decreases as the risk multiplier is increased because ‘risk’
components are less se sitive to errors than ‘value’ components (if only variances are used,
the utility loss varies from 0.40 to 0.45 depending on assessment errors). The utility losses
of variance models with large risk multipliers do not improve when dominated alternatives
are included (as other models do) because there are no substantial differences in the vari-
ances of dominated and non-dominated alternatives. A variance model using Kirkwood’s
weights [150] performs better than one using fixed risk multipliers, but it is only in the
unrealistic case where the risk multiplier is optimally chosen that an explicit risk model
gives consistently better results than expected values alone.
The average utility loss for the equal-weight quantile models over all assessment errors
(in the absence of dominated alternatives) is 0.052 and 0.080 using five or three quantiles
respectively, significantly lower than the 0.106 obtained using expected values (Hypothesis
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assessment error, but even in the absence of errors average utility loss is 0.004 and 0.019 if
five or three quantiles are used respectively, and 0.020 using expected values. If quantile
weights are chosen optimally, the error-free mean utility loss is less than 0.001 using either
five or three quantiles. The average weight allocated to the 5%, 50%, and 95% quantiles
is 0.16, 0.65 and 0.19 respectively8; this is very close to the weights proposed by [144]:
0.185, 0.630 and 0.185. If five quantiles are used, the average quantile weights are 0.07,
0.12, 0.60, 0.12, and 0.09 for the 5% through 95% quantiles respectively. The increase in
accuracy derived from placing more weight on the central quantile is also (as expected)
exhibited by the fuzzy models, where the best accuracy is obtained using 5%, 50% and
95% quantiles with Θ = 0.5 (equivalent to a quantile model using the same quantiles
with wq1 = 0.25, wq2 = 0.5, and wq3 = 0.25). Decreases in accuracy observed when using
different weights are only marginal, but large deteriorations are observed if the 5% and
95% quantiles are replaced by minima and maxima respectively.
Figure 3.2 also shows that if one excludes those explicit risk models which perform ter-
ribly, there is a clear trend towards increased robustness in the quantile and scenario
models, although robustness can also vary widely within model type. Table 3.3 shows
the deteriorations in utility loss that occur as a result of different sized assessment errors.
The selected models are the best-performing versions of each simplified model (in terms
of mean utility loss with no assessment error) that do not make use of optimal weights
and have been ranked from the smallest average increase in utility loss over all assessment
errors to the largest. Although there is some contrary evidence in that the 3-scenario
model is more robust than the 5-quantile model, there is a clear association between the
number of inputs used by a simplified model and its robustness to assessment error.
Scenario model accuracy is strongly influenced by both scenario construction and coverage.
Substantially better accuracy is obtained if scenarios are constructed using mean values.
The relatively poor results obtained when selecting realizations at random from each future
highlights the importance of accurately assessing means. If no futures are omitted (100%
coverage), then results can be excellent; but if coverage drops to 50% then accuracy (when
no assessment errors are made) is worse than if expected values are used. As indicated,
the view taken here is that results using 50% and 30% coverage probably provide more
appropriate indicators of the practical potential of scenario models. Coverage becomes
more important relative to scenario construction when dominated alternatives are present;
all models with 100% coverage outperform all those with 50% coverage, which in turn
outperform all those with 30% coverage. This is because alternatives can perform terribly
8These are calculated based on error-free assessments only. When assessment errors are made the













Model Conditions 10% 20% 30%
Scen 10 mean scenarios (100% coverage) 0.008 0.034 0.063
Scen 5 mean scenarios (50% coverage) 0.013 0.048 0.080
Scen 3 mean scenarios (30% coverage) 0.020 0.058 0.095
Quan 5 equally-weighted quantiles 0.024 0.067 0.102
Quan 3 equally-weighted quantiles 0.032 0.085 0.125
Fuzzy q = (0.05, 0.5, 0.95), Θ = 0.5 0.032 0.088 0.141
Pr(Poor) 0.50 cutoff, risk multiplier = 0.25 0.036 0.093 0.140
Var Kirkwood’s weights 0.049 0.120 0.170
EV – 0.052 0.121 0.172
Table 3.3: Increases in mean utility loss caused by assessment errors. Results are only
reported for simulations where dominated alternatives have been removed. Simplified
models are represented by their best-performing versions, after excluding models using
optimal risk or quantile weights.
in omitted futures. An advantage of scenario models is increased robustness to assessment
errors. When assessment errors are made, the mean scenario model with 50% coverage
offers similar performance to a three-quantile model using equal quantile weights.
Table 3.4 shows how average utility loss differs over other simulation parameters. The
utility function parameters τj and λj are shown jointly to evaluate Hypothesis 4. Accuracy
is primarily affected by the shape of the utility functions, and is best when these are
predominantly concave and worst when they are predominantly convex. Many of the
approximations used in the current simulations occur in the middle-to-upper part of the
attribute domain, where convex utility functions are steeper than concave ones (Hypothesis
4). This occurs because any differences are more heavily penalised by a steeper utility
function9. Further results show that both the approximations made by simplified models
and assessment errors cause the deteriorations in accuracy. With no assessment errors, the
greatest utility loss occurs (for all simplified models) with highly convex utility functions
(high τj , low λj). The increase in average utility loss caused by the same size assessment
error is also greatest when utility functions are highly convex. Table 3.4 also shows that
the accuracy of all the simplified models is very nearly constant over the simulated problem
sizes10 (Hypothesis 5). The only other variable exerting a meaningful effect on accuracy
is the variability of the attribute evaluations – as evaluations become more variable the
9Another explanation is that a sharp threshold at a low reference level implies a utility function that
is relatively flat over a large portion of the attribute domain, which reduces the utility loss of selecting a
‘good-but-not-the-best’ alternative. However, the rank of the alternative selected by the simplified models
in the MAUT rank order also deteriorates (from an average of 2.0 to 2.4 as utility functions shift from
mostly concave to mostly convex), and thus this cannot completely explain the effect.
10This depends on utility loss being used to measure accuracy. Measures of accuracy based on ranks e.g.
the average rank of the selected alternative in the MAUT rank order, differ significantly with the number
of alternatives used, but an increasing rank does not necessarily imply a deterioration in decision quality











accuracy of all the simplified models worsens.
3.6 Discussion
The simulation experiment reported here takes a number of simplified decision models
used in practice and evaluates how close their results are to what might be achieved using
MAUT. These results are not intended to be used to conclude a detailed apparatus which
prescribes rules for using particular decision models in particular situations. Rather the
results suggest a general course of action for practitioners who for reasons of simplicity
prefer not to use MAUT. It must be stressed that all findings are limited by the range of
cases which have been simulated, as all simulation experiments are. The complexity of the
simulation apparatus is largely to ensure that a suitable range of decision problems have
been covered (although doubtless there are counterexamples to the findings which could
be constructed). Although the apparatus of the simulation experiment may be complex,
the conclusions are fairly simple.
The basic message emerging from the simulations is that – for a wide range of simulated
decision problems – all of the simplified models are able to produce results that are, on
average, close to what would be achieved under MAUT. The best-performing of each of
the simplified models have average utility losses of less than 0.04 (where 0 is optimal,
and a policy of randomly selecting an alternative has an average utility loss of approxi-
mately 0.5). Given the time and effort required to implement a MAUT model, the use
of simplified models appears justifiable for many decision problems. The results suggest
that avoiding assessment errors in the application of a simplified model is more important
than the choice of a particular type of model. This provides numerical support for the
notion that analysts have considerable scope to choose the model that they (or the deci-
sion makers they are facilitating) are most comfortable with and are least likely to apply
poorly. One check that analysts should perform before using a simplified model is to test
whether preferences are highly non-linear. The results indicate that the accuracy of all
the simplified models deteriorates as preference thresholds become sharper in the region
where approximations are made. The main reason for this is that any assessment errors
are more heavily punished. Analysts wishing to use simplified models but finding that
strong preference thresholds exist should therefore place extra effort in ensuring accurate
approximations, for example by using additional consistency checks.
Although the performance of all the simplified models is good in the absence of assessment
errors, a quantile model (including those fuzzy decision models which are equivalent to






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































model will need to take into account other practical factors. The results only suggest
that if analysts wish to conform to MAUT but lack the resources to implement the full
model, they should consider a quantile model first. Accuracy is best served by avoiding
the use of absolute maxima and minima and by aggregating evaluations over quantiles
using the weights proposed by [144]: the median receives roughly two-thirds of the weight
and the remainder is shared between the other quantiles. These quantile weights do not
provide information about decision maker preferences but rather aim only to approximate
a MAUT model. This means that no assessment of quantile weights is required. Quan-
tiles (particularly non-extreme quantiles) can be assessed relatively accurately by decision
makers [e.g. 217, 103] and are commonly used in the practical assessment of probability
distributions using, for example, the bisection or interval methods [e.g. 238]. Trade-off
judgements are also likely to be easier than with other risk measures because quantiles are
measured on the same scale as the attribute evaluations. All this suggests a use for the
three-quantile model as a preliminary screening tool before a more detailed assessment
using MAUT. This could be done to select the most promising alternatives from a larger
set, or to assess whether the choice of a preferred alternative is clear enough that a full
MAUT analysis is not required. If the bisection (or similar) method is to be used to assess
probability distributions then the quantiles assessed for a preliminary model could be used
for later assessments too, so that the use of a preliminary model would not add a signifi-
cant amount of time or effort to the analysis. If a quantile model is to be used on its own,
the accuracy results as well as the relative inaccuracies reported when assessing extreme
quantiles [8] suggest that upper and lower quartiles be assessed as well as the usual median
and extremes. It may be useful to structure the quantiles into scenario-like arrangements
by collecting together all the attribute evaluations at a particular quantile. Although such
an arrangement is not necessary, some insight might be gained from allowing decision
makers to compare alternatives at their ‘almost-worst-case’, ‘almost-best-case’ and some
‘intermediate’ levels of performance. Some evidence for this conjecture is presented in an
application reported in Chapter 5.
Several authors have called for decision analysts to pay greater attention to scenario plan-
ning techniques [108, 197], which are well-established in strategic decision making. The
simulation results indicate that when a substantial number of futures are omitted a sce-
nario model gives a worse average approximation to MAUT than any other simplified
model. The time and cognitive effort involved in constructing scenarios means some omis-
sions are inevitable, in my view. Scenario-based MCDA may possess other advantages –
generating insights into uncertainty and novel actions are commonly-cited benefits [230] –
but analysts should be aware that a scenario model, even if correctly applied, will lead to











analyst may for pragmatic reasons (e.g. familiarity) want to use scenarios but also wish
to obtain results that are close to MAUT. The results here suggest that in such cases
scenarios should attempt to capture mean performances in as many futures as is practi-
cally feasible. This is quite different to the philosophy of scenario planning, which often
advocates taking a small number of extreme positions when constructing scenarios [e.g.
230].
For the range of simulated decision problems, explicit risk models performed poorly rela-
tive to other simplified models. When no assessment errors are made both the variance
model and a model using probabilities of poor performance can lead to poorer approxima-
tions of MAUT than a model using expected values only, unless risk weights are chosen
optimally. The variance model does particularly poorly when risk weights are assigned as
a fixed multiple of the attribute importance weights. Behavioural research suggests that
the elicitation and understanding of variance information is difficult [e.g. 102], and the
assessment of weights involving variances also seems a difficult prospect. In conjunction
with the accuracy results, this suggests that the variance model must make use of the risk












A choice experiment investigating
the effect of uncertainty
representation on decision making
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a choice experiment investigating the effects of using different for-
mats for representing uncertain attribute evaluations on decision making. The experiment
involves a series of choices presented to numerate but unfacilitated study participants.
Each choice task requires that the subject selects one alternative from a set of five. Sub-
jects are informed that in each problem they will be selecting an investment for a friend
who has specific aims on one, two, or three objectives. The performance of each alterna-
tive on each objective is not known with certainty but is presented to the decision maker
using one of six uncertainty formats: probability distributions; expected values with or
without standard deviations; a set of five quantiles; a triangular approximation to the
probability distribution (minimum-median-maximum); and a set of three representative
“scenarios”. No elicitation of uncertainty information is required from the participants –
all information is provided to them (in one of the formats mentioned above, without any
assessment errors) as part of the task. Because the choice is to be made on behalf of a
friend whose preferences are largely specified in the problem, it is possible to identify a
‘true’ best alternative according to an idealised application of MAUT and evaluate the
chosen alternative relative to this alternative using utility loss, as in the previous chapter.
Information is also gathered on the difficulty experienced by subjects in making a deci-
sion, the mental processes by which decisions are reached, and certain characteristics of
the selected alternative.
This study continues the line of enquiry begun in the previous chapter by examining how
different formats for representing uncertainty can systematically influence decision mak-











not study real prescriptive decision making but rather describes näıve subjects making
choices in the absence of any facilitation, the results have some implications for prescrip-
tive decision making practice in that they identify natural tendencies which may need
to be overcome in the course of a prescriptive analysis. The chapter is organised as fol-
lows. The next section presents the main hypotheses to be tested against the experimental
data. Following that, a description of the design and execution of the experiment is given,
followed by the results. A final discussion section concludes the chapter.
4.2 Research hypotheses
Previous research in behavioural decision making suggests that decision makers may be
overwhelmed by a large amount of information such as that presented by the full proba-
bility distributions [186], and thus that decision quality (interpreted here as synonymous
with how accurately the results of an additive MAUT model are approximated) may ben-
efit from the use of a more concise format. However, an oversummarisation will tend to
obscure important information about the riskiness of an alternative. It is difficult to judge
a priori, but expected values and perhaps standard deviations may fall into this category.
Uncertainty formats using “intermediate” levels of detail are therefore expected to perform
best.
Hypothesis 1a: Uncertainty format has a significant effect on accuracy.
Hypothesis 1b: Accuracy will be highest using uncertainty formats that provide “inter-
mediate” levels of detail: three-point (min-median-max) approximations, quantiles,
and scenarios.
The difficulty of a decision task is often related to the amount of information processing
required to arrive at a choice [213], which in turn is associated with the amount of infor-
mation provided to the decision maker. The uncertainty formats provide very different
amounts of information to decision makers, and it seems likely that those providing more
concise information will be judged easier to use. Because of the difficulty involved in
reasoning with (e.g. making trade-offs between) variances [103], an exception is expected
here: multi-objective decisions involving standard deviations are expected to be relatively
difficult despite the conciseness of the information provided.
Hypothesis 2a: Uncertainty format has a significant effect on the level of difficulty ex-
perienced, with the level of difficulty experienced increasing with the quantity of
information provided.
Hypothesis 2b: The use of standard deviations will become more difficult relative to the











It is expected that decision makers will tend to focus on information that is particularly
salient i.e. that which is directly presented to them [131], and will therefore be more
likely to choose alternatives that perform well on the type of information provided by
an uncertainty format. Precise hypotheses are listed as Hypothesis 3b, 3c, and 3d. No
hypothesis is made involving maxima, because the only uncertainty format which explictly
shows maximum values (the three-point approximations) also shows minimum values at
the same time. For most decision makers, the minimum values are expected to be more
influential than the maximum values, negating any effect.
Hypothesis 3a: Uncertainty format has a significant effect on the type of alternative
that is chosen – alternatives with certain characteristics will tend to be selected
more frequently using uncertainty formats explicitly showing information on those
characteristics.
Hypothesis 3b: Alternatives with relatively larger expected values will be more fre-
quently selected if expected values are used.
Hypothesis 3c: Alternatives with relatively smaller standard deviations will be more
frequently selected if standard deviations are used.
Hypothesis 3d: Alternatives with relatively larger minima will be more frequently se-
lected if three-point approximations are used.
4.3 Details of choice experiment
4.3.1 Recruitment and sample selection
The sample is drawn from postgraduate students (masters and doctoral) at Manchester
Business School. Twenty-eight subjects were recruited in September 2008 by email and
poster invitations to participate in an experiment and “give some feedback on differ-
ent ways of presenting uncertainty information in investment decisions”. One group of
13 subjects performed the experiment while carrying out a verbal commentary on their
decision-making processes, and another group of 15 simply performed the experiment,
without commentary. Subjects were told that the experiment without commentary would
take about an hour and would be remunerated at £8, with the experiment with com-
mentary taking about 90 minutes and being remunerated at £12. Subjects were asked
to indicate a preference for doing the experiment with or without commentary but were
told that their preference may not be accommodated. Most subjects opted for the ‘with











4.3.2 Description of the task
Each subject performs a series of 12 decision tasks, each involving choosing between a set
of five investment alternatives. Respondents are informed that, in each problem, they will
be selecting an investment for a friend who has been bequeathed £100,000. Depending on
the problem, the friend may have one, two or three objectives. These are stated as:
Objective 1: Maximise the amount of profit returned after year 1 (to be withdrawn and
used to fund a holiday).
Objective 2: Maximise the amount of profit returned after year 2 (net of year 1’s profit;
to be withdrawn and used to fund the purchase of a car). Included in this objective
is an additional statement from the friend to the effect that “I’ll need at least £4,000
to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all I’ll be able to get is
a piece of junk”.
Objective 3: Maximise the total value of the investment after 6 years, net of any with-
drawals (to be withdrawn and used to fund the purchase of a house).
If fewer than three objectives are used, they are introducted sequentially in the order
indicated above. Respondents are given additional instructions that only one investment
may be chosen, and that the weight wj that the friend associates with objective j is given
by w1 = 1, w2 = 1, and w3 = 2. Finally, subjects are told that although the values of the
investments at each time period are uncertain, experts have provided some indication of
the possible values that each investment might take on, and that different formats have
been used to represent this uncertainty.
Six different ways of presenting uncertain outcomes are used, although any one subject
will only see two of these: probability distributions, expected values, expected values with
standard deviations, three-point approximations/fuzzy numbers, scenarios, and quantiles.
Subjects were given a brief (typically about 5 minutes) tutorial on the meaning and use
of each of the uncertainty formats relevant to them.
4.3.3 Verbal commentary and facilitator involvement
One group of subjects performed the tasks without providing any verbal commentary, and
a second group performed the tasks while simultaneously commenting on their decision-
making processes. Subjects giving commentary were given a general overview of verbal
process-tracing protocols and the reason for verbal protocols in the current experiment i.e.
to better understand the processes that people use when making decisions when outcomes
are uncertain. They were then asked to provide a running explanation of how they were











which pieces of information they were considering at any point in time, and how they were
comparing alternatives using this information. Subject were told that any comments on
perceived difficulty or simplicity of the problem (or the way in which the problem was
formulated), subject fatigue, and interest or boredom were welcome, and that they were
also free to make any other comments they wished during the course of the experiment.
These commentaries were recorded and later transcribed.
Each subject in the ‘with commentary’ group completed their task in the presence of a
‘facilitator’ (myself). The role of the facilitator was primarily to provide an audience for
the subject’s commentary so that the atmosphere is less artificial and approximates that
of a conversation, albeit a one-sided one. The facilitator could also prompt the subject
to provide more detailed commentary where this was not forthcoming, and direct the
conversation to ensure that the essential aspects of the decision process were commented
upon. Beyond this, an attempt was made to keep the influence of the facilitator to a
minimum.
In both the groups providing and not providing commentary, subjects were advised that
at any time they could ask the person administrating the tasks for technical information
about the uncertainty formats used. No information about how the the decision should
be made was disclosed.
4.3.4 Design of investment alternatives
In each decision problem subjects must choose between I = 5 alternatives described on
J = 1, 2 or 3 attributes. The performance of investment ai on attribute cj is denoted by Zij
and is not known with certainty. The generation of uncertain investment returns uses the
same procedure as the simulation study described in Section 3.4.1. Realisations for each
Zij are drawn from L = 3 normal distributions or ‘futures’, denoted by N(µij`, σ2ij`), ` ∈
{1, . . . , L} where µ and σ2 are mean and variance respectively. The µij` are generated on
U [0, 1] and then standardised within each alternative ai so that
∑
j µij` = 1, ensuring that
the alternatives are Pareto optimal within each future1. The σij` are generated uniformly
between 0.01 and 0.1. Thirty values are then generated from each normal distribution
N(µij`, σ2ij`). Each Zij is therefore represented by 90 realisations. Evaluations on each
attribute are then scaled to lie between £0 and £10,000 (for attribute 1 and 2) or between
£90,000 and £150,000 (for attribute 3). In certain of the choice problems, one of the
generated investment options is replaced by an alternative which has a similar expected
value to the investment that it is replacing, but is much less variable on at least one of the
1In the case of a single attribute, a different standardisation is carried out (the one described above
would just result in values of one for all investments) in which attribute values are standardised over all











attributes. The same non-dominance conditions applying to the original set of alternatives
are preserved after the inclusion of the less risky alternative.
4.3.5 Uncertainty formats
The manner in which each uncertainty format was presented to subjects is shown in
Appendix B.1, which contains a copy of a questionnaire that was presented for one of the
two-objective decision problems (six questionnaires are given; one for each uncertainty
format). The most salient features of each presentation are given below.
Probability distributions Subjects are shown a histogram dividing each attribute do-
main into ten equal-sized intervals and plotting the relative frequency of each in-
terval. Where multiple objectives are used a grid of histograms is shown, with the
investments arranged in columns and objectives in different rows. No numerical
information is presented in this format, because it seems certain that any numeri-
cal information (even a tabular summary of the information in the histograms, for
example) will be so overwhelmingly dense that it will be ignored in favour of the
graphical format.
Expected values Subjects are shown the expected amount returned by each investment
on each objective. Where more than one objective is used, the expected values are
shown using in numerical format i.e. in a table, and in a graph in which investments
are represented as lines and expected values are plotted on the vertical axis. All
objectives are shown on the same table/graph. When three objectives are used, this
requires both a left-hand vertical axis (scaled between £0 and £10,000 for the first
two objectives) and right-hand vertical axis (scaled between £90,000 and £150,000
for the third objective).
Standard deviations Expected values are shown to subjects as before (in both tabular
and graphical formats) but in addition standard deviations for each investment are
shown in an extra column in the table of expected values.
Quantiles This format shows the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% quantiles of each distri-
bution of attribute evaluations. The information is presented as a 5 × 5 matrix of
attribute evaluations for each objective, together with an adjoining graph plotting
the quantiles along the x-axis and investment amounts on the y-axis. Each objec-
tive has its own table or graph, with each investment (for a particular objective)
represented by a different line in the graph (or row in the table).
Three-point approximations Each investment’s possible outcomes on an objective are
represented by a triple consisting of the minimum, median, and maximum attribute











the tabular format, the values are simply listed as minima, medians, and maxima.
Then, although it is not strictly necessary to interpret the triples as “fuzzy numbers”
(they are simply three-point approximations to the full probability distributions),
in the graphical format each graph is shown as a triangular membership function
using the (x, y) co-ordinates: (minimum, 0), (median, 1), and (maximum, 0), with
the y-axis labelled “membership”. Collectively the graphs are displayed in a similar
way to the probability distributions (investments in different columns, objectives in
different rows).
Scenarios Subjects are shown three tables, each one showing the mean performance of
the investments on each objective in that future i.e. the µij`, ` ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The
evaluations are also presented to subjects as graphs using the same format as the
expected value graphs. Prior to the presentation of the results subjects are given
a brief description of each scenario as well as an explicit statement that they are
considered equally likely to occur. The scenarios are labelled ‘Eastern growth’,
‘Nothing changes’ and ‘Problematic world’ respectively, although their labels and
descriptions are theoretically irrelevant to the problem.
4.3.6 Experimental design
The experiment has three treatment effects – uncertainty format (6 levels), number of ob-
jectives (3 levels), and the use of commentary (2 levels). The experiment is designed as an
incomplete block design in which each subject sees two of the six uncertainty formats and
two of the three objective set sizes, and answers three decision problems within each com-
bination of uncertainty format and objective number. Each of the 28 subjects therefore
makes 12 investment choices in total, for a total sample size of 336. At an estimated 5 min-
utes per problem (including the collection of outcome measures), this probably approaches
the upper limit of what can be considered a manageable workload for subjects. Originally,
it was hoped to have 15 subjects in each of the with- and without-commentary groups, but
two subjects scheduled to provide commentary did not arrive for their interviews. Time
constraints prevented replacements being found for these subjects. Nevertheless, each
uncertainty format is seen by either eight (scenarios), nine (expected values, standard de-
viations) or ten subjects (all other formats), who each see it in six problems, so that there
are between 48 and 60 observations for each uncertainty format. Each combination of
uncertainty format and objective set size is seen by between two and four subjects so that
there are between 12 and 24 observations for each combination. The 12 problems seen by
any one subject are all different problems i.e. subjects do not see the same problem using
different uncertainty formats. This means that 18 investment problems are generated in
all – six single-objective, two-objective, and three-objective problems – although any one











to the subjects is completely randomised.
4.3.7 Experimental outcomes
Measuring accuracy
As in the simulation study, accuracy is evaluated using “utility loss” [19]. Two utility loss
measures are used. The first compares the selected alternative to what would be selected
using an idealised additive MAUT model. This is the ‘conventional’ utility loss used in
the previous chapter, but it assumes that subjects have access to the full probability
distributions used by MAUT. Usually this will not be the case – subjects will see only a
summary of the distributions – and it seems somewhat unfair to evaluate subjects based
on information that is partly unavailable to them. The second type of utility loss thus
compares the selected alternative to what would be selected using an idealised application
of whatever simplified value function model is appropriate for the uncertainty format
presented in a problem (e.g. an expected value model, a quantile model). The same
simplified models are used as in the simulation reported in Chapter 3; see Appendix B.2
for details.
The use of both types of utility loss requires that one specifies the attribute weights and
marginal utility functions to be used as inputs to the idealised (MAUT or simplified)
models. Idealised weights are those specified by the problem description (w1 = w2 =
1, w3 = 2), but the precise shape of the idealised marginal utility functions cannot be
known with certainty. A number of functional forms that appear plausible based on the
problem description and an assessment of subjects’ statements of their decision-making
strategies have therefore been used. These indicate two dominant features: a strong
tendency towards risk aversion i.e. concave utility functions, for attributes 1 and 3; and
a very strong preference threshold around £4,000 for attribute 2. A full list of the utility
function parameters used for 12 plausible preference structures is given in Appendix B.3.
Each of the functional forms results in an estimate of utility loss. These 12 utility losses











)/12 where U (j)i∗ is the utility (obtained using idealised model j) of the best alternative
in idealised model j’s rank order, U (j)i∗ is the utility of the worst alternative in idealised
model j’s rank order, and U (j)
isel
is the utility (again according to idealised model j) of the
alternative selected by the subject. The sensitivity of the accuracy results to preference
structures is shown in Appendix B.4, which presents accuracy results separately for each
of the sets of marginal utility functions. The accuracy results of the expected value model
can vary considerably depending on the form of the underlying utility functions – they are
excellent when utility functions are linear but deteriorate relative to the other formats as











on which of the utility functions in Appendix B.3 are used.
Measuring perceived difficulty and confidence in answer
Following each investment decision subjects were asked to indicate how difficult they had
found it to arrive at a decision. Their answers were given on a scale from 1 (extremely
easy) to 7 (extremely difficult). Subjects were also asked to indicate how confident they
were of having chosen the best of all the investments, by completing a statement “Given
100 problems similar to this one, I would expect to choose the best investment in about
x of them”. Subjects were specifically instructed that they should consider both their
confidence in their decision-making and the fact that they may not have had access to all
information. After answering all 12 decision problems, subjects were given a final survey
in which they indicated which of the two uncertainty formats they felt helped them to
make better decisions, and which they found easier to use. This set of questions was asked
separately for both numbers of objectives that the subject had seen. Subjects were given
an option of indicating that no difference was perceived between the uncertainty formats.
Measuring the characteristics of the chosen alternative
For each choice task, different alternatives possess different characteristics e.g. a large
expected value, a small standard deviation. The selection of an alternative can be inter-
preted as providing an indication of the desirability of those characteristics. The approach
used here is to describe the performance of an alternative on each attribute in terms of its
rank among the set of alternatives according to four measures: expected values, standard
deviations, minima, and maxima. Descending rank orders are used for expected values,
minima, and maxima (where la ger values are preferred); an ascending rank order is used
for standard deviations (where less is preferred). A rank of one thus indicates the most
desirable alternative on any characteristic. For problems involving multiple objectives,
alternatives’ characteristics can be described for each objective and final rank measures
are calculated by averaging the ranks obtained for each attribute.
4.3.8 Model building
For the outcomes described above, one might expect responses to be correlated within
subjects – for some subjects to exhibit generally higher quality decisions, or to tend to
choose alternatives of a particular kind, etc. To account for the possibility of correlated
observations, generalised estimating equations (GEE’s, e.g. [173, 302]) has been used to fit
models to the data. These assume that the marginal distribution of a dependent variable
follows a generalised linear model (GLM’s; e.g. [190]) g(E[Yij ]) = xijβ, where Yij denotes
the value of outcome j for subject i, xij is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is a















i , where Ai is a diagonal matrix
of variance functions (in the quasi-likelihood approach employed by GLM’s and GEE’s,
these are known functions of the mean response i.e. h(E[Yij ])), and R(α) is the so-called
“working” correlation matrix of Yi. The vector of parameters α specifies the nature of
the correlation structure – for example, the standard GLM assumes that repeated obser-
vations for a given subject are independent of one another – and the matrix is referred to
as a “working” one because the parameter estimates and their estimated variances remain
consistent even if the correlation structure is misspecified, provided that the model for the
mean is correct [302]. Because the order of task presentation is completely randomised, a
simple “exchangeable” correlation structure is used which assumes a constant correlation
between any pair of observations within the same subject i.e. corr[Yij , Yik] = α for all
j 6= k.
For responses involving difficulty, confidence, and the ranks of the selected alternative
according to certain characteristics, Gaussian probability functions with identity links are
used. The accuracy outcomes are fractional response variables for which a logit link func-
tion and binomial probability function can be used whenever a quasi-likelihood approach
is adopted [210], as is the case with GEE’s. Two-factor interactions were considered and
have been included where significant at the 10% level. Results for main effects are shown
whether they are significant or not. The effect of uncertainty formats are shown using
probability distributions as a reference category. On a final note regarding outliers and
data cleaning, one subject, when presented with a single-objective problem using expected
values, selected the investment with the lowest expected value in two of the three prob-
lems (and the investment with the second-lowest expected value in the third problem).
The single-objective expected value problem is seemingly trivial, since each alternative is
represented by only a single number (to be maximised), and thus the choices are highly
suspect. Since the study is partly concerned with errors using decision aids, one is loathed
to remove observations where errors have clearly been made. However, it seems that here
the error cannot be expected to generalise and is simply the result of carelessness. I argue
that this carelessness would be far less likely to happen in real-world decision making, and
therefore delete these three observations from the analysis. It is worth noting, since one
might suspect the entire set of 12 choices made by that subject, that further deletion of
observations had no effect on any of the conclusions drawn.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Factors affecting accuracy
Mean utility losses are 0.20 if accuracy is computed relative to a MAUT model and 0.15











are less than 0.01). Median responses are 0.09 and 0.02 respectively. Mean MAUT utility
losses are 0.26 for expected values, 0.23 for standard deviations, 0.25 for probability dis-
tributions, 0.12 for quantiles, 0.15 for three-point approximations, and 0.17 for scenarios
(all standard errors are 0.03). These figures indicate that subjects generally performed
far better than random guessing, which returns a MAUT utility loss of 0.5. Figure 4.1
shows parameter estimates for variables potentially influencing accuracy, with estimates
for each uncertainty format (‘EV’ = expected values; ‘SD’ = standard deviations; ‘3pt’
= three-point approximations; ‘Quan’ = quantiles; ‘Scen’ = scenarios) shown in Figure
4.1(a) and estimates for other effects (‘Rep’ = number of previously seen problems of this
type; ‘MCr’ = more than one objective; ‘Comm’ = commentary given) shown in Figure
4.1(b). In Figure 4.1(a) parameter estimates should be interpreted relative to the appro-
priate reference category – probability distributions. Effects on utility loss calculated using
a MAUT model are shown on the x-axis, and effects on utility loss calculated using an
appropriate simplified model are shown on the y-axes. Labels are plotted at the estimated
parameter values, with 90% confidence intervals indicated by dashed ellipses. Statistical
significance (at the 10% level) can be deduced from the ellipses.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Parameter estimates for models of decision accuracy. The effects of uncertainty
formats are shown in (a), other effects are shown in (b).
Uncertainty formats that lead to more accurate approximations of MAUT than probability
distributions are those lying to the left of x = 0, and those that lead to good decisions
according to an idealised application of their own simplified models are those lying below
the line y = 0. Results indicate that quantiles, three-point approximations, and scenarios
all give significantly lower MAUT utility losses than probability distributions. Standard
deviations and expected values do not differ significantly from probability distributions












The results obtained relative to the idealised application of simplified models – those shown
on the y-axis – indicate that subjects are able to use standard deviations and expected
values to choose alternatives that are relatively good according to models considering only
standard deviations and expected values. The poor approximations of MAUT obtained
using these two uncertainty formats are therefore more due to limitations in the amount
of information that they can convey than to subjects using the information in a sub-
optimal way (the opposite is true of probability distributions). In contrast the location
of the ellipses for scenarios, quantiles, and three-point approximations in the lower-left
quadrant of Figure 4.1(a) indicates that subjects are able to make relatively good use
of the information conveyed by those formats and that those models are also capable of
closely approximating MAUT results.
Figure 4.1(b) shows the remaining effects. Decision accuracy improves as subjects see
more problems of a similar type, which would seem to indicate some kind of ‘learning’ or
familiarisation process. Accuracy also shows a very marginal tendency to deteriorate as
the number of objectives increases or if commentary is not provided – although it must
be stressed that these effects are not significant at the 10% level. Accuracy results show
essentially no within-subject correlations (within-subject correlations are 0.04 (s.e. 0.03)
and 0.05 (s.e. 0.03) for accuracy results using MAUT and simplified models respectively).
4.4.2 Factors affecting assessments of difficulty
The mean difficulty rating given by subjects is 3.21 (s.e. 0.07), indicating that most sub-
jects found the task moderately easy. Mean difficulty ratings are 2.9 for expected values,
3.8 for standard deviations, 3.5 for probability distributions, 3.5 for quantiles, 2.8 for three-
point approximations, and 2.7 for scenarios (standard errors are between 0.16 and 0.21).
Confidence in the quality of answer given is correspondingly high, with an average evalua-
tion of 76 (s.e. 0.8). Some 10% of all confidence ratings indicated 100% confidence, which
should only be possible under perfect information and a perfect decision-making strategy
(this was emphasised to subjects before the task). This suggests that either some subjects
were vastly overconfident in their abilities or (probably more likely) that the 0-100 scale
was interpreted in a subjective rating-scale sense rather than the intended probabilistic
one. Figure 4.2 shows parameter estimates for variables potentially influencing percep-
tions of difficulty and confidence, with the same format as Figure 4.1 except that the x-
and y-axes shows effects on perceived difficulty and confidence respectively. Uncertainty
formats that are evaluated as easier to use than probability distributions are those lying
to the left of x = 0, and those that lead to more confidence in decisions are those lying












Figure 4.2: Parameter estimates for models of perceived difficulty and confidence. The
effects of uncertainty formats are shown in (a), other effects are shown in (b).
Figure 4.2(a) shows a strong inverse relationship between difficulty and confidence, sup-
porting the suggestion that when evaluating their confidence subjects did not take into
account the amount of information that is lost when using a simplified model but rather
based both responses on difficulty. Subjects found expected values, standard deviations
(in single-objective problems), and three-point approximations significantly easier to use
than probability distributions. Coefficient signs for the quantile and scenario formats are
also negative but are not large enough to be significant, even at the 10% level. The strong
positive interaction between the use of standard deviations and the presence of multiple
objectives indicates that the use of this format becomes relatively more difficult when
multiple objectives are present, possibly because subjects find it difficult to make trade-
offs between the more abstract variance information. Both Hypothesis 2a and 2b are thus
supported by the data. Confidence evaluations, although less sensitive to uncertainty for-
mat, show essentially the same pattern. Only the expected value effect and the interaction
between standard deviations and multiple objectives are large enough to be significant at
the 10% level.
Subjects giving commentary rated the task as significantly more difficult than those who
did not give commentary. Subjects also indicated that problems became significantly more
difficult when multiple objectives were present and trade-offs between attributes had to
be considered. A further model was fitted using indicator variables to separate the effect
of two-objective and three-objective problems (relative to the reference single-objective
case). Both effects were significant at the 5% level and were of similar magnitude (0.41











perceived difficulty in going from one to two objectives was considered to be substantially
more than that experienced in going from two to three objectives. The effect of seeing one
or two problems of a similar type did not exercise a significant influence on difficulty. In
contrast to the decision accuracy results, evaluations of difficulty show substantial positive
within-subject correlation (0.31 (s.e. 0.05) for difficulty; 0.31 (s.e. 0.07) for confidence).
This indicates some general subject-specific differences, although because of the use of a
constructed difficulty scale, it is not possible to say whether some subjects genuinely felt
the tasks were more difficult than others or were interpreting the scale in a different way.
It is useful to combine the difficulty and utility loss results to broadly sketch the properties
of different uncertainty formats for multi-objective decision making. Figure 4.3(a) shows
the predicted MAUT utility loss and the predicted difficulty rating for decision problems
with multiple objectives. These evaluations can be compared with the overall ratings
of quality and difficulty gathered at the very end of the set of choices, shown in Figure
4.3(b). This figure shows, for each uncertainty format involving multiple objectives, the
proportion of all pairwise comparisons involving an uncertainty format in which subjects
perceived it as leading to worse decisions (as an inverse measure of accuracy, comparable
to utility loss) or being harder to use (as a measure of difficulty). The dashed ellipses
indicate 90% confidence intervals around the predicted values and proportions in Figure
4.3(a) and (b) respectively.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.3: Modes of uncertainty format evaluated according to their accuracy and dif-
ficulty in multi-objective problems. In (a) accuracy and difficulty are predicted values
obtained from the fitted models; in (b) they are obtained by holistic judgements made by
subjects after the set of tasks was completed.











tions, and to a lesser extent scenarios. Quantiles offer slightly greater accuracy than three-
point approximations, but are viewed as more difficult to use. Probability distributions
and standard deviations are essentially dominated by scenario assessments, three-point
approximatons, and quantiles. The positioning of expected values as an easy-to-use but
relatively poor-quality decision aid is also clear. The overall evaluations shown in Figure
4.3(b) are largely consistent with the predictive results shown in Figure 4.3(a). Two of the
main results – the accuracy of decisions using quantiles to present uncertainty, and that
three-point approximations offer additional ease-of-use with some trade-off in accuracy –
are clearly visible in Figure 4.3(b). The only noteworthy differences are that probability
distributions tend to be rated as relatively more accurate, and standard deviations and
three-point approximations relatively easier to use, in the holistic comparisons shown in
Figure 4.3(b).
4.4.3 Factors affecting the type of alternative chosen
The average rank of the selected alternative in rank orders of standard deviations and
minima – characteristics indicative of lower risk – are 2.26 (s.e. 0.05) and 2.14 (s.e. 0.05)
respectively. This is somewhat lower than the average rank in rank orders of expected
values (2.64, s.e. 0.05) and maxima (3.22, s.e. 0.07), indicating that subjects tended to
choose less risky alternatives more often. Figure 4.4 shows parameter estimates for vari-
ables potentially influencing the type of alternative chosen. In Figure 4.4(a) the x- and
y-axes show the relative effect of uncertainty format on the rank of the selected alternative
according to expected values and maxima respectively. In Figure 4.4(b) the x- and y-axes
show the effects on the rank according to standard deviations and minima respectively.
Uncertainty formats that tend to favour the selection of alternatives with a particular
characteristic will be located to the left of x = 0 (in the case of expected values and
standard deviations) and below y = 0 (for maxima and minima).
There are three main results in Figure 4.4(a) and (b), which apply only (or to a far
greater extent) in single-objective problems. Firstly, subjects shown expected values are
more likely to choose alternatives with large expected values or maxima, and less likely
to choose alternatives with small standard deviations or large minima. Secondly, sub-
jects shown standard deviations are less likely to choose alternatives with large maxima.
Thirdly, subjects are more likely to choose alternatives with relatively large minima if
three-point approximations are used. The latter two effects disappear when there are
multiple objectives, and the first effect is weaker – subjects are no longer more likely to
select alternatives with large expected values, are only slightly more likely to select alter-
natives with large maxima; but they remain less likely to choose alternatives with small












Figure 4.4: Parameter estimates for the rank of the chosen alternative according to specific
characteristics: (a) expected values and maxima, and (b) standard deviations and minima.
between objectives plays a role in drawing attention away from the pure “risk” aspect of
the problem.
With regard to the research hypotheses, at best mixed support is found. Alternatives with
larger expected values are more likely to be selected if expected values only are shown (Hy-
pothesis 3b), but only in the trivial single-objective case where this is the only information
given. There is no tendency for subjects to select alternatives with small standard devia-
tions relatively more often if standard deviations are shown (contrary to Hypothesis 3c).
Alternatives with larger minima are more likely to be selected using three-point approxi-
mations (Hypothesis 3d), but again only in the single-objective case (although this is no
longer trivial).
The remaining effects are much smaller in magnitude, and are not shown in detail here.
Subjects are less likely to choose alternatives with large expected values in multi-objective
problems (β = 0.28, p = 0.03), but are more likely to do so after seeing a problem type
several times (β = −0.13, p = 0.02). Subjects are more likely to choose alternatives with
large minima (β = 0.54, p < 0.01) in multi-objective problems. There is essentially no
within-subject correlation in any of the four outcomes (within-subject correlations are
between -0.02 (s.e. 0.02) and 0.04 (s.e. 0.04)).
4.4.4 Analysis of verbal commentaries
In this section, a qualitative summary of the subjects’ verbal commentaries is given. An
attempt is made to identify those features of subjects’ decision making processes that











Salience of problem description
One aspect of the problem description that was frequently mentioned by subjects was the
indication that more than £4,000 was required for the car to avoid buying a “piece of
junk”. All of the 13 subjects made some reference to satisfying this goal at some stage
in their commentaries; 10 subjects referred to it in more than a third of the (two- or
three-objective) problems that they saw, and 6 subjects referred to it in more than half
the problems that they saw. Subjects made use of this information in two quite different
ways. Most frequently, the fact that an alternative did not guarantee (or almost guarantee)
an amount of £4,000 for the car was used as a basis for excluding it. This was often done
in an initial ‘screening’ phase of evaluation [e.g. 196, 21]. Otherwise the probability of
obtaining £4,000 was used as a measure of the attractiveness of an alternative i.e. as an
explicit risk attribute. When scenarios were used, the number of scenarios in which the
amount received for a car exceeded £4,000 was used in a similar fashion.
A second feature that appears regularly in subjects’ commentaries and also involves the
salience of problem descriptions is a propensity to begin the decision making process
by considering performance on the most important objective, namely the house. This
behaviour can only be observed in three-objective problems, but in those cases it is fairly
widespread. Ten of the 13 subjects saw tasks involving the house objective, and of those ten
only two never considered the house objective first. Four of the remaining eight subjects
considered the house objective first in more than 50% of the problems they saw, although
only one subject did this in every problem. However, recognising that one objective is most
important does not always imply that it should be considered first – this largely depends
on what choice strategy is being used. Most compensatory approaches – like maximising
expected value or utility – do not require that objectives be considered in any particular
order. However, satisficing and other lexicographic strategies do imply that objectives are
considered in the order of their importance to the decision maker. On this point, it is
worth noting that the three subjects who considered the house objective first also made
the most frequent use of a satisficing-like heuristic (discussed in the next subsection).
Decision-making strategies
Subjects often worked by sequentially eliminating alternatives from consideration. This
elimination serves two purposes. First, it can be used in the early part of the decision
process to remove alternatives which are considered to be clearly unsuitable. This allows
the decision maker to then focus on a smaller number of alternatives in more detail. This
behaviour is widespread even though the number of alternatives is already quite small to
begin with. Second, some subjects continue with sequential elimination of alternatives











of unsuitable alternatives) ends and the other (a more subtle exclusion of alternatives)
begins. Alternatives are most often eliminated because they (a) do not offer £4,000 for
the car with sufficient certainty; (b) are too risky in the sense that they offer an unaccept-
ably high chance of getting a zero or near-zero amount on the holiday or car objectives,
or (c) are too risky in the sense that they offer an unacceptably large range of outcomes
on one or more objectives. Interestingly, although subjects often excluded alternatives
because of a possible zero-amount on the holiday or car objective, no subject explicitly
excluded an alternative because of a possibility of getting £90,000 for the house objective
– even though this is the minimum possible. This suggests that the value zero formed
a particularly salient reference point for subjects’ judgements i.e. the situation in which
nothing is obtained and no purchase (of a holiday or of a car) is possible at all.
Although the elimination of alternatives is by some way the most frequently observed
element of decision making strategy emerging from the commentaries, other features can
also be discerned. Where attractive features of an alternative’s performance have been
mentioned, these most often relate to (a) a high minimum value, (b) a small range between
worst and best outcomes, and (c) a good “balance”, particularly between the amount re-
ceived for the car and holiday. The first two of these features are fairly obvious in light of
the features perceived as particularly negative. The search for a “well-balanced” alterna-
tive was often justified using the equal importance of the car and holiday objective, but
even in the absence of this justification there was a strong tendency for subjects to view
alternatives doing excellently on one objective (even the house objective) at the expense
of the other objectives to be relatively poor.
There is fairly frequent use of a strategy bearing a strong resemblance to a satisficing-type
heuristic. The strategy involves the identification of a single alternative that does best on
some objective, generally maximising the value for a house. Following this, the selected
alternative’s performance on other attributes is assessed. If the performance is satisfac-
tory, the alternative is selected; if not, the alternative that is next-best on the original
attribute is selected and the process continues. The checking of performance on other at-
tributes is usually done in a fairly holistic way, and the subjects using this strategy differ
quite strongly with respect to how good the performance must be in order to be accepted.
One subject performs only a cursory inspection, another ends up always rejecting the first
selected alternative, from which one can assume that he is being fairly demanding. One
particularly clear example of this strategy is provided by a subject who uses the 50%
quantile of performance on the house objective to select an alternative. Performances on
the 5% and 95% quantile of the house objective are then checked. Following this, perfor-
mance on other objectives is evaluated in a more holistic way – no details are provided in











The “satisficing” heuristic described above is observed in three of the 13 subjects at some
stage of their decision making. Other heuristics that are also found at some stage include:
the “max-min” heuristic in which the alternative with the largest minimum value (on a
particular attribute, or across attributes in the multi-attribute case) is selected, the “take
the best” heuristic in which the alternative doing best on the most important attribute is
chosen; the “elimination by aspects” heuristic in which alternatives are removed if they
fail to achieve a certain performance level (until only one remains), and the “majority
of confirming decisions” heuristic in which the alternative that does best on the greatest
number of attribute is selected. In only one case does a subject explicitly attempt to
calculate the expected value to be obtained from the various alternatives, and to choose
the alternative with the highest expected value.
Use of uncertainty information
Subjects seeing three-points approximations often referred to minimum evaluations, using
these especially in the initial phases of the decision process to exclude alternatives which
had small minima on one or more objectives. This was perhaps the clearest influence of
uncertainty format on subjects’ decision-making processes. Subjects using probability dis-
tributions were observed to make reasonably frequent use of the mode of the distribution.
This was done without explicitly labelling it as such, but by making comments regard-
ing the most likely outcome or outcomes. Although the median is of course something
quite different, subjects using three-point approximations made less frequent comments
about this “middle” quantity – even though they only had three measures of attribute
performance to begin with. Variance information was used in two quite different ways.
Two of the four subjects seeing standard deviations used them to make very holistic de-
scriptions of an alternative’s desirability. In one case, this was accompanied by explicit
comments that it was difficult to work with standard deviations, so one interpretation of
these holistic judgements is that they are best attempts in the absence of a clear idea of
how to use standard deviations. The other two subjects constructed ranges by adding
and subtracting some multiple of the standard deviation from the expected value. These
ranges were then used as effective minimum-maximum ranges.
General comments
Most subjects giving commentary displayed a surprising level of enthusiasm and commit-
ment to the tasks. No real boredom or fatigue seemed to creep into their analyses, and no
comments to this effect were made. All subjects requested that the results of the study be
sent to them. Several subjects indicated that they thought that the context of the deci-
sion problem i.e. investments, had a significant influence on their decisions, and that their











When pressed however, subjects were not really able to elaborate on how or why their
decisions might have been changed by a different context. A related problem was that
subjects often attempted to adjust their friend’s weighting of the three objectives in line
with their own preferences – almost always by trying to impose that the house should be
the overwhelmingly more important objective (because it “appreciates in value over time”,
or is “a fixed asset”, and so on). Every attempt was made to focus subjects’ attention on
the stated preferences rather than their own, but probably not with total success.
4.5 Discussion
In Chapter 3 a simulation experiment was used to evaluate the potential ability of a
number of simplified decision models to replicate the results obtained using MAUT. The
main messages emerging from those results were that an idealised application of a sim-
plified model is on average capable of producing results close to an idealised application
of MAUT, and that a quantile model gives consistently better approximations than any
other simplified model. One concern with the simulation results is whether they carry over
into real-world prescriptive decision making. Another is that they are incapable of evalu-
ating critical practical issues for decision aid – ease of use, for example. In this chapter,
by considering actual choices made by unfacilitated subjects in a controlled experimental
setting, some progress has been made toward addressing these concerns.
4.5.1 Reconciling the simulation and choice experiments
A simplified model’s approximation of MAUT would be worse in practice than when
simulated if the uncertainty format used by the model biases the selection process in
favour of weaker (according to MAUT) alternatives. Biases may lead to some uncertainty
formats being preferable to others, or to the creation of tools for removing as much of
the bias as possible. Evaluating the biases in prescriptive decision making is difficult or
impossible. The time and effort involved in sourcing and assessing enough decision prob-
lems for any finding to be statistically reliable is prohibitively large, but even a single
within-subject comparison requires that the same decision maker independently construct
facilitated MAUT and simplified models, which in itself seems difficult to achieve.
In the absence of prescriptive results, some progress can be made by examining unfacili-
tated decisions and identifying any biases that may exist when using different uncertainty
formats. There is good reason to suspect that descriptive biases may also arise in pre-
scriptive decision making unless they are specifically addressed by the prescriptive analysis.
This sentiment has a long history in decision analysis in the context of probability elici-
tation (e.g. [102]). But because descriptive biases may be reversed with the facilitation,











prescriptive conclusions must be drawn tentatively.
There is nothing in the results of this chapter to suggest that radical changes to the main
conclusions drawn by the simulation study are required. Results continue to suggest that
the amount of information lost when using a simplified model does not prevent results from
approximating MAUT fairly closely. In the choice experiment average utility losses ranged
between 0.12 for quantiles and 0.26 for expected values, well below the 0.5 expected from
a random alternative selection. These utility losses were achieved without facilitation and
using artificial decision problems of no real consequence to the decision makers. Better
utility losses might be expected in real-world prescriptive decision making. The utility
loss results are roughly comparable in magnitude to those obtained using simulation with
large (30%) assessment errors, where the utility losses of the 5-quantile and expected value
models were 0.11 and 0.19 respectively (although the scenario model with 100% coverage
performed relatively better in the simulation – utility losses were 0.09 and 0.16 in the
simulation and choice experiments respectively).
The main result is that uncertainty format can exert a significant influence on the unfa-
cilitated choice of an alternative. For the tasks performed in this study and for the set
of participants used, the use of probability distributions appeared to overload subjects,
leading to relatively poor choices. This finding cannot be directly compared to any of the
simulation results, which only consider the idealised use of probability distributions in a
MAUT model. From a prescriptive perspective the results highlight the need for consider-
able facilitation and model building when probabilities are used to represent uncertainty,
because in the absence of facilitation decision makers use probability information poorly.
Of the other uncertainty formats, selected alternatives most closely approximated those
preferred under MAUT if quantiles, scenarios, or three-point approximations were used.
All of these formats provide an intermediate level of detail when summarising probability
distributions. Expected values and standard deviations returned significantly lower accu-
racies. By comparing the selected alternatives with what would have been chosen using an
idealised application of simplified models using expected values and standard deviations,
subjects were shown to be able to use this information effectively, choosing alternatives
that were good according to the simplified models. The poor approximations of MAUT
obtained using expected values and standard deviations are therefore predominantly due
to limitations in the amount of information that they can convey.
The experimental results also support the conclusion that a quantile model gives consis-
tently better approximations of MAUT than other models, which was drawn from the
simulation results. Although fuzzy decision models performed worse relative to other











point approximations may have also been used as quantiles. Simulation results also indi-
cated the scenario models could give excellent approximations if all futures are captured
in the scenarios, as is the case here. The relatively poorer performance of standard devia-
tions and to a lesser extent expected values is also in basic agreement with the simulation
results.
4.5.2 Practical issues
Because the choices in this chapter are real rather than simulated, the effects of uncertainty
format on more practical aspects of decision making can also be investigated – particularly
ease of use and the mental processes by which decisions are reached. Table 4.1 summarises
the main results and provides a classification of the six uncertainty formats in terms of
their effects on the main experimental outcomes.
Subjects found the detailed probability distributions relatively difficult to use, and more
concise formats – particularly expected values, standard deviations (in single-objective
problems), and three-point approximations – relatively easy to use. Standard deviations
were viewed as relatively more difficult to use in problems with multiple objectives, sug-
gesting that trade-offs involving standard deviations are difficult to think clearly about.
For decision making with multiple objectives, the use of probability distributions and
standard deviations is dominated by – in the sense of leading to poorer and more difficult
decisions than – the use of quantiles, three-point approximations, and scenarios. Expected
values occupy a unique position in that they are easy to use but lead to relatively poor
decisions. From a prescriptive perspective, the difficulty in using probability distributions
– which appears to be due to the amount of information given and a lack of ideas about
how to structure it – would probably be substantially reduced with facilitation. In the case
of standard deviations, relatively little information is shown and difficulty is experienced
not because of any overload but because of the difficulty of understanding and reasoning
with standard deviations. This difficulty, which is conceptual rather than due to a lack
of structure, would probably be reduced by facilitation but not to the same extent as
probabilities. The difficulty of using probability distributions may also be justified by the
improved decisions that surely arise when these are facilitated, but as the simulation re-
sults have shown even the idealised application of a variance model returns relatively poor
selections. The experimental and simulation results suggest that the standard deviation
is a relatively poor way of representing uncertainty in prescriptive decision problems.
Uncertainty formats convey information about the full probability distributions using dif-
ferent quantities. Drawing attention to certain quantities rather than others can not only
affect the choice of final alternative and the ease of use and understanding, but also the











evaluations tended to focus strongly on these, selecting alternatives with significantly larger
minima in single-objective problems and eliminating alternatives that had low minima on
one or more attributes. This behaviour occured even though no information was given
about how likely obtaining this minimum was. Attention was especially strongly drawn to
the minimum when this value was zero. Decision makers tended to be less extremely risk
averse if 5% and 95% quantiles were used instead of the extremes, partly because some
probability information is provided. However, given that the main purpose of a prescrip-
tive process is to provide a structure to replace many of these descriptive heuristics, one
might expect this increased risk aversion induced by the minima to be removed or much





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Applications of decision support
with simplified representations of
uncertainty
5.1 Introduction
The two previous chapters have evaluated simplified uncertainty formats in the artifi-
cially induced conditions of simulation and choice experiments. The controlled nature of
these experiments allow different uncertainty formats to be directly compared and pro-
vide a number of insights, but are limited in the practical issues that they can address.
In this chapter three real-world applications involving decision analysis with simplified
uncertainty formats are reported. The aim of the chapter is (a) to establish whether a
simplified decision model can be employed in a practical decision problem; (b) to identify
any difficulties experienced during the application, and (c) to establish whether the addi-
tional decision support provided by incorporating assessments of uncertainty is perceived
by decision makers to be useful. Of course, in addition to these “research” objectives, in
each application decision makers will have their own aims for the analysis. In this respect
I follow the distinction drawn in the action-research literature (e.g. [40]) between the “ac-
tion” aims of the decision maker and my own “research” aims.
In the first problem, a group of energy researchers must decide which of a number of
electricity saving options should be advocated to the public as part of a media campaign
aiming to reduce household electricity consumption. In the second problem, the man-
agement of a casino wish to evaluate their portfolio of slot machines and assess which
of these machines are dominated or nearly-dominated. In the third problem, a group of
market researchers must evaluate how one “client” alternative performs in relation to its
competitors on the basis of multi-attribute evaluations collected in a survey. Attribute
evaluations in all of the problems turn out to be uncertain, and in all cases the use of











use and evaluate some of the simplified uncertainty formats described in previous chap-
ters.
All three decision problems are somewhat unusual for decision analysis. The first two
involve providing support for groups tasked with selecting a single shortlist of alterna-
tives on behalf of individuals belonging to a market or ‘population’ for which the group is
responsible – each of the individuals making up the market will then make their own un-
facilitated choice from the shortlist. In the third application, the group receiving support
is tasked with providing information about a particular alternative for which the group is
responsible. In all three applications, the group for whom decision support is provided is
not the decision maker (in the sense of the people whose preferences it is wished to model),
but may be thought of as effectively acting as an ‘expert’ providing what knowledge it can
about the decision problem and the decision makers. Furthermore, very little is known
about the preferences of the individuals making up the market, and no direct contact is
made with them to assess this information.
Although not by construction, the lack of decision maker involvement in each of these
problems made the use of a traditional value function approach impossible. Instead, use
has been made of stochastic multi-criteria acceptability analysis (SMAA), a family of in-
verse preference methods based on an analysis of inverse weight spaces (e.g. [17]), and
which were briefly introduced in Section 2.2.3. Current SMAA models all treat uncertain
attribute evaluations using probability distributions, but can be fairly easily adapted to
incorporate simplified uncertainty formats. The integration of simplified uncertainty for-
mats with SMAA is an additional and somewhat secondary aim of the chapter.
The remainder of the chapt r is structured as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview of
the SMAA methods. Section 5.3 describes how these models can be adapted for use with
different simplified uncertainty formats. Section 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 describe the three appli-
cations. Section 5.7 provides some collective reflections on the attempts to apply simplified
uncertainty formats in practical decision problems.
5.2 Stochastic multi-criteria acceptability analysis (SMAA)
The SMAA family of inverse preference methods are useful in applications where prefer-
ence information is not precisely known, and typically work by providing information to
decision makers about the types of preference information that would lead to the selection
of a particular alternative. That is, instead of asking ‘which alternative is best given a
particular set of preferences?’, one asks ‘what preferences might make a particular alterna-
tive the preferred one?’. A number of SMAA variants have been developed. These differ











is imprecisely known, but are all based upon Monte Carlo simulation from distributions
which govern unknown preference parameters (and attribute evaluations). For example,
SMAA variants are available for value function [159, 162], outranking [124], reference point
[161, 87], and prospect theory [164] methods. The methods described here are the value-
function based SMAA-2 [162], with or without an adjustment for the presence of ordinal
criteria (SMAA-O, [160]).
In theory the SMAA methodology allows the involvement of decision makers to lie any-
where between not expressing their preferences at all to a complete assessment of pref-
erences as for conventional prescriptive decision aid. In practice SMAA is often applied
in situations where the assessment of information from decision makers is limited. This
can occur where it is practically difficult or impossible to explicitly state preference in-
formation (for example in antagonistic political situations), where the decision maker is
unwilling to expend the time and effort required for assessment, or in the early stages of
a decision process where the aim is to narrow down the set of potential alternatives to a
smaller shortlist for closer consideration. Some of these conditions are the same as those
used in previous chapters to motivate against the use of probability distributions in favour
of simplified uncertainty formats. This suggests that, although all current SMAA models
treat uncertain attribute evaluations by assessing appropriate probability distributions,
they may be made relatively more attractive for the types of decision problems just listed
if they are adapted to use simplified uncertainty formats rather than probability distribu-
tions.
We once again consider a decision problem consisting of I alternatives {a1, a2, . . . , aI}
evaluated on J attributes {c1, c2, . . . , cJ}. Let Zij be a random variable denoting the
(possibly stochastic) attribute evaluation of ai on cj , and U be a multi-attribute utility
function mapping the attribute evaluations of alternative ai (denoted Zi) to a real value
using a weight vector w. A joint density function fX(Z) governs the generation of the Zij
in the space X ⊆ RI×J , and a second joint density function g(w) governs the generation
of imprecise or unknown weights in the weight space W . Total lack of knowledge is usually
represented by a uniform distribution in W .
Given a particular weight vector w, the global utility of each alternative can be computed
and a rank ordering of alternatives obtained. SMAA-2 is essentially based on simulating
a large number1 of random weight vectors from g(w) and observing the proportion and
distinguishing features of weight vectors which result in each alternative obtaining a par-
1The exact number of Monte Carlo iterations that are required to achieve a given level is discussed in
[252]. To estimate the acceptability index within ξ of the true value with 95% confidence, one requires
1.962/4ξ2 iterations – so that 10 000 iterations will usually be sufficient to achieve error bounds of 1%. In












ticular rank r (usually the “best” rank, r = 1). Let the set of weight vectors that result
in alternative ai obtaining rank r be denoted by W ri . SMAA-2 is based on an analysis of
these sets of weights using the following descriptive measures:
Acceptability indices The rank-r acceptability index bri measures the proportion of all
weights that make alternative ai obtain rank r. The most acceptable alternatives








gW (w) dw dZ (5.1)
In practice, because SMAA is implemented by generating weights and attribute
evaluations randomly using Monte Carlo simulation, the acceptability index bri is
simply the relative proportion of all simulation runs in which ai obtains rank r.
Central weight vectors The central weight vector wci is defined as the expected center
of gravity of the favourable weight space W 1i . The central weight vector gives a
concise description of the “typical” preferences supporting the selection of a particu-
lar alternative ai, with the aim of helping decision makers understand how different









wgW (w) dw dZ (5.2)
but again in practice this integral would not be evaluated directly; rather the central
weight vector would be computed from the empirical averages of all weight vectors
supporting the selection of ai as the best alternative i.e. the j-th element of wci is
the average of all weights for attribute cj in W 1i .
Confidence factors The confidence factor pci gives the probability that alternative ai
is the preferred alternative if its central weight vector wci is chosen, and gives an
indication of the impact of uncertainty in the attribute evaluations (it would not be





but would in practice be computed based on simulations rather than an analytic
solution to the integral above.
Ranges for favourable weights The minimum (maximum) favourable weight wminij
(wmaxij ) is the minimum (maximum) weight for attribute cj in the favourable weight
set W 1i (i.e. the minimum (maximum) for which alternative ai is still the preferred


















Minimum (maximum) favourable weight vectors wmini (w
max
i ) are obtained by col-
lecting together all wminij (w
max
ij ) for a particular ai.
In applications where some of the criteria are measured on ordinal rather than cardinal
scales, utilities are generated by randomly generating mappings between the ordinal and
cardinal scales. At each iteration, utilities of 1 and 0 are assigned to the most and least
favoured levels of the ordinal scale respectively, and k−2 randomly generated values from
U [0, 1] are assigned (after being appropriately sorted) to the intermediate levels of the
ordinal scale. This approach is known as SMAA-O [160].
5.3 Integrating simplified uncertainty formats with SMAA
Adapting SMAA models to use simplified uncertainty formats is fairly straightforward.
Each uncertain attribute is simply replaced by a number of lower-level attributes which
capture the uncertainty in the evaluations on that attribute, using one of the simplified
uncertainty formats discussed in previous chapters. This transforms the decision problem
into one having the same appearance as a deterministic decision problem2, and can be
treated by any of the existing SMAA methods with some minor modifications. The precise
form of these modifications depends on which uncertainty format (and hence simplified
SMAA model) is being used. These are described in turn below, again using the value
function-based SMAA-2.
5.3.1 Expected values
Each uncertain evaluation Zij is replaced by a single value, its expected value E[Zij ]. The





attribute importance weights simulated as for SMAA-2. No random generation of attribute
evaluations is required using this (or indeed in any other simplified SMAA) method.
5.3.2 Explicit risk attributes
Each uncertain evaluation Zij is replaced by two values: its expected value E[Zij ] and
an explicit risk measure Rij (for example, the variance of Zij or the probability that
2One implication of replacing each stochastic attribute evaluation with a number of ‘deterministic’ ones
is that confidence factors are no longer computed as part of the output shown to the decision maker, since
there is no longer any uncertainty around these new attributes and any confidence factor would therefore




















ijRij . The simulation of weights can take several
forms. If variances are used to measure risk, earlier results suggest that Kirkwood’s [150]
weights wRij = (−1/2)wju′′j (E[Zij ]) should be used. This requires the same simulation of
J weights at each iteration as for SMAA-2. If other risk measures (like the probability of
poor performance) are used, the most lenient approach – in terms of giving each alterna-
tive the maximum chance of obtaining one of the best ranks – is to randomly generate the
risk weights wRj and attribute importance weights wj together i.e. generate 2J weights at
each iteration. This would require that the Rij on each attribute be scaled beforehand to
lie between 0 and 1 (assuming the utility functions uj do the same to the expected values).
Variances could of course also be treated in this fashion. Any further weight restrictions
(e.g. that risk weights should be some multiple of attribute importance weights) can be
specified as required.
A potentially useful approach would be to use ordinal assessments of the risk of each at-
tribute i.e. ordinal explicit risk attributes. This would require, for each uncertain attribute,
only that the decision maker rank the set of alternatives from most to least risky. It may
often be easier for a decision maker to make these ordinal assessment of uncertainty rather
than to assess it quantitatively, particularly in the early stages of the decision process or
where getting extensive participation from the decision maker is difficult. The SMAA-O
method then allows cardinal and ordinal attributes to be treated in the same model.
5.3.3 Quantiles
Each uncertain evaluation Zij is replaced by Nq values, where Nq is the number of quantiles









weights wjk can be simulated directly or as wqkwj|qk , and other weight restrictions (e.g.
equal quantile weights) can be specified as required as part of the simulation. Earlier
results suggested that one restriction which may be particularly useful is to restrict quantile
weights to be those identified by Keefer and Bodily in [144] i.e. to use quantile weights
w0.05 = w0.95 = 0.185, w0.5 = 0.63, and then generate only the wj|qk .
5.3.4 Fuzzy numbers
Each uncertain evaluation Zij is replaced by a fuzzy number, usually triangular or trape-
























for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers; for triangular fuzzy numbers z(q2)ij = z
(q3)
ij . These fuzzy











iteration, a set of J attribute importance weights must be generated, as for the conven-
tional SMAA-2. The chosen method for ranking the fuzzy global evaluations may also
have weighting parameters that can be randomly generated if necessary. For example, it
would be possible to randomly generate values for the right-dominance weight Θ used in
the fuzzy models of Chapter 3 and 4. Any ranking weights would presumably be simulated
independently of the attribute importance weights.
5.3.5 Scenarios
Each uncertain evaluation Zij is replaced by Ns values, where Ns is the number of scenarios








ij ). As in
the case of quantiles, the weights wjk can be simulated directly or as wskwj|sk , with other
weight restrictions (e.g. equal scenario weights) specified as required.
5.4 Decision support for evaluating electricity saving op-
tions
5.4.1 Background to problem
This section describes a project undertaken by a research unit at the Energy Research
Center (ERC) at the University of Cape Town, and commissioned by the South African
national electricity supplier Eskom3. The project is part of Eskom’s demand-side manage-
ment (DSM) program. Its primary objective is to develop tools which empower Eskom’s
residential customers to make more informed electricity consumption choices, in particular
choices on how to reduce their consumption. The tools aim at helping energy users to
be (a) aware of the electricity saving options available to them; (b) able to evaluate the
options available; (c) actively involved in decision making around their own energy-related
behaviour.
This section describes a small part of this ongoing project: the design of decision support
for addressing aim (a) above i.e. creating awareness about electricity saving options. The
intention of the ERC research group is to create awareness (at least partially) through the
development of an information campaign making households aware of a limited number
of “best ways to save electricity”. This would be distributed through print, internet, and
other channels. Limiting the number of presented options is considered essential in light
of the enormous number of possible ways to reduce electricity – some initial screening is
required to avoid overloading users with information. The current section describes a pilot
study constructing a methodology which performs this screening.
3Eskom is a parastatal organisation responsible for the generation of approximately 95% of the electricity
used in South Africa and 45% of the electricity used in Africa. It is regulated by the National Energy
Regulator of South Africa under the Electricity Regulation Act and by the National Nuclear Regulator in













This application follows the distinction drawn in the action-research literature (e.g. [40])
between action aims and research aims. The primary action aim of (this part of) the
project is to identify a shortlist of promising electricity savings options to be included
on a media insert. It should be possible to customise this shortlist to certain types of
users i.e. in the sense of a ‘targeted’ marketing campaign (e.g. [154]). Following similar
applications of simplified MCDA models in [197], the research aims here are (a) to establish
whether a simplified SMAA model could be employed in a practical decision problem; (b)
to identify any difficulties experienced during the application, and (c) to establish whether
the additional decision support provided by incorporating assessments of uncertainty was
perceived by decision makers to be useful.
Stakeholder involvement
Ultimate responsibility for formulating electricity saving policy lies with Eskom. Their
decisions are based on multiple sources of information collected from external sources –
predominantly previous literature and studies conducted by consulting groups such as the
ERC. For the purposes of this application, the stakeholder and source of information is a
group of three energy researchers at the ERC who are primarily responsible for the project.
Inputs to the SMAA models have been provided by these researchers but some of these
inputs are based on prior estimates provided by another group of energy researchers at
Sustainable Energy Africa (SEA, who often collaborate with the ERC and in this instance
provided the data to them). Feedback on the modelling process and model outputs are
also provided by those at the ERC. Since the ultimate aim of the media campaign is to
reduce household energy consumption, the households are themselves stakeholders in the
process, but are only represented in the decision process by members of the ERC group
with specialist knowledge of household energy consumption.
Constructing attributes and alternatives
The set of attributes and alternatives to be used was essentially given by the earlier
work done by SEA. They had evaluated 134 electricity saving options on three criteria:
electricity savings, capital cost, and the ease of making the change implied by the new
technology or behaviour. There is substantial support for these attributes in previous
literature around household energy use (e.g. [6, 112, 113]), and these were confirmed in a
workshop session with researchers at the ERC.
Measurable attributes had already been defined for each of the criteria. Electricity savings











electricity saving option. This calculation is based on estimated monthly electricity use
before and after the introduction of an alternative. The calculation of prior electricity use
usually requires some assumption about the technology/behaviour that a household might
use to perform the same function. For example, in the evaluation of a gas oven an electric
oven is used as a basis for comparison. The calculation of (before or after) electricity us-
age is based on multiplying the frequency of usage with the amount of electricity required
per “use”. Secondary information sources have been used to indicate (a) the electricity
required “per use” prior to the introduction of an alternative, and (b) the percentage of
the previous electricity consumption saved by an alternative.
Capital cost is a monetary cost (measured in Rands) of implementing the different alterna-
tives. Where possible this information has been gathered from various distributors. Ease
of change had originally been defined using a simple subjective rating scale (a three-point
Likert scale: “easy”, “medium”, and “difficult”) but during the assessment of uncertainty
a feeling arose that greater differentiation was needed and this scale was expanded to a
seven-point constructed scale using the descriptions shown in able 5.1.
Value Description
1 Complete change in behaviour: substantial changes to important aspects
of life. Large effort required. Adjustment takes a long time with a
significant chance that one could not adjust to the change at all.
2 Large changes required: very substantial effort required. Would take a
number of months to adjust to the change. All friends would notice a
difference in behaviour.
3 Fairly large changes required: significant effort required. Would almost
certainly take some weeks to adjust to the change. Most friends would
notice a difference in behaviour.
4 Moderate changes required: change will take some effort. May take
a short time to adjust to the change. Some friends would notice a
difference in behaviour.
5 Minor changes required: still small in number and require little real
effort to implement. Would take no time to adjust to the change. Good
chance that close family and friends would not notice the difference in
behaviour.
6 Very minor changes: Small in number and require only very minor
changes to behaviour. Would take no time to adjust to the change.
Even close family and friends would probably not notice the difference
in behaviour.
7 Absolutely no change required at all to habits; no difference between
behaviour before and after.
Table 5.1: Constructed scale used to measure the “ease of use” criterion in the evaluation











SEA had divided the 134 electricity saving options into 9 categories: water heating; light-
ing; cooking; fridge and freezer; heating, ventilation and cooling; laundry and dishes;
renewable energy; standby (essentially, using appliances when needed); and others. Be-
cause the current analysis was intended as a pilot study, a set of 8 of the cooking options
were chosen as alternatives. These alternatives, which contain new technologies as well as
changes to behaviour, are:
1. Buy a solar cooker.
2. Buy a gas stove/oven.
3. Buy a “hotbox” (used for cooking rice, stews, etc.)
4. Use a pressure cooker for food that takes a long time to cook.
5. Use a microwave for cooking, instead of an oven.
6. Ensure that the size of the pot matches the size of the stove plate.
7. Keep oven reflectors clean.
8. Boil only as much water as needed when using the kettle.
As part of their analysis, SEA had assessed the expected performance of each alternative on
the three attributes. These mean evaluations are based on a mixture of prior research and
literature (particularly for evaluations of electricity savings), market research (for costs of
new technologies), and subjective assessment (for ease of use). The mean evaluations were
presented on the spreadsheet con tructed by SEA, an extract of which is shown in Figure
5.1. Uncertainty around the attribute evaluations is not formally assessed, although in
a small proportion of cases (particularly relating to cost) ranges of possible values have
been recorded in supplementary notes to the spreadsheet.
Uncertainty representation
Uncertainty exists around the evaluation of all three of the attributes. Previous studies
give useful indications of expected electricity consumption requirements and savings, but
these typically depend on the implementation of the alternative (e.g. hotboxes) or have
only been partially studied and remain the subject of discussion (e.g. clean oven reflec-
tors). Frequencies of usage are also subject to substantial variation both between and
within households. Uncertainty (here perhaps more accurately labelled ‘imprecision’) ex-
ists around costs for some alternatives because these are described only in broad terms
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affect costs. More precise definition of alternatives (in terms of makes, etc.) is not con-
sidered to be appropriate for the media campaign. Costs for many of the behaviour-type
alternatives require no capital outlay, and are deterministic. Evaluations of ease of change
are subject to both between household (some households may find one alternative harder
to adapt to than another household) and within household (since households cannot be
sure in advance of how difficult a new alternative may be to implement and adapt to).
A choice of uncertainty format was made based on a discussion involving the facilitator
and ERC research group. Because of constraints on time and effort the group preferred
to use only a single uncertainty format, so that it will not be possible to directly compare
uncertainty formats (this is true in all three applications). Probability distributions were
felt to be too time- and effort-consuming to construct, particularly bearing in mind that
the application might ultimately be applied to a large number of alternatives. There were
no clear indications of a preference in the group for any particular simplified uncertainty
format. After a brief discussion around the results of the previous chapters advocating the
use of quantiles in cases as a good ‘default’ option, the group were satisfied to assess un-
certainty around the mean evaluations using the 5% and 95% quantiles for each attribute
evaluation.
The assessment of the quantiles was performed by one member of the ERC research group
who carried out the assessment on his own following a brief meeting to explain the task.
Facilitated assessment was not used because the researcher was well-trained in statistics
(a postgraduate degree) and had previous experience in the assessment of quantiles. After
some discussion it was decided to present results as “worst-case”, “mean/median”, and
“best-case” rather than referring to the specific quantile involved. This was done because
the same extreme quantile (say, the 5% quantile) is ‘good’ for some attributes (cost) and
‘bad’ for others (electricity saved, ease of change), which the researcher felt may cause
some confusion later on. The full value tree for the problem is shown in Figure 5.2 using a
format which shows performance at different quantiles as higher-level criteria, as described
in Section 2.4.3.
In some cases the quantile assessments were assisted by ranges of possible costs provided in
an accompanying note to the original evaluations (e.g. costs of solar cookers and hotboxes;
see Figure 5.1). A second meeting was held following completion of the task to discuss
the quantile assessments. Means and medians were felt to be reasonably similar (i.e.
symmetric distributions) and the original means estimated by SEA were therefore used
as central estimates. The final evaluations are given in Table 5.2. The researcher who
assessed the quantiles found the learning associated with the assessment process useful as



























Figure 5.2: Value tree for selecting promising electricity savings options.
The assessment of precise quantiles was felt to be difficult at the extremes, and evaluations
there were self-reported as “not quite best” and “not quite worst” cases.
5.4.3 Results
Results were obtained by applying a SMAA-O model to accommodate the ordinal ease of
change attribute. Utility functions for the two cardinal attributes were randomly generated
as per the SMAA-2 model to be convex below a reference point and concave above it,
according to general prospect theory [139] principles. Costs were defined as negative
profits so that utility functions are increasing in all three attributes. Reference levels
Elec savings Capital cost Ease of change
Alternative Wor Med Best Wor Med Best Wor Med Best
Solar cooker 2 10 20 4500 2225 300 3 5 7
Gas stove/ovens 30.4 30.4 30.4 20000 4500 1000 2 2 4
Hotbox 2 9.1 25 250 200 150 2 3 4
Use pressure cooker 5 7.6 12 1200 600 240 3 5 6
Pot matches plate 1 3.8 5 0 0 0 1 2 3
Microwave 8 10.646 13 875 250 150 4 5 7
Keep oven reflectors clean 0.5 0.75 1 0 0 0 2 3 4
Boil water as needed 4 11.3 14 0 0 0 2 3 4











reflect the status quo of no electricity savings and zero cost, so that utility functions for
the electricity savings attribute(s) are generated to be between linear and moderately
concave (τ = λ = 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 4 using the formulation in (3.7)); and utility functions
for the capital cost attribute(s) are generated to be between linear and moderately convex
(τ = λ = 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 4). Utility functions for the ordinal ease of change attribute
are simulated by randomly generating sets of cardinal values that are consistent with the
known ordinal values as per SMAA-O. Three models were used here to show the impact of
uncertainty representation and quantile weight generation, although typically (i.e. outside
of the current ‘action research’ context) not all of these would be shown to the decision
maker.
Model 1 Uses the mean/median evaluations only.
Model 2 Uses the full set of evaluations in Table 5.2, with Keefer-Bodily quantile weights.
Model 3 Uses the full set of evaluations in Table 5.2, with quantile weights allowed to
vary freely.
Model 1 is used so that the impact of using expected values only can be evaluated. Model
2 is shown to evaluate the sensitivity of results to restrictions on the quantile weights (no
restrictions are made on the attribute importance weights), and Model 3 implements the
least restrictive approach. All models employ a single locally-defined (between observed
best and worst performance evaluations) utility function for each attribute. All three
models were presented to energy researchers at the ERC for feedback. The results of each
of these models are given below with a summary of the feedback provided.
Figure 5.3 displays the rank acceptability indices for each alternative, showing the share
of the different preferences i.e. weights, that support an alternative for a particular rank
1 (best) through 8 (worst). Acceptability indices in Figure 5.3(a) are calculated based on
quantiles with Keefer-Bodily quantile weights (Model 2). Those in Figure 5.3(b) are calcu-
lated based on quantiles with unrestricted quantile weights (Model 3). Figures 5.3(c), (d),
and (e) show acceptability indices based only on attributes in the ‘worst-case’, ‘median-
case’, and ‘best-case’ part of the value tree respectively. Note that the ‘median-case’ Model
3 results are effectively those of Model 1 (which uses only median evaluations).
The most promising alternatives are those with larger (at least non-zero) acceptability in-
dices for the best ranks, which appear towards the bottom-right corner of each of the plots
in Figure 5.3. There was reasonably strong agreement between the models on the most
promising alternatives. All models identify gas stoves/ovens, matching pots to stove plate
sizes, and boiling water only as needed as alternatives that potentially appear first in a

























(c) Model 3, worst cases only
(d) Model 3, median cases only












(e) Model 3, best cases only
Figure 5.3: Acceptability indices for electricity savings options obtained with an adapted
SMAA-O model.
is (in Model 3) 0.91, signifying that 91% of all possible sets of weights lead to the selection
of one of these alternatives. Hotboxes and microwaves also show substantial acceptability
indices for second and third ranks, with hotboxes in particular becoming relatively more
favourable in the models using quantiles (Models 2 and 3). The other three alternatives
– keeping oven reflectors clean, pressure cookers, and solar cookers – perform noticeably
worse and tend to occupy lower ranks. The main difference between the results of Model
2 and Model 3 is that the two alternatives with the highest rank-one acceptabilities –
gas stoves/ovens and boiling water as needed – swap ranks (in Model 2, gas stoves/ovens
have the larger rank-one acceptability; in Model 3, boiling water as needed). Because the
aim of the analysis is to identify a shortlist of promising alternatives the reversal was not
considered to be particularly important, but its cause is that boiling water as needed is
favoured by a greater range of quantile weights, in particular those which place relatively
more weight on the ‘best case’ quantile than the Keefer-Bodily weights do (as shown by
the relatively better performance of boiling water as needed in Figure 5.3(e)).
In an informal feedback discussion, the group indicated that they found the acceptability
results easy to understand and interpret. They identified the ability of the SMAA model











its main benefit, and it became fairly clear during the analysis that a promising shortlist
of alternatives should include gas stoves/ovens, matching pots to stove plate sizes, boiling
water only as needed, and hotboxes. The selection of promising alternatives was expe-
rienced as fairly easy and was based on (a) the acceptability indices for the best ranks
and (b) the robustness of the rank of an alternative to changes in preferences. The latter
criterion was felt to be of importance given the aim of promoting alternatives that would
be viewed as acceptable by as many of the target audience as possible. Hotboxes and boil-
ing water as needed were identified as the most robust of the promising options, and gas
stoves/ovens and matching pot and plate size as relatively sensitive to preferences. The
poor robustness of microwave ovens also played an important role in the group’s decision
to exclude this alternative from the shortlist. The extra (within-quantile) acceptability
information provided by Model 3 was considered useful in better understanding the per-
formance of the alternatives but in this instance did not affect the selection of alternatives.
Figure 5.4 displays the central weights for each alternative with a non-zero rank-one ac-
ceptability index – these show the typical (average) weights that make each alternative
most preferred. A large shaded area for an attribute indicates that a greater weight is
allocated to that attribute in the central weight vector. Figures 5.4(a), (b), and (c) show
the attribute importance weights of efficiency attributes in the ‘worst-case’, ‘median-case’
(i.e. Model 1), and ‘best-case’ part of the value tree respectively. Figures 5.4(d) and (e)
show attribute importance and quantile weights respectively; these are calculated over the
entire value tree. Figure 5.4(f) shows a joint presentation of attribute importance and
quantile weights originally shown to the ERC group. All figures are based upon Model 3 –
very similar attribute importance weights, both over all quantiles and within each quantile
(i.e. those shown in Figures 5.4(a), (d), (e), and (f)) were obtained using Model 2. These
are therefore not shown here.
The central weight vectors shown in Figure 5.4 provide insight into the reasons why certain
alternatives may be preferred. Figure 5.4(a) displays the central weights for the three
attributes, and shows that:
• The use of a hotbox tends to be preferred by decision makers who place roughly
equal weights on the three attributes, with slightly more weight being placed on
electricity savings.
• Matching pots to plate sizes tends to be preferred by decision makers with relatively
large weights on ease of change, and small weights on electricity savings.
• The use of a microwave tends to be preferred by decision makers with relatively large











(a) Attribute weights (all quantiles)
(b) Quantile weights (all attributes)
Figure 5.4: Central weight vectors for electricity savings options obtained with an adapted












(d) Worst cases only
Figure 5.4: Central weight vectors for electricity savings options obtained with an adapted











(e) Median cases only
(f) Best cases only
Figure 5.4: Central weight vectors for electricity savings options obtained with an adapted











• Boiling water only as needed tends to be the preferred action of decision makers
who place roughly equal weights on the three attributes (as for hotboxes), but with
slightly more weight being placed on cost.
• The use of gas stoves/ovens tends to be the preferred action of decision makers with
relatively small weights on cost and larger weights on electricity savings.
The central attribute weights were easily understood and interpreted by the group, and
confirmed “common sense” descriptions of the alternatives. Note that Figure 5.4(a) shows
that if only medians are used (Model 1), then no descriptions are provided for hotboxes or
microwaves because their rank-one acceptabilities are in that case zero. In this application
the addition of other quantiles therefore had a substantive impact on the information that
could be displayed. It was proposed that the acceptability indices in Figure 5.4(a) could
also be used to tailor intervention recommendations (the shortlist of suggested alterna-
tives) to different decision maker “typologies”. These typologies are currently expressed
in terms of importance weights on the three attributes (as in the above list), but ulti-
mately these may be linked to other characteristics – for example low-income households
placing greater importance on cost. This possibility for customising awareness programs
was identified as a second major benefit of the analysis.
Figure 5.4(b) shows the central quantile weights for Model 3. Approximately equal central
quantile weights are observed for three alternatives: matching pot and stove plate size,
boiling water as needed, and gas stoves/ovens. The equal weights, in conjunction with the
relatively large rank-one acceptability indices for these alternatives, suggest that a wide
range of quantile weights support each of them (rather than quantile weights having to
be equal). The other two alternatives show some patterns. The use of a hotbox tends
to be preferred if more weight is placed on the ‘best-case’ evaluations, and the use of a
microwave tends to be preferred if more weight is placed on the ‘worst-case’ evaluations
(both under the condition that attribute weights are also allocated as indicated in the list
above).
The group felt that the central quantile weights were moderately useful. Although the
hotbox had already been identified as a promising alternative, knowing that its attrac-
tiveness depends quite heavily on being applied ‘ideally’ was felt to be a practically useful
insight. In this case this had already been suggested by evaluating the acceptability indices
within each quantile; the central weights provide a second, more direct indication. The
information provided by the central quantile weights was considered of relatively minor
importance when compared with that provided by the central attribute weights, and it
noted that Model 2 (with constant Keefer-Bodily weights) provided essentially the same











in other cases, and given the greater flexibility of Model 3 and the limited additional effort
in interpreting its results, it was chosen as the preferred model for future work. Finally,
it should be noted that a joint presentation of central attribute and quantile weights,
as shown in Figure 5.4(c), was initially attempted. The group found the interpretation
of these weights relatively difficult and preferred the aggregated results shown in Fig-
ure 5.4(a) and (b). The difficulty seemed to lie with understanding trade-offs involving
differences in both attributes and quantiles (e.g. between worst-case cost and best-case
electricity saving). This may be expected to be as or more problematic for the elicitation
of attribute and quantile weights.
5.4.4 Follow-up
The ERC project is in its early stages but the group is satisfied that the SMAA approach
described in this section can contribute to the design of targeted media around electricity
savings options, by supporting the decision of which options to include in the media.
Similar analyses to the one performed here for cooking interventions are to be carried
out for other categories of energy use (e.g. cooking, lighting, heating) in the months to
come. The choice of media platform(s) and the design of the media is scheduled for
2011. In the longer term the project aims to evaluate the impact of targeted campaigns
on awareness of energy-related issues and making consumers actively involved in decision
making around their own energy-related behaviour, but it is not yet possible to assess
whether the shortlists of alternatives provided by the SMAA model are effective in helping
to achieve these goals.
5.5 Decision support for evaluating slot machines
5.5.1 Background to problem
This application arose from a project undertaken for a large casino in the Western Cape
province of South Africa. The focus of the project was on constructing simulation models
of some of the machines on the casino floor, but during this task it became clear that
different makes of slot machines held by the casino differed quite substantially in terms
of the distributions of their payouts. Literature around gambling behaviour suggests that
some distributional summary measures, particularly expected values and probabilities of
payout, are linked to psychological factors affecting gambling behaviour, and thus might
be used as measurable attributes for evaluating the desirability of a machine to a particular
type of player. A secondary study was carried out with the aim of describing different slot
machine varieties at the casino in terms of these attributes, and in terms of the types of











Basics of slot machine play
The main ingredient of a slot machine is a set of reels, usually five, each of which can be
thought of as a list arranged in a circular configuration. When the machine is played,
the reels are “spun” and a position on each reel is chosen at random. The symbol in the
selected position on each reel, as well as the symbols in the positions adjacent to the
selected position on the reel, are displayed graphically to the player in a 3×5 grid. Payouts
are made when the same symbol appears along certain winning lines across the grid. A
winning line is a sequence of cells appearing from left to right in the grid. For example,
the first three winning lines in all slot machine games run horizontally across the cells in
the middle, top and bottom rows of the grid respectively. A selection of typical winning
lines is given in Figure 5.5. Some modern machines can be played on up to 25 winning lines.
Figure 5.5: Illustration of three typical ‘winning lines’ on a slot machine.
Before each play, players choose the number of winning lines they would like to make use
of and the amount they would like to bet per winning line, so that the total amount bet
per play is given by the product of the two. For a payout to be won on a winning line the
same symbol must appear in the first P reels from left to right along this line, with the
payout usually only being non-zero for P ≥ 3 and increasing with P . Following each play,
the winnings on each of the played lines are summed and added to the player’s winnings.
Different symbols offer different payouts, with the symbols that appear most rarely on the
reels generally giving the biggest payouts when they do appear.
5.5.2 Problem structuring
Research objectives
The ultimate objective of the casino is to provide a portfolio of slot machine that are
popular with their customers. This involves identifying attributes that are important to
different segments of slot machine players, and ensuring that at least one of the portfolio
of machines held by the casino addresses the desires of each segment. Because no formal
evaluation of slot machines had been previously attempted by the casino, the primary
action aim of the project is simply to describe the slot machines in a systematic and











that are not catered for by the portfolio of machines currently held at the casino. This
places the analysis within what Roy [222] identifies as the “description” problematique. A
secondary action objective is to identify any clearly inferior i.e. dominated, make of slot
machine. Research aims are: (a) to establish whether a simplified SMAA model could be
employed in a practical decision problem; (b) to identify any difficulties experienced during
the application, and (c) to establish whether the additional decision support provided by
incorporating assessments of uncertainty was perceived by decision makers to be useful.
Stakeholder involvement
Partly due to the size of the casino company involved, the analysis was conducted at a level
quite far removed from any final decision making authority. The construction of a decision
analytic framework was commissioned by a statistical consultant working for the casino,
who liaised with a line manager in charge of technical operations at the casino. This line
manager would then report to more senior management, who had ultimate responsibility
for major decisions. The line manager could therefore be seen as one stakeholder group
tasked with informing or potentially seeking to influence senior management, and the
consultant as another stakeholder tasked with the provision of information to the line
manager. However, the client in this case was very much the statistical consultant, who
commissioned the work and provided input regarding technical details as well as feedback
throughout the structuring process. The line manager did not participate directly in any
of the modelling.
Constructing attributes and alternatives
Chantal et al. [52] identify two categories of motivations for gambling: gambling for intrin-
sic rewards like excitement, a sense of accomplishment, or to socialise with friends; and
gambling to gain external rewards, usually money. The objective of maximising monetary
gains (or at least minimising losses) is an obvious one, and can be measured by the long-
run expected return from each play. Different machines offer different expected returns –
these are routinely provided to casinos by slot machine manufacturers but are typically
not disclosed to the public (they are also always negative). Provincial gambling legislation
sets the minimum expected return to the gambler (calculated over a continuous 12-month
period) at 85% of the amount bet4.
Excitement is the most frequent self-reported motivation for regular slot machine playing
[86]. Players “tend to prefer more frequent reinforcement rather than larger and less fre-
4Gambling in the Western Cape is governed by the Western Cape Gambling and Racing Board Casino
Rules published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary 5952 (29 November 2002) and subsequently amended
in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary 5983 (14 February 2003). The full set of rules is available at











quent reinforcement” [84], which is supported by evidence that most players play multiple
lines with the minimum number of credits [269]. A simple way to operationalise expected
entertainment is to use the probability of winning any kind of payout on a particular
play, termed the ‘win probability’. The motivation behind the use of the win probability
is that it is the act of winning some kind of payout that contributes significantly to the
excitement of the player – including audiovisual activities such as lights going off, sounds
of coins dropping, and so on, which have been shown to be important components of en-
tertainment [179] – and that long periods of inactivity are likely to be construed as boring
intervals between the exciting winning plays. Payne [212] has recently provided evidence
that overall probabilities of winning or losing are important influences on risky choice in
fairly simple (five-outcome) gambles.
Because slot machines can be played on different numbers of lines, and this may affect the
performance of a machine in terms of monetary return and excitement, alternatives are
defined by combinations of a slot machine type and a number of lines to play. Although
a casino has no influence over how many lines are played, a casino may decide to hold a
particular type of slot machine because (perhaps only for a specific number of lines played)
it is popular with a segment of their customers.
Uncertainty representation
The current application consists of a single uncertain criterion (monetary returns) which
is decomposed into a ‘value’ component (expected return) and a ‘risk’ component (the
probability of achieving a return greater than zero). The choice of uncertainty format
has therefore essentially been made as part of the attribute definitions. Information on
expected returns and win probabilities was gathered for five makes of slot machines on
the casino floor at the time, by creating simulated versions of the machines using reel
information provided to the casino by the machine manufacturers. The machines differ on
the number of lines that can be played: Machine A can be played on 1, 3, 5, or 9 lines;
Machines B and C on those of A as well as 15 lines; and Machines D and E on those
of B and C as well as 21 and 25. There are therefore 29 alternatives in total. Table 5.3
shows the (negative) expected returns and win probabilities for the set of alternatives –
all statistics have had a small constant added to them to preserve the proprietary nature
of the information, but this makes no difference to results.
5.5.3 Results
Results were obtained by applying a SMAA-2 model with utility functions for the expected











Slot A Slot B Slot C Slot D Slot E
Lines EV Pr0 EV Pr0 EV Pr0 EV Pr0 EV Pr0
1 -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.11 -0.10 0.12 -0.06 0.15
3 -0.09 0.33 -0.08 0.12 -0.05 0.20 -0.24 0.20 -0.14 0.27
5 -0.14 0.39 -0.12 0.18 -0.09 0.27 -0.36 0.27 -0.20 0.38
9 -0.23 0.46 -0.19 0.26 -0.15 0.36 -0.55 0.39 -0.33 0.54
15 -0.28 0.33 -0.24 0.42 -0.73 0.43 -0.48 0.59
21 -0.85 0.47 -0.60 0.63
25 -0.90 0.49 -0.66 0.65
Table 5.3: Attribute evaluations for five slot machines
ear utility functions were used for the win probability attribute in accordance with (2.4).
In this application there is only a single underlying criterion (monetary return) captured
by one ‘value’ attribute (expected return) and one ‘risk’ attribute (win probability). There
are therefore only two weights to be generated at each iteration. Figure 5.6 displays the
acceptability indices and central weight vectors. Alternatives are referred to by concate-
nating their machine make (A to E) and the number of lines played (1 to 25).
Three of the five machine types are non-dominated: Machine A, C and E. The alterna-
tive with the largest rank-one acceptability index is Machine C played on a single line,
following by Machine E played on 25 lines. Machine A contributes three non-dominated
alternatives, when played on three, five, or nine (its maximum number of) lines, although
the acceptability indices for three-line and five-line plays are small (3% and less than 1%
respectively). The only other non-dominated alternative is Machine E played on 9 lines.
The central weight vectors show that alternative C1 caters for players who place consider-
ably more importance on maximising expected return than on maximising entertainment;
alternative E25 caters for players who do the opposite. Between these extremes Machines
A and E offer some alternatives that provide greater a balance between the two objectives.
The following set of descriptions was provided to the decision maker:
• Machine type A is the preferred option of a range (22%) of possible player types. It
appeals to players who place roughly equal weight on monetary return and enter-
tainment, by offering a balance between these two attributes.
• Machine B is one of the machines that is dominated by others. It appears un-
favourably because of a poor win probability accompanied by relatively moderate
expected returns. For a given expected return, Machine A consistently offers greater
entertainment value.
• Machine C is the preferred option of the widest range (41%) of possible player













Figure 5.6: Results of a SMAA-2 analysis showing, (a) acceptability indices for the first
four ranks for all machines having any of the corresponding acceptability indices greater























importance on monetary return than entertainment. For any number of lines played
it offers the best expected return of all the machines, at the expense of a relatively
low win probability. It is particularly attractive for a small number of lines played
(one or three); beyond that, it is dominated by Machine A.
• Machine D appears by some way the worst of the modelled machines. It is dominated
by Machine E for all lines played, by Machine A up to 21 lines, and by Machine C
up to 15 lines.
• Machine E is the preferred option of a range (37%) of possible player types. It
appeals to players seeking ‘implicit rewards’ i.e. those who place greater importance
on entertainment than monetary return. It offers the greatest entertainment if 9 or
more lines are played, but at fewer than 9 lines is dominated by Machine A.
In an informal feedback discussion the client indicated that both the acceptability indices
and central weight vectors were intuitive and easy to interpret. The correspondence be-
tween the SMAA results and observed gambling behaviour was felt to create confidence in
the method and in the set of attributes used. One expressed concern was that qualitative
characteristics of slot machines – particularly the entertainment value of bonus games and
the attractiveness of the main “theme” – was not taken into account. The client felt that
Machine B, for example, had a novel bonus game which might mitigate its relatively poor
performance on the quantitative attributes. Because of the difficulty of obtaining subjec-
tive evaluations from the management of the casino, a decision was made not to include
these qualitative attributes at this stage, although as shown in the previous application it
is entirely possible to do so using either a constructed cardinal scale or an ordinal scale in
conjunction with SMAA-O.
5.5.4 Follow-up
The client indicated, again in informal discussion, that he found the learning associated
with structuring the problem useful as it led to a perspective on slot machines (involving
precise statistical definitions of ‘risk’ and ‘return’) which is quite different to the qualitative
one usually considered in the industry. This allows for a more objective comparison
of machines. The results obtained from the analysis were presented in report form to
the line manager of technical operations at the casino, but obtaining any meaningful
feedback from casino management on the methodology or results has proved difficult. A
general satisfaction with the results was expressed by the line manager, but a strict code
of confidentiality among casino employees meant that requests for information about the
actual popularities of slot machines on the casino floor were rejected. Soon after the
report was completed the line manager resigned from the casino, so that it is doubtful











all) is currently being used at the casino. It is therefore unfortunately not possible to
evaluate the usefulness of the SMAA methodology to the end user in this case. Two visits
to the casino, one made six months after the work was completed and another made after
a further six months, revealed that all the slot machine included in the current study were
still in use on the casino floor.
5.6 Decision support for evaluating brands in consumer
markets
5.6.1 Background to problem
Consumer behaviour and brand-choice models often concern themselves with the construc-
tion of simple metrics that can be easily measured in survey questions and shown to be
correlated with actual purchase behaviour e.g. overall satisfaction in [208], intention to
repurchase in [215], and various forms of ‘commitment’ in [263] and [111]. These metrics
are generally gathered from individual survey respondents and aggregated5 to identify the
changing fortunes of brands and to inform marketing strategy. The purpose of the appli-
cation described in this section is to construct and validate such a measure from survey
questions indicating which alternatives possess each of a set of attributes i.e. a traditional
matrix of attribute evaluations that may be binary. The project was undertaken for a
market research group in South Africa.
Review of relevant brand-choice models
There are two broad kinds of descriptive brand-choice model. The first uses a single mea-
sure as a proxy for the latent value of an alternative. Typical measures include overall
satisfaction [208], affective commitment [263], repurchase intention [215], and overall ‘ef-
ficacy’ [215]. The popularity of these measures, particularly commercially, derives from
the parsimony of their measurement and the lack of a need for parameter estimation.
Their ease of construction means that choice predictions can often be made directly from
the single measure e.g. select the alternative with the highest overall satisfaction. Other
examples of these models can be found in [76] and [148].
The second type of model tends to use multiple lower-level attributes such as marketing-
mix variables or specific product or service characteristics such as price, quality, and so on.
These models generally provide a finer level of detail into the reasons for choice but also
require more effort in estimation. Furthermore, since different aspects may be important
to different people, accommodating respondent heterogeneity using random-effects speci-
fications becomes standard [e.g. 234]. This means that any choice prediction requires sub-
5The way in which responses are aggregated depends on the sampling approach used but is generally a











stantial and often technically sophisticated model fitting using some empirically-gathered
dependent variable. Examples of these models can be found in [106] and [224].
The market research group in this study desired an approach which did not require any
calibration against an empirically-gathered dependent variable. That is, only models that
construct a single measure of brand performance from one or more survey questions,
without any parameter estimation, were considered. This excludes all so-called “proper”
models of the second type6. A model of the second type that can and will be considered
however, is an “improper” linear model that assigns an equal weight to each attribute.
Dawes [74] has shown that predictions obtained from such an improper model can prove
both accurate and robust to changes in external circumstance.
5.6.2 Problem structuring
Research objectives
The aim of the project is to construct a measure of brand performance that can be used
in future studies conducted by the market research company. In order for any measure to
be used with confidence (by the market research company and its clients), it is important
that it is shown to be associated with actual choice behaviour. The validation of the
constructed measure against observed behaviour in two ‘pilot’ studies constitutes a second,
related aim. Validation is based on two outcomes: customer retention (the continuance
of an individual’s relationship with a service or product) and ‘share of wallet’ allocations
(the percentage of money allocated by an individual to a particular service or product in a
category). By way of comparison, many authors have shown that overall satisfaction has a
positive effect on the intention to repurchase [e.g. 37, 158], retention [e.g. 107], and share of
wallet [e.g. 148, 215]. Correlations between satisfaction and share of wallet and retention
generally lie between 0.2 and 0.4 [e.g. 158, 148, 215], although much smaller correlations
between satisfaction and behaviour have also been observed (e.g. correlations of 0.07 in
[231] and 0.13 in [111]; also see [263]). Correlations between repurchase intentions and
buying behaviour range from fairly weak (r = 0.11 in [231] and r = 0.24 in [158]; also see
[198]) to substantial (r = 0.43 in [137], r = 0.44 and 0.65 in [215]).
In consultation with the market research company, the following three research hypotheses
(to be satisfied by any prospective measure) were formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Relative purchase frequency is positively associated with the constructed
performance measure, both at the individual and aggregate level.
Hypothesis 2: Probabilities of defection are higher from alternatives with relatively lower
6Proper linear models are those in which the weights of the input variables are estimated so as to fulfil












Hypothesis 3: Changes in relative purchase frequencies are positively associated with
the constructed performance measure.
Stakeholder involvement
The formulation of marketing strategies will usually be performed by the clients of the
market research company. Although the market research company may play some part in
the crafting of strategy, their primary responsibility is to provide survey information to
their clients to assist in the decision-making process. This is similar to the Eskom/Energy
Research Center relationship described in Section 5.4. The primary stakeholder in this
application is the market research company, who (in consultation with their clients) con-
struct sets of relevant alternatives and attributes and conducts surveys to collect attribute
evaluation information. The actual evaluation of alternatives over attributes is of course
performed by survey respondents. Feedback on results were primarily obtained from two
directors of the market research company.
Constructing and evaluating alternatives and attributes
The relationship between the constructed brand performance measure and buying be-
haviour is evaluated by testing the three research hypotheses described above using real-
world longitudinal survey data obtained for two different fast-moving consumer goods
(FMCG) markets: the toothpaste market in the United Kingdom (17 brands, n1 = 281)
and the laundry detergent market in Spain (11 brands, n2 = 361). This data was kindly
provided by Dr Jan Hofmeyr at Synovate (also a market research group). In both studies,
a team of researchers assigned to the project constructed the set of brands to be included
in the study and a list of relevant attributes based on their own knowledge of the particular
market. This problem structuring is not facilitated in any decision-analytic sense. Usually
(and in both the studies reported here) effectively all brands participating in the market
are included; there may be a small number of brands with almost no market presence that
are not explicitly included (although an “other” option can be specified for most survey
questions). Attribute sets contain a mixture of attributes that are widely used across
product categories (e.g. “price” and “quality” attributes) and those that are specific to a
particular category. Table 5.4 lists the attributes used in each of the pilot studies.
Uncertainty representation
In general, evaluations on many attributes (particularly those relating to product or ser-











Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Toothpaste Laundry detergent
High quality High quality
Trusted Trusted
Value for money Value for money
Becoming more popular Becoming more popular
Positive word-of-mouth Positive word-of-mouth
Prominent packaging Prominent packaging
Pleasant taste Gets clothes clean
Keeps breath fresh Quite expensive
Cleans teeth Nice fragrance
Quite expensive Gentle on clothes
Protects teeth
Table 5.4: Lists of attributes used to evaluate alternatives in the two market research
studies
either because of differences in the product or service over time, or because of environmen-
tal differences which affect product or service performance. Respondents are also allowed
to evaluate alternatives which they are aware of but have not used, in which case some
uncertainty is bound to be present. However, constraints on the survey process mean that
it is generally not feasible to collect detailed information regarding uncertainty. Market re-
search surveys are typically long (often running to 100 or more questions; only small parts
of the full surveys are used here) and require substantial time and effort from respondents,
who are generally not compensated. They are also not facilitated in any meaningful way.
In the vast majority of studies (including the two discussed here), respondents evaluate
alternatives on attributes by giving an expected rating on some (usually binary or Likert)
constructed scale. In this case, the choice of uncertainty format is essentially constrained
by difficulties of data collection.
Because no attribute importance information is gathered, the SMAA approach is an ob-
vious candidate as a ‘decision’ model. The lack of weight information is due mostly to a
tradition which distrusts collecting explicitly “stated” importance weights, and the diffi-
culty in reliably collecting weight information using unfacilitated surveys. In the absence
of weight information, the acceptability index bri gives an indication of the relative num-
ber of possible weight vectors that support the selection of ai in rank r. In its use as a
metric for brand performance, it describes a model in which an individual’s preferences
(the relative weights allocated to each attribute) will show some variation, as a function
of (a) internal changes in what is desired, (b) changes in purchase-to-purchase contextual
factors, and (c) other forms of essentially random variation. The source of the variation
is not important for the purposes of the analysis. If the variation is entirely random,











Ehrenberg and his co-authors have shown in a series of books and papers [93, 106, 259]
that purchase behaviour can be fruitfully modelled as occuring “in an as if random man-
ner” at the individual level even if true randomness is only a feature of the model. This
motivates the use of the acceptability index as a predictive measure of expected relative
purchase frequencies, both at the individual and aggregate level.
Designing the validation study
In both studies, respondents completed an initial survey at t0 in which they identified:
• B1(t0): the set containing those brands the respondent was aware of
• B2(t0): the set containing those brands the respondent had purchased in the last 3
months
• B3(t0): the set containing those brands the respondent would consider buying, in-
cluding those brands in B2(t0)
• Sat: overall satisfaction with each brand in B1, evaluated on a 10-point scale from
1 (“terrible”) to 10 (“perfect”)
• PI: the intention to purchase each of the brands in B3 within the next few weeks,
evaluated on a 5-point scale from 0 (“definitely will not buy”) to 1 (“definitely will
buy”)
• AdR: a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent could remember seeing
any advertising for each of the brands in B3(t0)
• SoP(t0): the relative proportion of the respondent’s last 10 purchases allocated to
each of the brands in B2(t0)
Respondents were also shown a list of relevant attributes and were asked to associate
brands from B1(t0) with each of the attributes. Respondents were explicitly told that they
could select one, more than one, or no brand at all for each attribute statement. There were
11 and 10 attributes in the studies of the UK toothpaste and Spanish laundry detergent
markets respectively. These responses constitute the expected attribute evaluations (zij =
1 if brand ai was selected as possessing attribute cj and zij = 0 otherwise). In both
datasets, one of the attributes was negatively worded (“quite expensive”). Responses on
this attribute were simply coded to take on the value −1 if a brand possessed the negative
attribute and zero otherwise i.e. preferences are increasing in all attributes. Different
acceptability indices bri for r = {1, 3, 5} were calculated on the basis of 20000 random
weight vectors generated for each respondent, in line with results in [252]. Weights are











In addition, a further measure of preference for each brand was constructed from a equally-
weighted linear combination of the attribute values i.e.
∑
j zij . This modelled is labelled
‘Dawes’ after previous research by that author showing that this model can be an excellent
and robust representation of preferences [74]. By setting all weights equal to one, the
measure can be thought of as representing the net number of positive attributes associated
with each brand. It is also consistent with the other measures in that it can be constructed
from a simple set of survey questions without reference to actual or claimed purchase
frequencies.
A follow-up survey of all respondents at t1, approximately 6 months after the initial
survey, was used to gather information on the set of brands the respondent had purchased
in the 3 months prior to the t1 survey i.e. B2(t1), as well as the relative proportion of
the respondent’s previous 10 purchases attributed to each of the brands in B2(t1) i.e.
SoP(t1). For ease of presentation, the analysis section to follow focuses on three target
brands in each dataset – the brand with the highest penetration, a ‘medium-sized’ brand
selected at random from those brands with penetrations from 20%–50%, and a ‘small’
brand selected at random from those brands with penetrations from 5%–10%. Zero and
11 dropouts were reported in the UK toothpaste and Spanish laundry detergent surveys
respectively, leaving effective sample sizes of n1 = 281 and n2 = 350. In addition to the
relative purchase frequencies described above, the initial and follow-up survey information
was used to determine which respondents had defected from brands used at t0 by the time
of the follow-up survey at t1.
5.6.3 Results
Associations between the acceptability index and relative purchase frequency
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the relationship between predictions of aggregate purchase fre-
quency i.e. a proxy for market share, obtained using five predictive measures and actual
market share at t0 and t1, for all brands with market shares greater than 5%, in each
market. Aggregated brand-level measures are obtained by averaging each measure over
all respondents. For brevity only the best-performing acceptability index b1i is shown. All
measures make use of the relative rather than absolute performance levels i.e. relative
satisfaction, advertising recall, net number of positive attributes, and purchase intentions
have been used. This simply reflects a preference model in which purchase probabilities
are proportional to absolute levels of satisfaction, advertising recall, net number of pos-
itive attributes, or purchase intentions respectively, and is necessary for market shares
to sum to 100% at both an individual and aggregate level. The acceptability index is
an inherently relative quantity and so does not require any standardisation. Finally,
δ̄(tk) =
∑n











market share SoPi(tk) and predicted market share Ψi over all brands in each market.
Significant differences between these values and the values of δ̄(tk) obtained using the ac-
ceptability index are flagged using a single, double, or triple asterisk superscript to denote
significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively (the nonparametric Wilcoxin matched
pairs test was used for this purpose since distributions of market shares are strongly skewed
to the right).
Rank SoP(t0) SoP(t1) Sat AdR Dawes PI b1i
1 44.8% 52.4% 28.7% 16.9% 30.3% 34.1% 46.2%
2 17.0% 13.7% 16.8% 14.1% 14.9% 16.1% 17.9%
3 9.9% 9.4% 9.9% 19.8% 9.3% 10.3% 7.7%
4 7.0% 8.6% 4.4% 2.6% 3.6% 5.4% 4.5%
5 5.9% 6.5% 11.5% 4.2% 9.0% 9.3% 5.8%
δ̄(t0) 2.3% 4.4%∗∗∗ 2.4%∗∗∗ 1.6% 0.8%
δ̄(t1) 3.3% 5.2%∗∗∗ 3.2%∗∗ 2.5% 1.5%
Table 5.5: Associations between survey measures and overall market share for all brands
with market share greater than 5% in Dataset 1
Rank SoP(t0) SoP(t1) Sat AdR Dawes PI A
(1)
i
1 30.1% 27.6% 25.1% 21.1% 26.7% 24.7% 30.9%
2 19.2% 21.5% 11.7% 1.8% 13.7% 16.1% 15.3%
3 11.8% 11.0% 14.2% 9.7% 12.8% 13.6% 11.1%
4 10.0% 9.2% 13.9% 11.7% 12.9% 11.6% 10.6%
5 6.3% 7.7% 7.9% 10.2% 7.7% 7.3% 7.1%
6 6.0% 6.7% 5.3% 4.8% 5.6% 5.5% 5.6%
δ̄(t0) 2.4%∗∗ 5.4%∗∗∗ 1.7% 1.6% 1.1%
δ̄(t1) 2.5%∗ 5.3%∗∗∗ 1.8% 1.8% 1.5%
Table 5.6: Associations between survey measures and overall market share for all brands
with market share greater than 5% in Dataset 2
The first-rank SMAA acceptability index offers very accurate predictions of aggregate
relative purchase frequencies, particularly at t0 but also at t1. The average deviation be-
tween the market share predicted by the acceptability index and the actual market share
is smaller than any of the other measures, although the difference is only significant for
advertising recall and the relative net number of positive attributes (Dataset 1) and sat-
isfaction and advertising recall (Dataset 2). The former result is important because it
shows that the acceptability index is demonstrably superior to the simpler-to-implement
net count of the number of positive attributes. It is also noteworthy that in Dataset 1 only
the acceptability index is able to accurately predict the market share of the leading brand
for this market. The results in Table 5.5 and 5.6 provide a strong indication of the ability











in relation to other existing measures.
Having considered purchase behaviour in the aggregate, one can turn to the more difficult
task of modelling individual buying behaviour. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show correlations be-
tween each of the seven measures (three SMAA acceptability indices are now used, plus
the four other measures) and the shares of purchases allocated to each brand at t0 and t1,
for each market. Again, all measures use the relative rather than absolute performance
levels. Significance at the 5% and 0.5% level is denoted using a single and double asterisk
superscript respectively.





SoP(t0) Large 0.65∗∗ 0.08 0.62∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.57∗∗
Medium 0.78∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.50∗∗
Small 0.61∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.45∗∗
SoP(t1) Large 0.34∗∗ 0.03 0.42∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.39∗∗
Medium 0.63∗∗ 0.04 0.69∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.40∗∗
Small 0.15∗ 0.16∗ 0.16∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.43∗∗
Table 5.7: Associations between survey measures and share of purchases in Dataset 1





SoP(t0) Large 0.62∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.55∗∗
Medium 0.65∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.65∗∗
Small 0.70∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.56∗∗
SoP(t1) Large 0.34∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.30∗∗
Medium 0.33∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.37∗∗
Small 0.30∗∗ 0.09 0.34∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.28∗∗
Table 5.8: Associations between survey measures and share of purchases in Dataset 2
All acceptability indices are significantly related to relative purchase frequency at the
0.5% level at both t0 and t1, providing strong support in favour of the first research
hypothesis. With the exception of the small brand in Dataset 1 at t1, the strength of
association between purchase frequencies and the acceptability indices decreases as more of
the rank order is considered. In Dataset 1, the first-rank acceptability index shows a higher
correlation with relative purchase frequency at t0 than either the net number of positive
attributes or overall satisfaction for two of three brands, although all are markedly lower
than the correlations obtained using purchase intentions. At t1, correlations involving b1i
are again higher than the net number of positive attributes and overall satisfaction, this
time for all three brands and to a greater extent than at t0. The first-rank acceptability
index exhibits higher correlations with relative purchase frequencies at t1 than purchase











largely echo those obtained from the first. All acceptability indices are highly significantly
related to relative purchase frequency at both t0 and t1, with the strength of associations
declining as the number of ranks considered increases from one to three to five. Purchase
intentions are most strongly correlated with relative purchase frequency at t0 but not at t1,
where purchase intentions, the relative net number of positive attributes, and the first-rank
acceptability index are all roughly equally-strongly correlated with purchase frequency.
Associations between the acceptability index and defection behaviour
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the relationship between each of the seven measures and the
likelihood of defection, for each market respectively. In these tables, the absolute rather
than relative levels of satisfaction, advertisting recall, and net number of positive attributes
have been used. Within each brand, the first two rows give the average value of each
measure among non-defecting and defecting users respectively. The third row gives a
Z-statistic obtained from a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test for equality of means.
Results that are significant at the 5% level are superscripted with a single asterisk and
results that significant at the 0.5% level are superscripted with a double asterisk. The
fourth row shows the odds ratio (OR) associated with a logistic regression of defection on
each measure. The fifth and final row in each sub-table shows the Z-statistic associated
with each odds ratio, and is superscripted to denote statistical significance in the same
way as described above.





Large X̄Stay 181 8.28 0.33 7.83 0.82 0.65 0.81 0.84
brand X̄Defect 16 7.81 0.13 3.63 0.56 0.18 0.36 0.43
ZX̄ 1.87 1.70 4.10
∗∗ 3.80∗∗ 3.88∗∗ 3.95∗∗ 4.23∗∗
OR 0.73 0.29 0.71 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10
ZOR -1.65 -1.61 -4.13∗∗ -3.59∗∗ -3.59∗∗ -3.99∗∗ -3.85∗∗
Medium X̄Stay 36 8.58 0.50 6.50 0.83 0.42 0.67 0.71
brand X̄Defect 23 8.26 0.39 4.48 0.65 0.11 0.39 0.47
ZX̄ 0.48 0.81 2.11
∗ 2.74∗ 2.51∗ 2.28∗ 1.96∗
OR 0.61 0.64 0.84 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.32
ZOR -1.42 -0.82 -2.08∗ -2.36∗ -2.72∗ -2.30∗ -1.92
Small X̄Stay 14 7.79 0.14 5.36 0.73 0.18 0.39 0.47
brand X̄Defect 15 7.00 0.07 3.87 0.47 0.08 0.24 0.30
ZX̄ 1.24 0.66 1.19 2.61
∗ 1.22 0.92 0.95
OR 0.69 0.43 0.89 0.02 0.30 0.40 0.41
ZOR -1.31 -0.66 -1.08 -2.18∗ -0.87 -1.00 -1.02
Table 5.9: Associations between survey measures and defection behaviour in Dataset 1
The second research hypothesis, stating that probabilities of defection should be inversely
















Large X̄Stay 116 7.89 0.63 5.40 0.79 0.54 0.82 0.88
brand X̄Defect 39 4.79 0.46 2.95 0.30 0.17 0.52 0.55
ZX̄ 4.70
∗∗ 1.83 4.31∗∗ 6.60∗∗ 5.40∗∗ 2.87∗∗ 4.30∗∗
OR 0.63 0.5 0.74 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.14
ZOR -4.94∗∗ -1.83 -4.09∗∗ -6.17∗∗ -4.59∗∗ -3.93∗∗ -4.34∗∗
Medium X̄Stay 44 7.57 0.45 4.61 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.79
brand X̄Defect 34 3.26 0.50 1.56 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.29
ZX̄ 5.15
∗∗ -0.40 4.69∗∗ 5.92∗∗ 4.94∗∗ 4.64∗∗ 4.18∗∗
OR 0.56 1.2 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08
ZOR -4.05∗∗ 0.40 -3.81∗∗ -4.85∗∗ -3.43∗∗ -4.36∗∗ -4.32∗∗
Small X̄Stay 13 7.23 0.69 3.85 0.79 0.28 0.63 0.70
brand X̄Defect 14 1.71 0.57 1.29 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.25
ZX̄ 3.26
∗∗ 0.64 3.04∗∗ 4.23∗∗ 2.29∗ 2.47∗ 2.14∗
OR 0.56 0.59 0.70 0.001 0.19 0.07 0.10
ZOR -2.96∗∗ -0.65 -2.08∗ -2.92∗∗ -1.23 -2.44∗ -2.38∗
Table 5.10: Associations between survey measures and defection behaviour in Dataset 2
Dataset 1 and all three brands in Dataset 2 (although with some discrepancies in which
index is most significant). All relationships are in the hypothesised direction – average
acceptability indices for all brands are smaller among defecting users than among non-
defecting ones, and odds ratios are all less than one, indicating a reduced risk of defection
as the acceptability index increases. For example, the acceptability index b1i for the largest
brand in the market in Dataset 1 indicates that on average 65% of all preferences supported
the brand as ‘best’ among those who did not defect. In comparison just 18% of all
preferences supported the brand as best among those who defected within the next six
months. Similar results are obtained for the medium-sized brand. Odds ratios indicate
that those with acceptability indices around 0 (indicating a dominated alternative) are
around 20 times more likely to defect than those with acceptability indices around 1
(indicating a dominating alternative).
The SMAA acceptability index compares favourably with the other attitudinal equity
measures. In Dataset 1 overall satisfaction is non-significant for all three brands, the
Dawes measure is of roughly equal significance with the first-ranked acceptability index,
and purchase intentions are the only other measure showing a consistently significant
relationship with defection behaviour. In Dataset 2 overall satisfaction is significant for
all three brands, the Dawes measure is again of roughly equal significance with b1i , and











Associations between the acceptability index and changes in relative purchase
frequency
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show the partial correlations between the seven measures with relative
purchase frequencies at t1, after controlling for the effect of purchase share at t0. It is also
possible to test hypothesis 3 by regressing changes in purchase frequency i.e. SOP(t1) −
SOP(t0), on both relative purchase frequency at t0 and each of the predictive measures.
The conclusions to be drawn are the same using either analysis but the partial correlations
more concisely address the question of whether an association exists between a measure
and changes in relative purchase frequencies over time. As before, significance at the 5%
and 0.5% level is denoted using a single and double asterisk superscript respectively.





SoP(t1|t0) Large -0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.01 0.17∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.15∗
Medium -0.02 -0.21∗∗ 0.18∗∗ -0.01 0.29∗∗ 0.00 0.00
Small -0.16∗ 0.01 -0.19∗∗ -0.13∗ 0.06 0.27∗∗ 0.29∗∗
Table 5.11: Associations between survey measures and share of purchases in Dataset 1





SoP(t1|t0) Large -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.04
Medium -0.04 0.01 0.15∗∗ -0.04 0.15∗∗ 0.02 0.02
Small -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.17∗∗ 0.01 0.00
Table 5.12: Associations between survey measures and share of purchases in Dataset 2
The first-rank acceptability index is the only measure that exhibits reasonably consistent
significant correlations with changes in relative purchase frequencies over time. Although
correlations are not high, the correlations obtained with b1i are positive and significantly
different from zero at the 0.5% level for two of the three brands in both datasets. Corre-
lations for the two other acceptability indices are also significant in Dataset 1 for two of
the three brands. These correlations provide some support in favour of the third research
hypothesis, to the effect that changes in the relative purchase frequency are positively
related with the SMAA acceptability index. No other measure approaches a similar level
of consistent statistical significance. In Dataset 1, the net number of positive attributes is
highly significant for the medium-size brand and is significant but in the wrong direction
for the small brand. The correlations obtained using purchase intentions are either not
significant or in the wrong direction. In Dataset 2, the relative net number of positive












As a result of the two validation studies, the stakeholders in the market research company
were satisfied that a first-rank SMAA acceptability index using expected values was able to
give a measure of brand performance that correlated well with observed purchase behaviour
at the individual and aggregate (brand) level. The index has since been used in more than
10 further studies for several large client brands in South Africa, with representatives from
a number of product and service categories: consumer goods (McDonald’s, KFC), retail
(Pick ’n Pay), travel (South African Airways), and technology (MWeb).
5.7 Conclusions
It was clearly possible to employ various simplified uncertainty formats in practical de-
cision problems. In the first application, the inclusion of quantiles around the original
estimates of expected values was felt to add significant value to the analysis. Two al-
ternatives that were dominated at their mean values (and hence had no central weight
vectors) became relatively more attractive once quantiles were included. This provided a
richer set of electricity user “typologies”. The group also felt it was useful to be able to
assess the extent to which the attractiveness of options depend on the manner in which
they are applied. Media for options like the hotbox which are much more attractive at the
best-case quantile (which implies a ‘correct’ application, among other factors beyond the
control of the group) should be accompanied by greater educational material than those
options which give relatively similar performance over quantiles, for example.
In the second application it was shown that, although explicit risk measures like the vari-
ance and probability of poor performance were found in earlier chapters to lead to poorer
decisions than other uncertainty formats, in some application areas these measures are
the way in which uncertainty is most naturally expressed. This makes the point that al-
though the previous chapters suggest that facilitators should hold certain preconceptions
about uncertainty formats – particularly that quantiles are a good ‘default’ option – they
should certaintly be flexible enough to accommodate whatever types of uncertainty rep-
resentation seem most appropriate for a given decision maker and problem context. In
the third application, the choice of uncertainty format was essentially constrained to be
expected values by virtue of the data collection process. The use of expected values to
represent uncertain attribute evaluations is perhaps more common than is apparent from
the MCDA literature; even if not done explicitly, where uncertainty is perceived to be
limited in magnitude or resources are limited, there is surely a tendency to use expected
values. In this particular application, decision makers were satisfied enough with the use











In terms of difficulties, the assessment of quantiles in the first application did take some
time and was experienced as moderately difficult (although also useful as a learning pro-
cess). Although 5% and 95% quantiles were requested, the researcher did not feel that he
was able to deliver estimates to this level of precision, and preferred to think of evaluations
as “almost” worst- and best-case performances respectively. The interpretation of quantile
weights required some care, and the joint interpretation of attribute and quantile weights
i.e. of the wjk, was experienced as difficult. Instead, the decision maker found it easier
to interpret the attribute importance weights for each quantile (wj|k), and the quantile
weights (wqk), separately. Although no elicitation of weight information was performed,
the same difficulties and responses might be expected to apply there too. The evaluations
on the explicit risk attributes in the second application were assessed via a computer sim-
ulation model and no subjective information was required from the client. Central weight
vectors in the second application were therefore relatively straightforward – in that they
show only two (explicit risk) attributes – and were easily digested and found to convey
useful information.
One of the unintended features of the three applications is the use of a SMAA model.
The SMAA models address internal uncertainty, particularly uncertainty relating to the
preferences of the decision maker, by presenting information about the consequences of
particular preferences rather than by eliciting those preferences directly (the approach
taken by most MCDA methods). It may be that many of the conditions that suggest the
use of the SMAA approach for resolving internal uncertainty might also suggest the use
of a simplified format for resolving external uncertainty. In particular, all three of the
applications reported in this chapter were characterised by constraints on the time and
effort that stakeholders were willing to devote to the decision process. In such cases the
simplified SMAA models developed in Section 5.3 may be useful. Decision makers in all
applications found the acceptability indices (within quantiles in the first application, over-














In this final chapter I collect together the conclusions drawn in the previous three chapters
and state these as a number of findings and related recommendations for the support of
decisions involving uncertain attribute evaluations. The emphasis in doing so is on pro-
viding insights that are practical and general enough to be useful to facilitators and other
practitioners of decision analysis. Key findings are listed in bold below and elaborated on
in the text. The sources on which each finding is based (simulation experiment (Chapter
3), choice experiment (Chapter 4), or real-world application (Chapter 5); denoted S, C
and A respectively) are given in square brackets following the finding. Despite the different
methodological approaches used in the three chapters, where it has been possible to base
a finding on multiple approaches there is substantive agreement between the approaches.
Following the findings and recommendations, some questions for future research are listed.
6.1 Findings and recommendations
Finding 1a: The use of any of the simplified uncertainty formats considered in
this thesis (rather than probability distributions) can be justified. [S,C,A]
Finding 1b: Placing elements of simplified uncertainty formats (scenarios,
quantiles, variances and other explicit risk attributes) in the second level of
the objectives hierarchy can offer a useful uncertainty-orientated view of a
decision problem. [A]
Perhaps the most important message emerging from the simulation and choice experiment
results is that, given the time and effort required to implement a MAUT model, the use of
several simplified uncertainty formats can be justified from an accuracy-effort perspective.
Simulation results gave average utility losses for error-free simplified models of between
0.004 for quantiles and 0.03 for scenarios. In the choice experiment, even though choices
were artificial and made without facilitation the average utility loss ranged between 0.12











plified uncertainty formats except variances easier to use than probability distributions.
They also selected poorer alternatives using probability distributions than using any sim-
plified uncertainty format except expected values, suggesting real difficulty in correctly
employing probability information. Helping decision makers address this difficulty is part
of the responsibility of decision analysis, and a process of facilitation through the steps
of assessing, validating and using probabilities in a MAUT (or similar) model is almost
certainly the best way to do this. But sometimes it will simply not be possible to carry
out this process well. The applications in Chapter 5 illustrate decision problems where the
aim is to narrow down the set of potential alternatives to a smaller shortlist and decision
makers are unwilling to expend much time and effort in doing so, but these are by no
means the only possible reasons for preferring to use a simplified model. Results suggest
that it is better to correctly apply any of the simplified decision models than to apply a
probability-based model poorly.
This still leaves practitioners with considerable scope to use whatever model they feel is
least likely to be applied poorly. Other results (discussed in the next finding) suggest that
the largest determinant of decision accuracy is the extent to which assessment errors are
avoided. Practitioners should therefore primarily consider the knowledge and experience
of the decision makers they are facilitating, and choose a simplified uncertainty format
that they and the decision makers are comfortable working with.
Although not so much a finding as an observation based on past literature, considering
uncertainty elements (scenarios, quantiles, variances or other explicit risk attributes) in
the second level of the objectives hierarchy (rather than at the lowest level) imposes a quite
different but potentially useful view of uncertainty on MCDA. Uncertainty is not viewed
as something which must simply be aggregated over to provide a valid indicator of per-
formance, but as something that can be decomposed into elements in much the same way
that overall performance can be decomposed into attributes. In this view, assessments of
alternatives’ performances in each uncertainty element provide useful information in their
own right. This has an established history in scenario planning, but was also found to be
useful in the quantile models used in the electricity saving application reported in Chapter
5.
Finding 2a: Deviations from linearity in the marginal utility functions increase
the attractiveness of MAUT relative to all of the simplified models. [S]
Finding 2b: Increases in the size of a decision problem (number of alterna-
tives and attributes) increase the attractiveness of all of the simplified models











In various parts of this thesis the choice of whether to use a simplified model (and if so,
which model to use) has been viewed as a meta-choice problem in which decision quality
(accuracy), effort, and contribution to “learning” are the primary attributes. Some char-
acteristics of a decision problem may therefore serve to make certain decision models more
or less attractive relative to others by differentially affecting any of the three attributes.
The simulation results indicate that the approximation of MAUT provided by all the sim-
plified models deteriorates as marginal utility functions deviate from linearity. If it can
be assumed that the shape of the utility functions does not affect the relative amount
of effort required (or learning imparted) by any of the models, which seems reasonable,
then deviations from linearity act to increase the relative attractiveness of MAUT in the
meta-choice problem (note that this does not imply an absolute preference for MAUT over
any of the simplified models).
Similarly, the simulation results indicate that approximation accuracy (in the form of
utility loss) is almost unaffected by the number of alternatives and attributes present.
If it can be assumed that effort increases with problem size and that the MAUT model
is more sensitive to increases in problem size than any of the simplified models, then a
greater number of alternatives or attributes acts to increase the relative attractiveness of
all simplified models in the meta-choice problem (assuming relative amounts of “learning”
are unaffected by problem size). Increases in problem size will also favour those simplified
models requiring less effort per alternative or attribute than others, but not enough is
known to draw any firm conclusions here.
Finding 3a: Errors in the assessment of inputs to all simplified models cause
substantial deteriorations in model accuracy. [S]
Finding 3b: Quantile and scenario models are slightly more robust to assess-
ment errors than expected value and variance models. [S]
The simulation results indicate that avoiding errors when assessing an uncertainty for-
mat is more important to decision accuracy than any of the other experimental factors
(for the ranges of parameter values used), including which uncertainty format is used.
Practitioners must ensure that any uncertainty information is assessed as accurately as
possible. This is particularly true of models using expected values and explicit risk at-
tributes, which (under the assumption of random assessment errors) are more sensitive to
assessment errors than the scenario and quantiles models, which use a greater number of
inputs to measure risk and thus benefit to a greater extent from “error cancellation” [151].
Practitioners should therefore consider the likelihood of assessment errors when deciding











the assessment of a particular format (a) are less likely if the decision maker has prior
knowledge and experience of that format, (b) are more likely with variances or probabili-
ties than with expected values and quantiles (little is known about scenarios), and (c) are
more likely with more extreme quantiles. Some time ago Amos Tversky wrote of a need to
develop decision aids “more responsive to the complexities and limitations of the human
mind” [256]. The fact that errors are less likely using quantiles than variances and that
quantiles are more robust to errors than variances surely constitutes evidence in favour of
the former and against the latter. This is discussed further in the next two findings.
Finding 4: A model using quantiles is the most promising of the simplified
models and should be used as a ‘default’ option in the absence of other infor-
mation. [S,C,A]
Although one of the more important messages emerging from the results is that it is not
possible (because of circumstantial factors like decision maker experience which affect ease
of use and assessment error) to say that one uncertainty format is definitively “better”
than another, this does not imply that all uncertainty formats should be equally favoured
a priori by practitioners. The advocacy of quantiles is based on three results obtained in
this thesis. Firstly, the simulation results show that a quantile model gives the best ap-
proximation to MAUT. Secondly, the choice experiment results show that the same holds
in unfacilitated decision making, and also that quantiles were judged relatively easier to
use than probability distributions. Thirdly there is the fact that it was possible to apply
a SMAA model using quantiles and generate a successful outcome without any significant
problems. In addition, previous research has shown that quantiles can be assessed rela-
tively accurately by decision makers [102], and they are already a standard tool in decision
analysis (in the assessment of probability distributions e.g. [238]).
The results indicate that three quantiles are sufficient to obtain good results. The quantiles
included (in addition to the median, which appears standard) should not be as extreme
as minima and maxima, and the 5% and 95% quantiles were used with good results. Al-
though decision makers find the minima and maxima easier to work with they tend to lead
to lower accuracy, and the presence of the minima in particular can increase risk aversion
dramatically, as seen in the choice experiment. Some insight may be gained, as was the
case for the electricity saving application presented in Chapter 5, by viewing quantiles as
higher-level criteria situated in the second-tier of the objectives hierarchy (see Figure 2.2)
and allowing decision makers to evaluate and compare alternatives at their ‘worst-case’,
‘best-case’ and some ‘intermediate’ levels of performance. In aggregating performances
over quantiles, the simulation results showed that fidelity to MAUT is best served by us-











weight of 0.63 and the remainder is shared between the extreme quantiles. It is recom-
mended that these weights be used as ‘default’ values to be replaced only where it is clear
that the decision maker values performance in the quantiles differently.
Finding 5: A model using variances is the least promising of the simplified
models and should not be used unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
[S,C]
Again with the caveat that in a particular decision problem there may be circumstantial
reasons for favouring the use of variances, several of my (and others’) results suggest that
variances are a relatively poor option for representing uncertainty in decision analysis. The
simulation results showed that a model based on expected values and variances performed
no better than a model based on expected values alone, and was less robust to assessment
error than all models except the expected value model. The choice experiment also showed
that in multi-criteria decisions variances are both less accurate and more difficult to use
than quantiles, fuzzy numbers, and scenarios. Previous research indicates that variances
are difficult to interpret and assess numerically [102], and trade-offs involving variances
would appear considerably more difficult to reason about than trade-offs involving risk
measured on the same scale as the underlying attribute (e.g. quantiles, scenarios). The
latter difficulty can be avoided if variances are weighted using Kirkwood’s weights [150].
The simulation results indicated that a variance model using Kirkwood weights performed
much better than a variance model in which variance weights were a constant multiple
of attribute importance weights, but only very marginally better than an expected value
model. Taken together this suggests that variances should only be used (a) in conjunc-
tion with Kirkwood’s weights, (b) where there are compelling reasons to use variances
to represent uncertainty, and (c) where the conditions favouring the variance model over
an expected value model (approximately normally distributed attribute evaluations and
utility functions not deviating too much from linear [150]) are satisfied.
Finding 6: Scenarios result in relatively poor approximations of MAUT and
are primarily devices for helping decision makers to gain a better understand-
ing of the causes of uncertainty and their consequences. [S,C]
The simulation results indicate that scenario-based models only give approximations of
MAUT that are comparable with models using other uncertainty formats under quite
specific requirements for the construction of scenarios – a large proportion of the possible
futures must be captured; and in each scenario the average performance of each alternative
in that scenario must be assessed. These requirements, which ensure that expectations
(over scenarios) approximate expected attribute values, were fulfilled by construction in











philosophy of scenario planning, which often advocates constructing a small number of
extreme scenarios without regard for any implications for later aggregation.
This leaves two options for scenario-based MCDA. Either scenario construction can ig-
nore established conventions and proceed along the lines just described, or scenario plan-
ning principles can be integrated with MCDA while acknowledging that approximating
expected utility is not of great importance for the decision process. The latter is recom-
mended on the basis that it seems far more likely to be accepted by most decision makers.
Scenario planning is already established as a popular method in areas of strategic decision
making where MCDA could possibly be applied. The onus would probably be viewed
as being on MCDA to integrate scenario planning principles rather than the other way
around, and failing to do so may alienate many users of scenario planning from MCDA. In-
creasing the importance of “learning” about uncertainty at the expense of the importance
accorded to approximating expected utility is unlikely to be viewed as untenable by users
of scenario planning, which was originally developed by changing the goal of forecasting
from ‘approximating expected value’ to ‘learning and contingency planning’.
Once scenarios have been constructed, the choice experiment as well as applications in the
literature [197] indicate that decision makers are able to work and reason with these, so
that decision maker learning about preferences is unlikely to suffer from the use of scenar-
ios. The main expected benefit then, is a greater understanding of the underlying causes
and consequences of uncertainty (this is well-established in the literature [260], but has
not been tested in this thesis); it is the importance accorded to this benefit which should
largely determine whether scenarios are used.
6.2 Questions for future research
Much work has been done on how people assess and reason about uncertain outcomes, and
on how they assess and reason about conflicting objectives, but much less is known about
how these two elements interact with one another. This thesis has attempted largely ex-
ploratory work on this interaction, mainly from the perspective of controlled experimental
tests rather than real-world case studies. This leaves much for future research. Some of
those questions that appear more important or immediate are listed below. Methodolo-
gies which might prove useful in investigating each question are given in square brackets
following each question (again using S, C and A to denote simulation experiments, choice
experiments, and real-world applications respectively).
Question 1a: Which uncertainty formats do decision makers find easier to use











Question 1b: Which uncertainty formats do decision makers perceive as help-
ing them to make better decisions in real-world prescriptive decision problems?
[A]
Assessing individual case studies, even in an action-research mode, brings its own com-
plications, but an important task is to systematically evaluate the simplified models in
‘traditional’ real-world MCDA problems. This would allow one to (a) assess the ease with
which decision makers make trade-off assessments when different uncertainty formats are
used, (b) possibly disconfirm the observations drawn from controlled environments in this
thesis, (c) assess the extent to which using more concise summaries of uncertainty than
probability distributions affects decision makers’ belief in the process.
Question 2: Does uncertainty format and the number of objectives used inter-
act to affect decision accuracy if more objectives are used? [C,A]
The amount of information made available to the decision maker (and hence uncertainty
formats) affects accuracy both by placing different cognitive ‘loads’ on decision makers and
by obscuring important information (in the case of the simplified uncertainty formats).
The choice experiment in Chapter 4 indicated no interaction effect between uncertainty
format and the number of objectives used, suggesting that whatever the difference between
the ‘load’ and ‘information loss’ for a particular model, these differences are constant over
objectives for all models. If this holds for any number of objectives it is a important result,
since it implies that no model becomes relatively more or less favoured (from an accuracy
perspective) as the number of objectives increases.
Question 3a: How often do preferences (utility functions, importance weights)
differ over uncertainty elements (particularly scenarios and quantiles)? [A]
Question 3b: Where preferences do differ over uncertainty elements, is it
better to assess alternative-uncertainty element ‘meta-alternatives’ over at-
tributes or to assess alternatives over attribute-uncertainty element ‘meta-
attributes’? [A]
One of the more intriguing possibilities arising from the use of simplified models is the pos-
sibility of allowing preferences to vary over elements of uncertainty (scenarios, quantiles,
means and variances or other explicit risk attributes). There is now some evidence (in
[197] and the first application of Chapter 5) that this may be of benefit in some decision
problems. It remains an open question how often preferences differ over uncertainty ele-
ments and how preferences should be elicited where they do differ. Montibeller [197] has












Question 4: Do the same results found in this thesis extend to other schools
of MCDA (particularly outranking and reference point methods)? [S,C,A]
All models and results in this thesis are based upon value function methods. It is possible
that at least some of the conclusions drawn might differ if other schools of MCDA are used.
Although because of the lack of an axiomatic foundation in other schools of MCDA, it is
usually necessary to choose one or other model as “ideal”, the same mixture of simulation,
choice experiment and real-world application could be applied quite easily to assess any














A.1 Equivalence of quantile and fuzzy decision models




ij ) denote the evaluation of the utility of alternative ai using
quantile qk, so that the fuzzy global utility Ũi can also be written as the triangular fuzzy




i ] using (3.4). In the ranking method employed in [56], a discrete
number of α-cuts of Ũi are taken, and at each α-cut the two values of Ũi at which Ũi = α
are evaluated and used in the final crisp evaluation of ai given by (3.5). Figure A.1 gives
a graphical illustration of this approach for α ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The contribution





















Uαi = (1−Θ)li3 + Θri3
Uαi = (1−Θ)li2 + Θri2






Figure A.1: Illustration of computations performed by fuzzy decision model
Figure A.1 shows how any value of Ui in the support of Ũi (and thus any values that lin











three quantiles i.e. U (q1)i , U
(q2)
i , and U
(q3)






































Note that this equivalence only holds for the fuzzy decision model as it is defined here,
and when triangular membership functions involving quantiles are used. Also note that
in this case results are independent of the number of α-cuts used, N , and that the weight
attached to the intermediate quantile is constrained to be equal to the sum of the other two
weights (so that Keefer-Bodily or equal quantile weights, for example, are not possible).
The formulation also suggests that the parameter Θ should not be interpreted as an index
of “optimism” (as it is in [56]) but as an indication of the relative importance of differences














B.1 Documents given to study participants
Documents are shown on the following pages for one of the decision problems involving
two objectives. The material comprises:
• An introduction to the problem, a summary of uncertainty formats, and survey
questions to be answered following each task
• Attribute information for the decision problem











Thank you for participating in this study on decision making.  
 
You will be required to make a number of investment decisions. The context of the decision, 
described below, will be the same for all the decisions. However, some aspects of the decision, 
like the number of investment objectives and the actual investment returns, will change from 
decision to decision.  
 
Please carefully consider all information and make the best possible choice that you can, given 
the available information. You will have 4 minutes for each decision, and there are 12 decisions 




A good friend of yours has received a bequest of £100 000 from a recently deceased relative. He 
wishes to invest the money, but knows nothing about the financial market. He has therefore asked 
you to invest the money for him. Depending on the problem, there may be one, two, or three 
investment objectives. Your friend has stated these to you as follows. 
 
•  OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
• OBJECTIVE 3: “After 6 years, I want to take all the money and use it to buy a house”. 
 
In addition, your friend has also told you: 
 
• “Please put all my money into a single investment. I don’t want to have to keep track of 
more than this”. 
• “Buying a house is more important to me than the holiday or the car, of course. The car 
and the holiday are about equally important”.   
 
After some discussion with your friend you agree that the house is roughly twice as important as 











In this choice, there are TWO OBJECTIVES to consider and FIVE INVESTMENTS to 
choose from. 
 
• OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
 
Information in the form of SCENARIO ASSESSMENTS has been prepared by experts 
for you to consider in making your decision. Remember that each of these scenarios is 
considered equally likely to occur, but that it is also possible that none of the scenarios 
unfold exactly as predicted. See the attached note again if you are unfamiliar with the 
concept of scenarios. 
 
Brief descriptions of each scenario are given below: 
 
The “Eastern Growth” Scenario: In this scenario, countries in the Middle and Far East 
grow more rapidly in economic strength than the West (in particular, US and Europe). 
This growth, together with political stability, leads to good performance for investments 
with greater ties to the East.   
 
The “Nothing Changes” Scenario: In this scenario, economic and political conditions 
remain relatively constant at their 2008 levels, for all major countries in which 
investments are held. The growth shown by China and India continues, but at a slower 
rate than previous experienced.   
 
The “Problematic World” Scenario: In this scenario, some major economic shocks are 
experienced in several countries worldwide. Rising food prices leads to political 
instability in some of these countries. However, not all investments are affected and 











Investment performance in the “Eastern Growth” (EG) scenario 
 
Investment Amount available for 
holiday in EG scenario 
Amount available for 
car in EG scenario 
A  £      7,667   £      3,732  
B  £      8,093   £      2,566  
C  £      2,151   £      8,485  
D  £      1,806   £      8,583  















































Investment performance in the “Nothing Changes” (NC) scenario 
 
Investment Amount available for 
holiday in NC scenario 
Amount available for 
car in NC scenario 
A  £      7,469   £      4,139  
B  £      6,484   £      5,622  
C  £      8,376   £         979  
D  £      1,193   £      8,723  














































Investment performance in the “Problematic World” (PW) scenario 
 
Investment Amount available for 
holiday in PW scenario 
Amount available for 
car in PW scenario 
A  £      5,375   £      6,740  
B  £      5,469   £      6,659  
C  £      5,902   £      6,258  
D  £      3,265   £      8,066  
















































In this choice, there are TWO OBJECTIVES to consider and FIVE INVESTMENTS to 
choose from. 
 
• OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
 
Information in the form of QUANTILES has been prepared by experts for you to 
consider in making your decision. See the attached note if you are unfamiliar with the 
concept of quantiles. 
 
On the next page, the information is presented for you in both numerical and graphical 
formats. In the graph, each line represents one of the investments, with the monetary 




























Inv. 1  £4,771  £5,793  £7,213  £7,755  £8,254 
Inv. 2  £4,615  £5,880  £6,503  £7,904  £8,409 
Inv. 3  £1,888  £2,346  £5,866  £7,905  £8,923 
Inv. 4  £892  £1,337  £1,822  £2,901  £3,718 
Inv. 5  £174  £295  £5,236  £6,941  £7,786 
5% quan. 25% quan. 50% quan. 75% quan. 95% quan.
 
 

















Inv. 1  £3,278  £3,740  £4,144  £6,517  £6,896 
Inv. 2  £1,894  £3,073  £5,571  £6,533  £6,919 
Inv. 3  £478  £1,295  £6,205  £8,411  £8,601 
Inv. 4  £8,003  £8,073  £8,310  £8,809  £9,370 
Inv. 5  £4,385  £4,517  £6,877  £8,500  £9,344 












In this choice, there are TWO OBJECTIVES to consider and FIVE INVESTMENTS to 
choose from. 
 
• OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
 
Information in the form of PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS has been prepared by 
experts for you to consider in making your decision. Read the attached note again if you 
are unfamiliar with the concept of probabilities. 
 
On the next page, the information is presented for you in graphical format. The graphs 
are histograms, showing the probability that an investment returns amounts lying between 
certain intervals. On the X-axis, the investment returns have been divided into 10 
intervals of £1000 each (£0 - £1000, £1000 - £2000, etc). The Y-axis specifies the 
probability that the investment return will lie within each of the given intervals. 
Important note: graphs in the same column all refer to the same investment. Graphs in 



































































































































































































































































































































































































In this choice, there are TWO OBJECTIVES to consider and FIVE INVESTMENTS to 
choose from. 
 
• OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
 
Information in the form of FUZZY NUMBERS has been prepared by experts for you to 
consider in making your decision. Read the attached note again if you are unfamiliar with 
the concept of fuzzy numbers. 
 
On the next 2 pages, the information is presented for you in both numerical and graphical 
formats. The tables show three values, for each investment: 
1. The minimum investment return that is considered possible. 
2. The median investment return, which is considered to be “most representative” of 
the set of possible investment returns. 
3. The maximum investment return that is considered possible 
Note that there is one table for each attribute. The graphs simply plot the three values in 
the table for each investment, with linear interpolation being applied between the three 
values. All amounts are shown in pounds (£). Important note: graphs in the same 














Fuzzy investment returns for “Amount available for holiday” 
 
Investment Minimum amount 
possible 




1  $   4,266   $   7,213   $     8,596  
2  $   3,918   $   6,503   $     8,735  
3  $   1,292   $   5,866   $   10,000  
4  $      501   $   1,822   $     4,206  




Fuzzy investment returns for “Amount available for car” 
 
Investment Minimum amount 
possible 




1  $   2,802   $   4,144   $     7,555  
2  $   1,088   $   5,571   $     7,209  
3  $         0     $   6,205   $     8,847  
4  $   7,300   $   8,310   $     9,978  




































































































































































































































































































































































































In this choice, there are TWO OBJECTIVES to consider and FIVE INVESTMENTS to 
choose from. 
 
• OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
 
Information in the form of EXPECTED VALUES has been prepared by experts for you 
to consider in making your decision. Remember that these are only expected values and 
not the amount your friend will receive for sure (see the attached note if you are 
unfamiliar with the concept of expected value). 
 
On the next page, the information is presented for you in both numerical and graphical 
formats. In the graph, each line represents one of the investments, with the expected 













Investment Expected amount 
available for holiday 
Expected amount 
available for car 
1 £6,818 £4,855 
2 £6,675 £4,949 
3 £5,467 £5,233 
4 £2,094 £8,479 














































In this choice, there are TWO OBJECTIVES to consider and FIVE INVESTMENTS to 
choose from. 
 
• OBJECTIVE 1: “After 1 year, I’m going to take out all the profit made in that time and 
take my wife on a holiday. The more money, the better the holiday we’ll take”. 
• OBJECTIVE 2: “After 2 years, I’m going to take out all the profit again and buy a car. I 
think I’ll need at least £4000 to get any kind of decent car. Anything less than that and all 
I’ll be able to get is a piece of junk”.  
 
Information in the form of EXPECTED VALUES and STANDARD DEVIATIONS has 
been prepared by experts for you to consider in making your decision. Remember that the 
expected values are only expected and not the amount your friend will receive for sure 
(see the attached note if you are unfamiliar with the concept of expected value). 
 
On the next page, the expected values and standard deviations are presented for you in 
the form of a table. In addition, the expected values are shown in a graph below the 
tables. In the graph, each line represents one of the investments, with the expected values 
plotted on the vertical (Y) axis. Important note: the graph only shows the expected 












Investment Expected amount 
available for holiday 
Risk (standard 
deviation) 
1 £6,818 £1,165 
2 £6,675 £1,212 
3 £5,467 £2,607 
4 £2,094 £951 
5 £4,258 £2,992 
 
Investment Expected amount 
available for car 
Risk (standard 
deviation) 
1 £4,855 £1,426 
2 £4,949 £1,839 
3 £5,233 £3,214 
4 £8,479 £518 













































TO BE ANSWERED AT THE END OF THE TASK 
 
Please answer the following four questions.  
 
 
• When there was ONE objective, which way of presenting uncertainty made it easier 






There was no 
difference 
 
• When there was ONE objective, which way of presenting uncertainty do you think 






There was no 
difference 
 
• When there were TWO objectives, which way of presenting uncertainty made it easier 






There was no 
difference 
 
• When there were TWO objectives, which way of presenting uncertainty do you think 


















B.2 Decision models used
In the following, alternatives are denoted by ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, and attributes by cj ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. The (stochastic) attribute evaluation of ai on cj is denoted by Zij , and
uj(Zij) are marginal utility functions.
B.2.1 Additive MAUT model
The evaluation of ai is given by Ui =
∑J
j=1wjE[uj(Zij)] where Ui is the expected utility of
alternative ai and wj is an attribute importance weight indicating the relative importance
of a one-unit change in attribute cj [e.g. 31].
B.2.2 Expected values









B.2.3 Expected values and standard deviations








− wRijσ2ij , where σ2ij is the
variance of Zij and wRij is a ‘risk’ weight for σ
2
ij . Risk weights are not specified by the
problem description, so it is not possible to identify idealised weights. In calculating utility
loss relative to an idealised application of standard deviations, I use eight different risk
weights, wRij ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and select the minimum utility loss obtained i.e.
the utility loss showing the decision maker in the most favourable light.
B.2.4 Quantiles








ij )], where qk refers
to a specific quantile, z(qk)ij is the qk-th quantile of Zij , wqk denotes the weight associated
with quantile qk, and Nq is the number of quantiles used. I use five quantiles i.e. Nq = 5,
q = (0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95); and equal weights for each quantile i.e. wq = 1/Nq.
B.2.5 Three-point approximations/fuzzy numbers




















the minimum, median, and maximum of Zij respectively. These evaluations can be ranked
by any number of fuzzy ranking procedures – this chapter employs an approach based on
left and right dominance [56], which is itself a generalization of the area compensation
approach in [99]. A final crisp score on which the alternatives can be unambiguously




n=0 rin + (1 − Θ)
∑N
n=0 lin] where rin and lin are
the upper and lower limits of the nth α-cut of the fuzzy number Ũi (so-called right- and











α-cuts used are given by αŨ = n/N for n = {0, 1, . . . ,N}. I use N = 6 on the basis of
results in [56] indicating little change in results beyond this value, and an equal weighting
for right- and left-dominance i.e. Θ = 0.5, although conclusions are not sensitive to choices
of either parameter.
B.2.6 Scenarios






j=1wjuj(µijk)] where sk refers to
a specific scenario, µijk is the mean evaluation of alternative ai on attribute cj in broad
future k, wsk is the weight associated with scenario sk, and Ns is the number of scenarios
used. I use three scenarios i.e. Ns = 3, and equal scenario weights i.e. wsk = 1/Ns.
B.3 Utility function parameters used









for τj < x ≤ 1
with parameters given in Table B.1.
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3
Set τ1 λ1 α1 β1 τ2 λ2 α2 β2 τ3 λ3 α3 β3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 90 0 0.002 0
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 4 2 90 0 4 2
3 0 0 8 4 0 0 8 4 90 0 8 4
4 0 0 12 6 0 0 32 16 90 0 12 6
5 0 0 0 0 4 0.9 0.002 0 90 0 0.002 0
6 0 0 4 2 4 0.9 4 2 90 0 4 2
7 0 0 8 4 4 0.9 8 4 90 0 8 4
8 0 0 12 6 4 0.9 32 16 90 0 12 6
9 0 0 0 0 4 0.9 0.002 0 100 0.6 0.002 0
10 0 0 4 2 4 0.9 4 2 100 0.6 4 2
11 0 0 8 4 4 0.9 8 4 100 0.6 8 4
12 0 0 12 6 4 0.9 32 16 100 0.6 12 6
Table B.1: Parameter estimates for utility functions used to compute utility loss. Reference
point values (τj) are given in thousands of pounds.











(a) Set 1 (b) Set 2
(c) Set 3 (d) Set 4
(e) Set 5 (f) Set 6
Figure B.1: Estimates of the effects of uncertainty format on accuracy using different











(g) Set 7 (h) Set 8
(i) Set 9 (j) Set 10
(k) Set 11 (l) Set 12
Figure B.1: Estimates of the effects of uncertainty format on accuracy using different
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